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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to trace the origins of
the Quebec separatist movement and to place the movement
in the context of Canadian history from 1763 to 1983*
The study concentrates on five principal aspects of
Quebec separatism, 1) The culture and world-view of French
Canadians during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries?
2) the origin and development of French Canadian nationalism;
3) French Canadian expectations concerning federalism, and
how the Canadian federal system has responded to the demands
placed upon it by the separatist movement; 4) the debate
between Pierre Trudeau and Rene Levesque concerning the
advantages and disadvantages of a separate state of Quebec;
and 5) the rise of the Parti Quebe^ois in the context of
twentieth century separatist parties.
The study places heavy emphasis on historical developments
in the belief that the Quebec separatist movement can best be
understood in the perspective of time and by the analytical
possibilities it offers. The study is based on the assumption
that the American reader lacks a clear understanding of the
forces which have shaped Canada--particularly French Canada—
and that only by examining current events in an historical
context can a thorough comprehension of Canada's present
dilemma be reached.
It is suggested that the primary goal of French Canadians
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the

survival of their language and culture through isolation. It
is also suggested that, in modern times, the nationalism of
survival changed to an aggressive and outward-turning
nationalism that sought to protect French Canadian language
and cultural rights not only in Quebec, but nationwide.
It concludes that the Parti Quebecois is the latest
manifestation of modern Quebec nationalism, and that the
party seeks to secure French Canadian rights through the
threat of the secession of Quebec if such rights cannot be
achieved within the Canadian federation.

QUEBEC NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM
A Study of a Continuing Canadian Crisis

INTRODUCTION
On a state visit to Canada in 1967 * French President
Charles De Gaulle stepped on the balcony of the Montreal
/

City Hall.” Vivre le Quebec! h e

proclaimed, "Vivre le

Quebec libre.”^
De Gaulle’s choice of words to end the speech had done
more than excite a cheering crowd of enthusiastic French
Canadian well-wishers. His use of a separatist slogan spar
ked consternation in governmental circles in Ottawa, and
many believed his visit would only foment a rising tide of
separatist sentiment that called for the establishment of an
independent Quebec. Nonetheless, while his speech angered
some officials, and Prime Minister Pearson cut short De
Gaulle’s visit, no one was expecting an immediate fulfillment
of his prophecy. Indeed, in subsequent elections in 1970 and
I9 7 3 » separatists made a poor showing; if anything, people
felt, demands for Quebec's independence had subsided.
Nine years later, however, "Vivre le Quebec libre"
would again be heard throughout Montreal and the rest of
1

Peter C. Newman, A Nation Dividedt Canada and the Com
ing of Pierre Trudeau ( New York: Alfred K„ Knopf, 1969), n.
A28.

2

3
La Belle Province, but this time not as a far-fetched, roman
tic notion. The new Parti Quebecois, under the able leader
ship of Rene* Levesque, had gained in stature. On November
15» 1976, it defeated the Liberal Government of Robert
Bourassa by winning 7i seats in the 110 seat provincial par
l i a m e n t ^ percent of the popular vote), a stunning upset
which took the country by surprise.
Prior to the election, P.Q. leader Levesque had announ
ced the intentions of his party: to establish an independent
»»

Quebec, based on the principles of "sovereignty-association*,
Although Levesque had no detailed manifesto of exactly what
"sovereignty-association” entailed, he said that he envis^*
ioned a state that would be autonomous in all respects—
political, social,,and cultural— while retaining certain
economic ties with the rest of Canada such as a common cur
rency, certain defense ties, and trade relations based on the
pattern of the European Common Marketc
Levesque had stated that the implementation of "sovereignty-association” would take place after he had achieved
a consensus of the Quebec electorate. He declared, therefore,
that within five years of his election to power, he would
place a referendum before the people which would decide the
issue of Quebec's independence from the rest of Canada.

During the interim period between the election of the
P.Q. and the referendum of I98O, separatists and federalists
waged an intense battle in the province to win the; support
of Quebec's electorate. Separatists argued that the time had
long passed when Quebec's economic and social life should be
controlled by a minority of English-speaking people. Federal
ists argued with equal fervor that to separate from Canada
in the fashion described by Levesque would bring about tremen
dous economic hardships in the province that neither the
government nor the French-speaking business community was pre
pared to handle. The Quebec legislature, under P.Q. leader
ship, tested the waters by passing various pieces of legis
lation designed to ensure the use of the French language in
schools and businesses in Quebec. It required that all per-*
sons coming to live in Quebec send their children to Frenchspeaking schools; it mandated that companies operating in
Quebec be able to communicate with their employees and the
public-

in French or be fined. Further, companies were given

until 1983 to meet the requirements s 1) that executives and
personnel have a satisfactory knowledge of French; 2) that
the number of French-speaking personnel at all levels be in
creased; and 3 ) that French be used in all

documents and in

ternal communication. It authorized the establishment of a

French language office to see that regulations were carried
out and enforced.
English Canadians in Quebec reacted sharply to the
measures. Prime Minister Trudeau termed the legislation "un
acceptable" and a violation of the "human rights" of Englishspeaking Canadians. As a practical politician, Trudeau
realized that he would have to negotiate a compromise with
the separatists if he wanted to keep the confederation in
tact. Declaring in an address before Parliament that his
government was willing to consider constitutional changes
to advance the cultural aspirations of the disaffected
French-speaking minority, he announced the formation of a
new governmental group to be called the Task Force on
Canadian Unity, and declared that to save Quebec and halt
the developing rift between the two language groups, Englishspeaking Canadians must become reconciled to more French in
their lives. He urged Quebeckers to forsake the unilingualism
of the PQ and to accept the argument for a truly bilingual
Canada.
Importantly, for the first time, Trudeau acknowledged a
willingness to face the constitutional issue. "I
cannot emphasize strongly enough," he said, "that the ques
tion of unity is not

confined to the issues of language nor

confined geographically to the province of Quebec." He lis
ted numerous dissatisfactions in other provinces, such as
the feelings of westerners that their interests were under
represented in a central government dominated by more pop
ulous Ontario and Quebec, and the unhappiness of the once
prosperous eastern provinces over their economic imbalance
with the more affluent central and western areas. As a
temporary concession, Trudeau announced that the govern
ment would be willing to allow the Parti Quebecois to go
ahead with its proposed provincial language legislation
because of what Secretary of State Roberts called the " in
security of French Canadians about the future of their
3
language in an overwhelmingly English-speaking country."
Levesque's initial victories proved chimerical, however.
The Supreme Court of Canada, by an overwhelming majority, de
clared unconstitutional language Bill 101, which had made
French the exclusive language in Quebec. Levesque's hopedfor referendum victory oh the "sovereignty-associationY pro
posal was also defeated by a wide margin in 1981, leaving
the future of the Parti Quebegois and its drive for an
"associate state" in doubt.
Hypotheses. Aims and Methods
In 1977» when this'thesis was conceived, I hypothesized
2

Robert Trumbull, "Trudeau Willing to Consider Aid
For Canada's Language Minorities," The New York Times. Julv 7
1977, p. A3.
--------- — :------*
3m
"Ottawa Yields to Quebec on Language Temporarity,”
The New York Times. June 23, 1977, p. All.
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that the P.Q.’s election would lead, inevitably, to a separ
ate nation of Quebec. Time and circumstances have eclipsed
that hypothesis, and I am forced to conclude with Eric L.
McKitrick that "nothing is more suceptible to oblivion than
an argument, however ingenious, that has been discredited by
events."

This being the case, it will be necessary to re

view the development of French Canadian separatism in the
context of more recent history.
Much has happened in the last six years to warrant fur
ther study concerning the reasons for the P.Q.*s initial vic
tory and the causes for its subsequent defeat on the referen
dum 1issueyoTo the changes in the political climate which
brought about the decline of support for the P.Q.®s drive
for "sovereignty-association" one must add the fact that
Canada*s constitution, since I867 subject to the approval
of the English Parliament concerning its amendment process,
has now been

patriated, leaving constitutional amendment

exclusively in Canadian hands. This certainly must rank as
the major political change in French Canadian/English Canadian
relations to take place in over a century. One must also
question the role of the French Canadian Prime Minister,
Pierre Trudeau, who has been in power longer than any other
Prime Minister in Canadian history, in shaping the federal
response to the separatist challenge. What factors were

8
responsible for Trudeau's decision to

patriate the con

stitution? Have the constitution's new provisions concer
ning the entrenchment of French Canadian culture and lin
guistic rights done anything to assuage French Canadians'
dissatisfaction! with the current state of their minority
position? What can be expected of English Canadians in terms
of their willingness to give French Canadians a larger role
in Canadian affairs in general, one not relegated to Quebec
alone? Will there be a greater effort on the part of English
Canadians toward wider use of the French language throughout
Canada and to incorporate French in business and government
outside the province of Quebec? These are questions which may
not be fully answered for some time to come and, with the
exception of Trudeau's motivation for constitutional reform,*
will not be attempted in this thesis.
What will be attempted in this thesis is an examination
of French Canada's role in the Canadian federation and the
efforts English and French Canadians have made to seek
accommodation over the years. It will attempt to examine not
only the major issues that have come to the fore in English
Canadian/French Canadian relations in recent decades, but
also the structures and patterns within which accommodation
has been sought— if not always achieved.

9
Chapter 1 will survey the background of the Frenchspeaking population in Canada and the subsequent conquest
of French Canada by the British. It will examine the sources
of conflict between the two groups and how the groups
achieved a modus vivendi despite strident— and often
violent— confrontations .
Chapter 2 will explore the origins of French Canadian
nationalism, its form and content, style and purposes,
methods and leadership. It will attempt to show how the
above-mentioned elements have changed over time to ac
commodate new circumstances and different strategies and
goals. It will hold as its central theme that the tactics
of French Canadian nationalism have fundamentally changed
from violent confrontation to political action

or, in

other words, the abandonment of revolutionary nationalism
for ballot-box change. It will trace this development
from'the eighteenth century, through the separatist parties
of the 1950*s and 6 0 8s and will conclude by looking at the
/
current status of the separatist Parti Quebecois.
Chapter 3 will -ffocus on the constitution and the federal
process in Canada. Specifically, the chapter will concentrate
on the reasons for Quebec®s entry into the confederation; the
degree of French Canadian support for the concept of federal
ism; the specific provisions of the

constitution that are

sources of dissatisfaction to French Canadians; the question
of repatriation of the constitution and the entrenchment of
French Canadian rights.

10

The chapter will include a section on specific weak
nesses of the constitution that have been the focus of
academic discussion and debate among English and French
Canadians alike. It will develop the hypothesis that
the "consociational" model is the most useful in explaining
how a nation such as Canada, with strong cultural cleavages,
has managed to accommodate the factionalism inherent in
societies where ethnic, linguistic and religious differences
prevail. In addition, the thesis will attempt to show that
the consociational pattern of accommodation, which prevailed
in the past, has begun to break down in the wake of a change
of leadership in Quebec.
Finally, the chapter will attempt to analyze the pro
visions of the new constitution, specifically, those dealing
with the entrenchment of French Canadian language and cul
tural rights.
Chapter ^ will explore the underpinnings of separatist
philosophy, examine the origins of separatist parties in
Quebec during the twentieth century, and survey the evolu
tion of separatist methods— both revolutionary and electoral—
and trace their development up to the victory of the Parti
Quebecois in 1976.
Chapter 5 will examine closely the two major protagon
ists of the current Quebec debates Pierre Trudeau and Rene
Levesque. Specifically, it will address the fundamental
issues of Trudeau's concept of federalism and Levesque's

11

separatism. This debate has been going on since the 1960’s
and is the backdrop of everything that has occurred in the
1970's and 80's. In addition, it will draw on the ideas ex
pressed by each man concerning his vision of what French
Canada is and what each expects it to be. It will trace the
development of each m a n ’s personality and the factors which
have shaped the world-view of each.
Chapter 6 will deal with recent events in Quebec since
the P.Q. victory in 1976, It will examine the sources of
P.Q. support in 1976, the measures taken by the P.Q. in
the areas of language rights, education, business regulation
and public policy. It will attempt to explore the reasons
behind the P.Q.'s loss on the sovereignty-association issue,
and the prospects for the future of the P.Q. in light of
the referendum defeat.
Finally, chapter 7 will draw some general conclusions
concerning the future of French Canadian nationalism, the
prospects for Canadian federalism, the conflict between
Trudeau and Levesque, and the obstacles facing both Levesque
and the P.Q. concerning Quebec independence.

CHAPTER I
QUEBEC AND THE FRENCH CANADIANS
THE SEEDS OF A SEPARATE STATE
The Land
The geography of Quebec provides an immediate introduc
tion to the idea of an independent state. With its enor
mous size and its very distinct boundaries, it is not
difficult for one to think of Quebec as a separate nation,
Quebec is the largest Canadian province; it covers ap
proximately 600,000 square miles--fifteen percent of the
total land area of Canada. Further, it is separated from
both the United States and the rest of Canada almost en
tirely by water (especially if its boundary with Labrador
is ignored, as it is on Quebec's official maps). Hudson Bay
borders it on the west, Hudson Straight and the Atlantic
Ocean on the north, the Gulf of St. Lawrence on the east,
1
and the Ottawa and St, Lawrence Rivers on the south.
Quebec's internal geography is also of primary importance

1
Jay and Audrv W a l z , Portrait of Canada (New York;
American Heritage Press, 197077 P* 170•

12

13
/
because it proved to be a source of division for the Quebegoi s: it first precluded rapid economic growth, then its
most promising areas came under the control of the English
rather than the French. Essentially, Quebec can be divided
into three regions running northeast to southwest. On the
southern extreme is the St. Lawrence Valley, a fertile
agricultural area that is the center of the densest pop
ulation. Directly north are two mountain ranges, the
Laurentians and the Appalachians, that would effectively
keep the Quebec populiiation along the St. Lawrence. Though
not impassable, they did discourage-emigration
out of the semi-fertile valleys until it was necessitated
2
by overcrowding. Furthest north is the tundra-like region
that has some economic value in its mineral resources but
which even today remains practically uninhabitable( under
two people per square mile). Thus it was that during the
early history of Quebec, population was concentrated along
the only navigable waterway where settlement was relatively
easy— the St. Lawrence.
The People
The French colonial presence began in 1608 when Samuel
Champlain sailed up the St. Lawrence and founded, v/hat was to

2

John Warkinton, Canada; A Geographic Interpretation
(Toronto; Methuen, 1968) , p. 3(T5~»
3
Rand-McNally World Atlas, Imperial Edition (New York;
Rand-McNally and Co ), p. 236.

Ik

become Quebec City. He was soon followed by Jesuit priests,
among them Father Marquette, and the fur traders. Remarkably,
the French were able to endure and expand their tiny colony
throughout what was called New France despite Indian attacks
and harsh winters. By 1682, exploration had taken place as
far as the western tip of Lake Superior and all the way down
the Mississippi. The entire watershed was claimed in the name
of Louis XIV of France.

Meanwhile, of course, the British

were firmly entrenched along the east coast of the presentday United States and around Hudson Bay. Gradually, animosity
grew as the British poached in French lands to the south of
Hudson Bay and expanded further westward from the colonies.
War broke out occasionally in the early 1700's but with
relatively little effect on either side.
The French who settled
realized that they were not

in the St. Lawrence valley soon
merely travelers or explorers

visiting the region or French officials on duty in the
colony. New France was their country, and to show their in
tention to identify themselves in ..the new land, they took the
name habitants. The word meant that they were there to stay
as residents, to inhabit. Later generations born in the
colony would come to be known as Canadiens, whose world
view, habits and collective traits would make the French
of Canada different from those of France.^
k

William K. Lamb, Canada's Five Centuries (Toronto?
McClelland and Stewart, 1971JT p. 36.
Ibid.
Ibid.

15
By 1 75 k 9 New France, except in physical expanse, was
still a tiny colony. Its total population was only about
5 5 f000 and there were only two cities of any size, Mon
treal and Quebec City (8,500 and 5*000 respectively).'*
The economy was based on small farms and fur-trading out
posts; there was little industry. Surrounded as the French
were by hostile elements, the Catholic church served as a
bastion of French culture in the wilderness? and in
addition to gaining profits from the fur trade the habitants
spread the gospel among the Indians, thus giving their
colonizing efforts a distinct missionary zeal.
With the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 175&* the
competition between England and France in the Old World was
transferred to British and French outposts in the New World.
This conflict would set the stage for France's final
struggle to remain a colonial power in Canada.
At 10 o'clock on the morning of September 13* 1759* two
armies faced each other on the high plateau above the cliffs
of Quebec. It was there, on the Plains of Abraham, that
France's dreams for further exploitation were dashed when
General James Wolfe's army overran the French position and
defeated Montcalm. That evening, the remainder of the French
army retreated from the east of Quebec. The city was left
virtually defenseless, and on September 17 it capitulated.

Ibid., p. 58.

16
Long before that, however, Montcalm was dead. "I shall not
g
live to see the surrender of Quebec,” he had said.
The Treaty of Paris in 1763 ceded all possessions in the
northern part of North America except two small islands to
Britain, but that was not to end the French presence. The
military and most of the elite deserted Canada but some
60,000 farmers, trappers and voyageurs were left behind to
fend for themselves. They clung together, working, teaching,
o
and praying in French.
In this solidarity can be found the
roots of French Canadian nationalism. From the 1760*s, as
the French held together and turned inward, survival or la
survivance became the goal of French Canadians after the con10
quest. Je me souviens --"I remember”— was the watchword.
The

British Canadians reached out to both the American

colonies and the Commonwealth, while the French Canadians
were more concerned with preserving their traditional way of
life. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the
English were the sole cause of French isolation.

11

Indeed,

the British military governors were well disposed to the
French and, although the official British position was to
assimilate the Quebeqois, the Quebec Act was signed in 177^
as a result of Governor Guy Carlton's bringing pressure to
bear on the British Parliament.
o
John Saywell, Canada, Past and Present (Toronto; ClarkIrwin, 1975)> P* 56.
Q

L a mb, p . 6 5 ®
^°Saywell, p. 5 6 .
■^Lamb, p. 6 9 .

1?
Mason Wade, a French Canadian historian, calls the Quebec
12
Act their Magna Carta. He notes that the problem with the
/

Quebe^ois was not that they were French but that they were
Roman Catholic and, as such, excluded from all civil rights.
For example, all the other provinces were given elected asir^o
semblies before 177^« In the Quebec Act, Quebec itself was
given only an appointed council because the British did not
trust the French electorate. Nonetheless, the Quebec Act did
assure some measure of religious freedom for the Quebeyois.
/

The Quebetpois were finally granted representative
government by the Constitutional Act of 1791* This Act also
divided Canada into two separate regions: Upper Canada, con
trolled by the United Empire Loyalists

(present-day Ontario ) %

and Lower Canada(the present province of Quebec). Neverthe
less, the French were relegated to minor positions in the
appointive legislative and executive councils, even as their
numbers assured them an overwhelming majority in the legislative assembly.

13

The English who took up residence in the newly-conquered
territory were divided among those who tried to gain the
sympathy of the local population, liberal-minded British
military officers, and those who came for the sake of profits
and displayed an openly hostile attitude toward both native

12
Mason Wade, The French Canadians 1760-1967. Vol II.
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968)’,
5°•
13
J.M.S. Careless, Canada: A Story of Challenge, rev. ed.
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1970), p. 11A.

18
French and immigrant British administrators; merchants and
adventurers, mostly from New England, Many of these new
arrivals were British Loyalists, who flocked to settle in
Canada along the St. Lawrence from Montreal westward. Some
had settled on the land but most had come to engage in trade
and commerce. It was not long before the British minority
and the French majority were engaged in competition. Through
out the first half of the nineteenth century Montreal was
outdistancing Quebec in importance, and the city of Montreal
was;lin fact, populated by a British majority®
In the economic field, the British wanted to develop
trade and commerce and to levy taxes to build harbors and
canals? the French, who lived largely on the land, objected
to paying taxes to assist the commercial English-speaking
city'dwellers• Politically, the English continued to enjoy
positions on the British governor's appointed council, and
the French protested that the governor should listen to
their advice and not that of the English-speaking merchants
15
and bankers 0
In 1837r the battle of words became a battle of acts.
Louis Joseph Papineau, the French leader of the assembly,
roused his followers, the Patriotes. to a r m s i n v e i g h i n g
against the English-speaking Chateau Clique for its
Kenneth McNaught, The Pelican History of Canada( Bal
timore s Penguin Books, 19&9)» P* ? C *
15

Ibid., p. 71

favoratism toward the mercantile interests of Montreal
businessmen, and against the British leaders who refused
recognition of ministerial " responsibility” to the French
majority in the House, In his famous Ninety-Two Resolutions
he enumerated the province's political grievances. However,
Lord Russell, speaking for the British government, made clear
16
that the demands for autonomy would not be conceded. In
May of 1837, Papineau declared," The democratic flood has
poured irresistably down the slope of time and growing
faster and faster, will topple the barriers which may be
17
erected against it."
The first violence of "Papineau's Revolt" flared after
a meeting called by the Patriotes in November of I 837 in
Montreal. Although Papineau fled the city, the government
mistook this move as an attempt to arouse rebellion in the
countryside and

dispatched military units to areas of known

Patriote sympathy. Because the rebellion had been ill-con
ceived and poorly executed, most of the rebels were either
killed or captured during an encounter with British troops
at St. Eustache. Papineau and his immediate circle fled to
the United States. The British, meanwhile, dispatched Lord
Durham to conduct a full investigation of the causes of the
18
rebellion.

16
Saywell, p. 56 .
17
Wade, p. 18^.
18
Careless, pp. I92-I9 3 .

20
There were, in fact, a number of reasons for the
rebellion, but Lord Durham saw it primarily as a racial
question* In his famous report, he wrote:
I expected to find a contest between a govern
ment and a people* Instead, I found two nations
warring in the bosom of a single state, not of
principles but of races; and I perceived that
it would be idle to attempt any amelioration of
laws or institutions until we could first suc
ceed in terminating the deadly animosity that
now separates the inhabitants of Lower Canada
/Quebec? into hostile divisions of French and
English.19
Durham criticized the French Canadians,characterizing them
as ”a people with no history, no literature.” Believing that
the French were backward and the British merchants progres
sive, Durham maintained that the only answer to the racial
conflict was to swamp the French population. Unite Upper
and Lower Canada, he argued, and in a short time the com
bined English-speaking population of the two colonies
would outnumber the French. Assimilation of the French would
then only be a matter of time.
Since, as Lord Durham pointed out, there were also good
economic reasons for the union of the two colonies, the
British government followed his advice and united the
colonies in 18^1. But Durham's attack only served to make
the French Canadians more determined to maintain their own
^Saywell, p. 57*
20Ibid.. p. 58.

culture; to make them attach themselves more firmly to their
language, religion, and the values of their rural, agricul
tural society; and to make them impress je. me souviens even
more indelibly on their children. In politics, French
Canadian leaders were quick to oppose any move that smacked
of inequality; or threatened their survival. This elaborate
game of chess, largely played out in the assembly, paralyzed
the government of the colony and was one of the reasons for
21
confederation in I867 .
Confederation once again divided the two Canadas, this
time into the provinces of Ontario and Quebec— the former
overwhelmingly English-speaking and the latter overwhelmingly
French-- and united them along with the other colonies in the
Canadian federation. Politically, the federal union did not
reflect a desire on the part of the English and the French
to live more closely together, but it was a reflection of
the fact that they could not live together under a unitary
22
system of government. Moreover, the federal union was based
on the hope that the two peoples could live together if
there were nothing to fight over. The constitution, therefore,
gave to the provinces all matters of special concern to each
cultural group, while the federal government was given
direct responsibility for broad national policies that did
21
lb id.

22
Thomas A. Hockin, Government in Canada (New York:
W.W. Norton and Co., Inc.I 1975)» P« 12.

not involve religious, linguistic, or cultural interests*
The Constitution also guaranteed the educational rights of
the Protestant English minority in Quebec and the Roman
Catholic religious minorities outside Quebec, and the use
of the French and English languages in the Canadian

21

Parliament and the Quebec legislature* J Thus, the founding
fathers of the Confederation hoped that Quebec would no
longer be obsessed with survival for, although it rep
resented a minority in Canada, it had control of its own
institutions m

the Province of Quebec*

2k

In the economic sphere,following confederation, however,
the French and British were far from equal* Confederation
did usher in the industrial revolution for Canada* Railroads
were started in Montreal and spread to the West; but from
Montreal east to Quebec there were still only small farms
inhabited by Roman Catholic families. In 1867, Quebec was
still a rural region while Ontario, the Maritime Provinces
and the Prairie Provinces, either populated or dominated by
the British, showed signs of emerging into the industrial
era. 2 5
Once again, geographic factors determined the patterns
of development. The mountain ranges running parallel to the
St* Lawrence valley, plus a lack of capital to invest
21

R. MacGregor Dawson and W.F. Dawson, Democratic
Government in Canada, ^th ed. (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1971), p* 100.

2k

Ramsay Cook, Canada and the French Canadian Question
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, I966) , pp, 59-°l•
25
Warkinton, p. 305*

in

mining ventures, forced Canadians to look to the United

States for supplies of iron ore and coal. Although parts of
southern Quebec, specifically Montreal, could get some raw
material from coal fields in western Pennsylvania and the
iron ore mines near Lake Superior, for the most part the
metallurgical industry developed in Ontario. Since the
regions east of Montreal could not import these essential
raw materials because the St. Lawrence was shallow and
could handle only limited shipping, Ontario emerged better
offthan all of Quebec. Added to this was the fact that
the British parts of Quebec, Montreal and the southern
parts of the province, were economically more advanced
than the French parts. Nowhere was this more obvious
that in the disparity

of wealth between Montreal and

Quebec City. With the continued expansion of the railroads
/

between Ottawa and Montreal, the latter was able to make
up ground on the former. Moreover, industrialization
could proceed at a moderate pace in Montreal because it
had access to large amounts of investment capital, whereas
'25
eastern Quebec could not secure the necessary funds• ^
The net effect of this pattern of industrialization was
25

Ibid., pp. 310-330.

a shift in population from the French sector to the

British.

Indicative of their will to survive, the French relied on
the revanche du berceau, "revenge of the cradle,” and in
creased their numbers one hundred times in two hundred years.
This population increase did serve the purpose of preventing
French Canada from being overwhelmed by the British; but it
neither lessened the British domination of such financial
centers as Montreal nor made the French Canadians any
wealthier. Thus,

it was that Quebec was left with a sub

stantial French majority which had the bulk of its wealth
27
controlled by the English. r
For their part the French, who found themselves lagging
farther behind in the economic sphere also found themselves
discriminated against in the cultural realm. The ink on
the British North America Act was hardly dry when the French
Canadians found that the conflict of cultures could not be
removed from national life. Moving beyond the borders of
Quebec, French Canadians soon realized that Canada was
basically an English-speaking country.: They encountered an
alien and often hostile culture that refused to provide
schools where their children could be educated in their own
language and religion, and forced them to work in
English if they wanted to succeed. Even the province of
26
Jay and Audry Walz, p. 172.
27

Warkinton, p. 351®

28

Donald Reisebrough, Canada and the French (New Yorks
Facts on File Publications,

25
Manitoba, where there was a large French-speaking population
and where French language rights had been guaranteed in 1870,
abolished French schools and ended the right of members to
speak French in the provincial legislature in 1890.
W ithin

found

that their language and culture hindered them from assuming
positions of influence within the Anglo-dominated commercial
center of Montreal. More important, however, was the fact
that Quebeckers found their traditional system of education
precluded them from gaining entry to the business world.
Since the time of Champlain, the Catholic Church had main
tained control of Quebec's educational establishment, and
the Church was more interested in training the young in law,
religion or education rather ..than in the more "worldly"
vocations. By contrast, English youths had been schooled in
such areas as engineering, finance and business adminis^:
tration. Thus, whatever economic development took place in
29
the province^took place under British control.
Because the French Canadian realized that he was often
powerless in Ottawa, Quebec assumed a larger importance: it
was only in Quebec that he had a province where his language
and culture would be respected. As Henri Bourassa, a
brilliant French Canadian nationalist,put it, the French
29
"Quebec, Uneasy Province," Christian Century 86
(March 26, 1969)» P* ^280

Canadian was like an Indian who had no rights once he left
the reservation. Only in Quebec could he remain French. La
survivance became the touchstone of French Canadian life.
An example of the fact that Ottawa turned a deaf ear
to French Canadian feeling came outside Quebec in 1885 when
✓
the Metis, French-speaking half-breeds in the Northwest
Territory, rebelled against the Canadian government. Even
though federal authorities had been guilty of serious mis
management in western Canada, the rebellion was quickly
crushed and its leader, Louis Riel, captured. English
Canada demanded that he be executed;but the French
Canadians asked for mercy, pleading that he was fighting
for the survival of a people and arguing— with some jus
tification— that he was insane. Pressured by a united
English Canada, the government followed the letter of the
law despite an almost unanimous chorus from Quebec demanding
that Riel's life be spared.
As Quebec entered the twentieth century it found itself
in a quandry. Even as Quebec became more industrialized as
a result of the development of hydro-electric power from the
St. Lawrence and a booming lumber business, the French be
came anxious about the preservation of their language, cul
ture and heritage. They had to face the prospect of
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2?
modernization or lose control of their destinies to the
Anglo-Saxon enterpreneurs• The dilemma was that they could
not enjoy the benefits of their heritage and modernization
at the same time. This situation was to obtain throughout
the first half of the twentieth century. Quebec lagged
behind the other provinces in both education and income
^see tables 1 and 2^7 while at the same time

it struggled

against the assimalative pressures resulting from industrial
ization and economic integralism.
The next serious political confrontation between French
and English Canada came with the conscription crises of 1900
and 1917. English Canada demanded that the nation send troops
to assist Great Britain in the Boer War in South Africa^but
French Canada argued that the conflict was of no vital con
cern to Canada and opposed participation. Nonetheless, Sir
Wilfred Laurier, then Prime Minister and himself a French
Canadian, had to bow to the demands of the English Canadian
majority. Likewise, the conscription crisis of 1917

fueled French

Canadians* animosity toward their English counterparts.
With Canadian forces suffering higher losses in: Europe in the
first half of 1917» and with the government

getting fewer

and fewer recruits, Ottawa decided that a draft was necessary.
For the most part, English Canada supported the federal
position, but Quebec was vehemently opposed. The Quebe^ois

28
felt no responsibility to serve a federation that was doing
little for them. Henry Bourassa, Premier of Quebec, warned
that conscription "would soon transform the most peaceable
perhaps most orderly, population of the Americas into a
30
revolutionary people." Riots broke out in Quebec and the
first talk of leaving the federation was heard from French
Canadian nationalists. As it turned out, the war was over
sooner than expected and only 50*000 conscripts were sent
overseas. But from these crises and defeats— and every crisis
was a defeat— French Canada learned the painful lesspn that
national politics could center on racial issues.
The Fragmented Canadian Identity
In addition to the historical, geographical, social^and
economic factors which have tended to distinguish Quebec and
its inhabitants from the rest of Canada, there are also a
number of very important psychological

’considerations

which have made a sense of national unity between Frenchspeaking and English-speaking Canadians difficult to
achieve and have tended to fragment the Canadian identity.
From the historical perspective, for example, Seymour
Mo Lipset has remarked that two nations, the United States
3*
and Canada, resulted from the American Revolution. Two other

30
Saywell, p. 23*
31

Seymour M. Lipset, Introduction to Public Opinion and
the Canadian Identity by Mildred Schwartz (Berkeley: Univer
sity of California Press, 1967), P*

29
observers of the Canadian scene, S.D. Clark and A.R.M.
Lower, suggest that Canada, the North American nation
formed from the losing side in the American Revolution,
has a counter-revolutionary tradition which is also a
32
clue to understanding Canadian values.

What is more,

as Mildred Schwartz observes, "Whereas after the revolu
tion many supporters of the American cause left behind
north of the new international border emigrated south,
many thousands of Tories moved north. And from what
emerged as a separate Canadian identity has been jus
tifying itself as not being American." ■?? S.Di Clark
adds that "Canadian life can almost be said to take
its rise in the negative will to resist absorption in
the American Republic." ^
With respect to Quebec's traditional values, Porter
notes that because of Quebec's parochial structure, its
traditional resistance to liberal ideas, and because the
Catholic Church held sway in Quebec immediately following
the conquest, Quebeckers feared the revolutionary doctrines
espoused by the United States. Consequently, when American
32

S.D. Clark and A.R.M. Lower," Revolution and Counter
revolution, the United States and Canada," in The Revolution
ary Theme in Contemporary America, ed. Thomas R. F o r d TLe xington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1965)* P» ^2.
33

Mildred Schwartz, Public Opinion and the Canadian
Identity(Berkeley: University of California Press,1957),
P*
3^
Clark and Lower, p. 22.
35

John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social
Class and Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
i % 5 ; . P. 370.

30
forces invaded Canada during the American Revolution, Quebec
did not grasp the opportunity to throw off British colonial
rule and side with the U.S. against England. Further, when
the 1789 Revolution broke out in France— with its decidedly
rationalist

and anti-clerical overtones— the French

Canadian clergy sought to cut the people off from both
sources of contaminations the United States and France.
Thus it was that the Quebec leadership found union with
the British monarchy preferable to the radical doctrines
of the Enlightenment.
As for the outward symbols of national identity, the
British flag flew over Canada until the 1960's, and the
highest court of appeal was the Judicial Committee of
the British Privy Conncil until approximately the same
time. Until 1982, the Canadian constitution was the
British North America Act, passed by the British Parliament
iin- I867. Any amendment to the Act was subject to the pro
forma

ratification of the British Parliament.
All of this has tended to prevent Canadians from having

a strong sense of national identity. S.M. Lipset observed
that although Canada has been very successful in achieving
economic growth and a high standard of living, it still
lacks a strong sense of national pride:" and identity." It

is still not certain what it is," Lipset claims," A

rm

North American nation* not much different from the United
States, which a significant minority thinks might join
the United States, a British nation with a large French
subculture, two nations, one French and the other English,
which exist in a loose confederation, or some combination
36
of these and other concepts."
The Unified French Identity^
It is with respect to identity that the French-speaking
Canadian (Quebegois) has a distinct advantage over his
English-speaking counterpart. Whereas the British Canadian
is somewhat uncertain of what Canada represents to him, the
French Canadian is quite sure of the meaning of Quebec. He
knows the traditions and folkways of his ancestors, their
rural way of life and their strong attachment to the Roman
Catholic faith. He has been taught the names of French
Canadian heroes of the past— Champlain, Riel, Papineau,
Bourassa— who fought for, and sometimes died, to preserve
his culture. He is painfully aware of le. conquete , the
forceful subjugation of his homeland, the dominance of
the British. Overarching all of these things is his cherished
language, the most salient feature of his lifestyle and his
means to transmit what he has learned to his progeny. Thus
it is that through his culture and his territory, the French
Canadian feels himself part of a distinct nation.
36
S.M. Lipset, Intruduction to Public Opinion and the
Canadian Identity$> p. 7 ®

CHAPTER II
THE PARTI QUEBECOIS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH CANADIAN NATIONALISM

In order to understand the place that the Parti
Quebecois occupies in terms of the development of French
Canadian nationalism,

it is necessary to trace the origins

of nationalist thought in French Canada. While nationalism
has remained a prominent theme in the history of FrenchEnglish relations in Canada, it would be wrong to conclude
that its context and content have remained the same at
all times. Nationalist expression has crystalized today
in a way which is fundamentally different from past forms.
It has changed from a rather vague nation to one of concrete
demands for a separate state of Quebec. It has undergone
a significant shift in emphasis, from a defensive inward1
looking philosophy of survivance to an outward looking
and aggressive orientation, symbolized by the doctrine of
maitre chez nous.^
My hypothesis is that French Canadian nationalism has
passed through several distinct phases

in its evolutions in

ward turning nationalism (defensive nationalism); constitu
tional nationalism; political nationalism; anti-imperialist
1
2

"survival”
"Masters in our own house"

32

33
nationalism; modern nationalism(which includes both liberal
and socialist nationalism); revolutionary nationalism; and,
finally, electoral or "ballot box" separatism. Each of
these phases will be considered in terms of its symbols,
leaders, trends*and expressions. The psychological, social,
and political factors which have given expression to
French Canadian nationalism at different periods will be
examined, and an analysis will be made of the institutional
and associational devices which have encouraged and
directed the forces of change.
The first task is to define exactly what we mean by
nationalism, for the exact dimensions and nature of the
subject have been a source of much academic debate and
discussion in recent years. According to Michael Brunet,
"nationalism is a manifestation of the national and
spontaneous solidarity that exists among members of a
human group sharing a historical and cultural tradition
from which the group derives its distinctive identity."-^
A somewhat different approach to nationalism is that of
K.R. Minogue, who draws a distinction between "nationalism"
and "patriotism." Patriotism, by Minogue*s yardstick means
devotion to one's country, a "sentiment of loyalty by vir
tue of which one feels identified with the political
communityi" a "spontaneous reference to the sharing of a
3
Michael Brunet," The French Canadians Search for a
Fatherland," in Nationalism in Canada, ed. Peter Russel
(Montreal: McGraw-Hill-Ryerson, Ltd., 1966), p. 47.

3^
common soil, language, culture, history, folkways, customs
and values— all of which result in a sense of pride as well
as a sense to duty to the group.*'

Ll

Nati onadism, on the

other hand, is a response to an outward threat. In this
respect, according to Minogue, "Nationalism is a political
movement which seeks to defend an objective we may call
e;
national integrity."
For our purposes, we will consider Louis Snyder's
concept of nationalism as our working definition. According
to Snyder, " Nationalism is a condition of mind, feeling,
or sentiment of a group of people living in a well defined
geographic area, speaking a common language, possessing a
literature in which their aspirations are expressed, at
tached to common traditions and customs, venerating their
own heroes, and, in some cases, having the same religion."
As for the precise form of nationalism that will pre
vail at a given time, it is necessary to define the suc
cessive stages through which nationalism passes. Minogue,
for example, holds that there are three distinct stages
which may be used to trace the development of nationalisms
1) stirrings— the period in which the nation becomes aware
of itself as a nation suffering oppression; 2) the struggle

K.R. Monogue, Nationalism (Baltimore: Penguin Books,

1967), p. 23.
5
Ibid.
^Louis Snyder,"Global Mini-Nationalism-s : Autonomy or
Independence," Contributions in Political Science, No 71,
Global Perspectives in History and Politics( Westport, Conn:
Greenwood Press, 1982), p. xv.
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for independence— this may involve terrorism, guerrilla
warfare, riots or a process of peaceful negotiation*
During this time there is an exposition pf national
virtue and the emergence of heroes? 3) the process of
consolidation— which is keeping the nation, once it
has achieved independence, from falling apart*
The Character of French Canadian Nationalism
Until quite recently, French Canadian nationalism was
tied closely to the values of traditional society. These
values tended to inhibit the expansion of the

-role of

the state, whatever may have been the implications for
economic and social development. The major premise of
this traditional ideology was that the "nation0 was,and
should always b e ,essentially agrarian, and that the truest
expression of the French Canadian identity lay in the
parish community. Industrialization and urbanization, it
was felt, could only weaken the nation. The notion of
agrarian superiority held sway over many nationalist intel
lectuals even until the middle of the twentieth century.
For example, in 19^3» clerical nationalist Richard Ares
wrote, "By tradition, vocation, as well as necessity, we
are a people of peasants. Everything that takes us away from
the land diminishes and weakens us as a people and encourages
7
Minogue, p. 29*
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Q
cross-breeding, duplicity and treason.”

As late as 1956,

the report of the Tremblay Commission, a provincially
appointed commission on constitutional problems, declared
that "the consolidation arid expansion of agriculture to
the extreme limit imposes itself as the first article of
Q

a programme of social restoration and stabilization.” 7
By the mid-twentieth century, however, the traditional
nationalist arguments had become outmoded, for the phil
osophy whicih extolled the virtues

of agrarian existence

did little to focus attention on social and economic prob
lems faced by the bulk of French Canadians now living in
cities. Thus, during the 1960*3, there was a marked shift
away from traditional ideology. Writing in 1963? Leon Dion
observed that nationalist ideology had undergone significant
changes in direction and scope.” This nationalistic revival,”
he claimed,” fuels the great drive for development seen in
every field of activity and in every segment of the com
munity.” 10
Origins of French Canadian Nationalism

Before the British conquest of 175^? there was little
nationalistic feeling among French Canadians. This, of
8
Richard Ares, quoted by Ferdinand Dumond and Guy Rocher
in ”An Introduction to a Sociology of French Canada,” in
French Canadian Society, ed. Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin
(Montreal: McClelland and Stewart, 196^), p« 3^6.
9 *
Dale Postgate and Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: Social
Change and Political Crisis(Montreal: McClelland and Stewart,
1976), po 65
10
Lion Dion, The Unfinished Revolution(Montreal: McGillQueens, 1976) , p. 33«>
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course, is understandable because they still regarded them
selves as citizens of France. For the most part, these
soil-tilling habitants, voyageurs, soldiers, seigneurs,
and the clergy were occuped with establishing their colony,
and had no real sense of separateness from their European
origins. Their feeling of group consciousness came only
after the British conquest, as a result of the conflict
with a culturally alien group.
Moreover, there were other important internal forces at
work which helped to restrain nationalistic expression.
Because Quebec's clergy was imbued with the doctrines of
royal absolutism and the principles of obedience to authority
as established by Rome, these influential church leaders did
much to persuade the habitants to accept British rule. Even
more, there was an alignment of French Canadian notables
with the British administrative class. French-English
marriages took place between British functionaries and
professional soldiers, on the one hand, and the daughters
of the merchant and professional French Canadians. This had
the effect of splitting French Canadian solidarity along
class lines, and widening the gap between French Canadian
rural and city masses and their intellectual and com
mercial 3_eaders. It was only during the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth century that national solidarity
grew into political consciousness. French Canadians were

38
then more aware of their minority status and of the fact
11
thay they were "charter members of the country•"
Defensive Nationalism
Between 1?5^ and 1840, French Canadians began to strug
gle for constitutional and civil rights# Bonenfant and
Falardeau have referred to this period as a time of "de
fensive nationalism" which climaxed in the Papineau
Rebellion of 1837-38# To be sure, Papineau was familiar
with the ideas of the French philosophes concerning the
concept of nationality, but they claimed that Papineau was
"a parliamentary liberal and a great patriot, forced by
12
circumstances to be a nationalist."
Notably, a decade before Papineau*s Rebellion, the
Canadian Party, which had changed its name under Papineau*s
leadership to the Patriotes Parti, adopted a rallying flag
which consisted of three horizontal stripes bearing the
colors of green, white and red, similar in design to the
French revolutionary tricolor. At the time of Papineau*s

11
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”92 Resolutions,"

13

the party included an impressive array

of French Canadian political leaders and orators such as
LaFontaine, Vigner, Morin, Nelson, Duvernay, Parent,and,
of course, Papineau. Its philosophy drew on many of the
ideas being expressed in Europe in the wake of the French
Revolution: social progress, democracy, reform and liberty.
The party also had a number of newspapers to disseminate
its propaganda: Le Vindicateur,and La Minerve in Montreal;
Le Liberal and Le Canadiene in Quebec City. The latter's
editor, Etienne Parent, had himself coined the Patriote's
slogan, "Nos institutions, notre langue. et notre droits."

1h

Other newspapers which served the Patrlote purpose were
L'Echo du Pays and Le Fantasque.
The party's activists were supervised by its Comite^
Central et Permanent, which centralized information and
propaganda and which had the duty of organizing meetings ,pro
viding speakers and literature, and otherwise uniting and
stimulating "popular forces."
Developing attthe same time, but independent of the
Patriote party, there emerged another movement dedicated
to the cause of French Canada. This was the Saint Jean
Baptiste Society, which had taken root several years
13
Document produced by the Lower Canada Assembly in 183^
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before 1837 through the efforts of Jacques Vigner and Paul
Duvernay. The Society, its founders hoped, would be the
first great associational device to bind together the
masses and elite among French Canadians who had been drift
ing

further and further apart.
The Society, like the Patriotes) party of Papineau,

had a flag, an emblem, and a definite purpose. The motto,
"Nos institutions, notre langue, et notre droits," was
borrowed from Etienne Parent. Likewise, the flag had the
same green, white and red colors as the Patriotes* flag.
Its emblem was the maple leaf, conceived as "the symbol
of destiny of the French Canadian people."Although they
were separate organizations, the link between the Saint
Jean Baptiste Society and the Patriotes* party was
strengthened by their common purpose. In fact, it was from
the ranks of the Saint Jean Baptiste Society that the
leaders of the Patriotes* party’s Permanent Committee were
later drawn. The Society, for its part, continued to
glorify and popularize, through its annual speeches and
demonstrations, a reverence for tradition and the in
stitutions of the past, and to emphasize the emotional
and mythlike interpretation of the historical development
of the French Canadians. This later developed into a
recurrent theme of a national mission for the French
Canadian people.
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Constitutional Nationalism
The first phase of defensive nationalism gave way in
the 1840's to a period of "constitutional’1'nationalism
under the Union Regime* This was largely in reaction to
the British attempt to assimilate the French Canadians
following Lord Durham's recommendation that Upper and
Lower Canada be united. The two provinces were actually
united in the Act of Union in 1841.
One of the French leaders, La Fontaine, seemed ably
equipped to defend French Canadian interests. Fortunately,
for French Canada, the reform movement sanctioned the
principles of ministerial responsibility--that is, con
trol of the executive by the people's representatives.
Lord Durham had, in fact, acknowledged the necessity of
applying this principle in the colonies, as it had been
in Great Britain a few years earlier. La Fontaine knew that
ministerial responsibility would mean control over the
executive by French Canadian representatives, and to
attain that aim he became allied with the reformers of
Upper Canada. This served to temper nationalistic fervor
and to redirect it into more practical concerns such as
education, local development, and agriculture.

While these developments were taking place in the
political arena, young French Canadians were being social
ized toward French Canadian values in a number of classical
colleges that had been founded either by the local clergy
/
or by teaching orders from Europe* The Ecole Litteraire
of Quebec had been fostering an ardent group of writers,
poets, historians,and novelists who exalted

the symbols,

ideas, and values of the French Canadians, They placed
emphasis on the history of the race, the mother country,
the Roman Catholic Church, the language and folkways of
French Canadians, and the attachment to the soil. Text
books underlined ecclesiastical and religious landmarks
of the history of the French in Canada.
Nonetheless, during this same period, there were also
sharp differences among the French Canadians themselves con
cerning the philosophical direction of French Canada, Where
as Papineau's ideas, for example, had been drawn from the
salons of Paris, the clergy opposed the ideas of the "En
lightenment »" They held that its doctrines were too
radical, too democratically minded, too free thinking, and
too anti-clerical. The conflict between liberal thinkers
such as Papineau and the clergy eventually resulted in the
Church reestablishing its dominance over thought

in Quebec,

which in turn brought about a more conservative form of

nationalism. The church was to retain its power over
thought in Quebec until the mid-twentieth century, and
lost its grip only as Quebec became more secularized.
Mercier, Riel, and the Rebound of Political Nationalism
The fragile consensus between French and English
Canada gave way shortly after confederation in 186?.
latent feelings of nationalist sentiment emerged in
response to events not in Quebec but in the new province
of Manitoba, part of the former Northwest Territories.
The infringement of rights of the French Canadian minority
in this area received considerable attention in Quebec,
especially from Liberals and the ’’national1' movement
/

directed by Honore Mercier. Mercier®s objective was to
create a "united French Canadian front, erasing former
party lines, for the defense of French Canadian rights."

15

The movement emphasized electoral reform, administrative
readjustments, provincial autonomy, decentralization,
tariff protection, and opposition to the Canadian Pacific

, 16

pro ject •

The Riel'-affair in 1885 galvanized Mercier®s movement.
15
Bonenfant and Falardeau, p. 25*
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Opposition to the railroad was due to French Canadian
feeling that rail~access to their enclaves in the hinterlands
would result in British Canadian dominance of French-speaking
areas outside Quebec0

Louis Riel, "chief” of the French Canadian half-breeds, the
Met is, in Manitoba, had become spokesman for the French
Canadians living along the Red River in Manitoba, While
both English and French Canadian half-breeds were concer
ned about the fate of their free life on the plains if
settlement should begin in earnest, the more numerous
Metis were also concerned about the fate of their Catholic
religion and French customs if English Canadians poured in.
Their fears became intensified when William McDougall, the
new Canadian lieutenant governor, reached the Red River to
take over the colony.
Riel, a clever but somewhat unbalanced man, set up a
"provisional government" on his own. He took over Ft, Gary
and stopped McDougall at the border of the settlement. Riel
purpose in setting up his government was to win terms from
Canada so that the Red River could enter the Dominion as
a separate province with guarantees for Metis land and
protection for French rights, as in Quebec, Delegates
from the settlement traveled to Ottawa, and Prime Minister
John McDonald sent a new representative to replace Mc
Dougall • The negotiations gave the Riel government almost
everything it demanded in the hope that it would peacefully
disband•
Riel, however, made a serous error in executing an

^5
English Canadian who had defied his authority. English- speaking Canadians in Ontario demanded that Riel be
brought to justice as a traitor and a murderer. Moreover,
when Manitoba became part of the dominion, Ottawa came
under increased pressure to assert its authority in the
area, and an expeditionary force was dispatched to subdue
Riel and disband the Red River colony.
Riel was quickly tried and executed once the forces
sent by the federal government arrived on the scene. While
English Canadians applauded the move, French Canadians
regarded him as a martyr who had been victimized by
fanatic "Orangists•" Popular meetings were held in many
French Canadian communities and villages, and there was
an uproar throughout the province of Quebec.
It was on the occasion of Riel*s execution that Mercier
proclaimed the formation of a great "national" party which
would gather in all those who resented the Riel outrage.
Their first objective would be to overthrow, by all con
stitutional means possible, the conservative government of
John A, MacDonald. Mercier*s following included Quebec
Liberals and Nationalist Conservatives who had broken with
their party over the Riel Affair, and the Ultramondists of
Quebec and Montreal (remnants of Papineau’s Patriotes party).

In practice, Mercier*s nationalist movement was both
rhbtorieal and political. With the help of Sir Oliver Mowat,
Premier of Ontario, Mercier found an ally .against McDonald,
and he again affirmed the rights of the provinces. Like
the predominant nationalist leader who followed him, Henri
Bourassa, Mercier focused-on two important issues t 1) French
Canadian interests outside the province of Quebec; and 2) the
opposition to British imperialism. Mercier®s slogans were
/ .
echoed m such newspapers as La Verite m Quebec and
L'Etenard in Montreal. Both stood for national causes such
as provincial autonomy, the development of agriculture, the
protection of minorities and official recognitionnof the
French language.
Nonetheless, Mercier®s brand of nationalism— though'

it

did arouse a certain amount of popular fervor— did not reach
down to a very large portion of the population. Although he
himself was very popular in French Canada, his popularity
tended to distract from his nationalist message. Further,
Mercier encountered opposition from the traditional foes of
liberalism and nationalism, the clergy. Thus it was mostly
among college students that Mercier#s brand of nationalism
gained adherents.

^7
The Anti-Imperialist Nationalism of Henri Bourassa
What, was significant about Mercier's nationalist
thought was that it was highly successful in integrating
the sacred with the secular point of view# Building on
this success Quebec's Premier, Henri Bourassa, came on
the scene at a time when recent events in French Canadian
life had once more intensified the French Canadian feeling
of solidarity# This was especially the case when the
Manitoba school question was settled to the disadvantage
of the French-speaking minority in 1890 and the provincial
government renounced language guarantees given to the
French-speaking citizens of the province#
In the first years after Confederation, Bourassa main
tained, the federal government had been true to the concept
of a bilingual and bicultural nation# Evidence of this
was to be found in the Manitoba Act of I87O and the North
west Territories Bill of 1875» each of which had accepted
French

as one of the official languages and had established

a denominational school system. Where the federal government
had erred, however, was in allowing the territorial govern
ment of the Northwest to extinguish the legal status of
French in I 890. Because the territorial legislature's ordinance,
which had changed the language laws and school system,

violated the spirit of the I875 federal law, a law superior
to the law of the Northwest Territories, the territorial
ordinances were actually illegal. However,. by accepting
the 1905 Sifton amendment, the federal government legitimized
the illegal school and language ordinances, thus turning its
back on the rights of western French Canadians. By giving
both French and English official status in Parliament, the
Fathers

of Confederation made it clear that they wished both

languages to co-exist everywhere in public life--in church,
in court, and'in government, Bourassa said. These rights
would be meaningless if the English provinces prevented
French Canadian children from acquiring a perfect knowledge
of their own language.
Furthermore, Bourassa held that the economic pull of the
United States would slowly absorb Canada and that the best
way to combat such absorption was to uphold the values of
the French Canadians: the rejection of materialism by the
preservation of Catholicism;

the value of agriculture; the

maintenance of the French language and French Canadians cus
toms •
Finally, Bourassa insisted that the failure to accept
cultural duality would threaten the continued existence of
the Confederation: French Canadians would never feel that

k9

Canada was their homeland unless their culture was free to
develop. Hence national duality was dependent on cultural
duality and "reciprocal respect for the rights of the two
races."

17

The alternative was instability and crisis.

It should be noted that Bourassa did not favor the
idea of a separate nation of Quebec? he emphasized the
integrity of French Canada within the context of a broad
Canadianism. Bourassa was, above all, a fierce "Canada
firster." His sentiments on this can be found anywhere in
his prolific writings, and particularly in his articles in
Le Devoir» the daily newspaper he founded in 1910. In a
pamphlet on the 1911 tariff agreement between Canada and
the United States, Bourassa wrote that "the general and
superior interests of Canada must have priority over the
more particular class or provincial interests ... Now or
never is the time to say 'Canada to the Canadians' and in
doing so, to yield neither to the Americas nor to the
18
other parts of the Empire."
Modern Nationalism

and the Coming; of the "Quiet Revolution"

The advent of the Duplessis regime in the late 1920 's
marked a twenty-year hiatus in the intellectual development
of nationalistic thought in Quebec. This was due to the
17
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nature of the Duplessis government, which ran the province
like a virtual fiefdom during the 1930's, ^-0 's and 5 0 *s,
and was faced with no significant opposition party during
its entire tenure. Above a3.1 else, Duplessis did his utmost
to stifle both criticism and constructive dialogue. Dion
claims that Duplessis deliberately avoided contact with
and the sponsorship of intellectuals,

"because he knew

instinctively that such a step would be suicidal."

19

It should be noted at once, however, that Duplessis's
reactionary regime held power with the full cooperation and
support of the Catholic Church, which preferred his con
servative doctrines to any kind of liberal thinking.
Education under Duplessis showed no evidence of modern or
progressive ideas, the Church believing that the older con
cepts of the "virtuous" agrarian life, religious piety,
and non-secular vocations should be emphasized in lieu of
such worldly subjects as law, business,and economics.
Given this fact, it is easy to see why the more progres
sive English-speaking provinces pulled ahead because of their
superiority in preparing themselves for the modern life of
the twentieth century. In this respect, Quebec's backwardness
may be ascribed to injurious policies implemented by its own
provincial government rather than a conspiracy on the part of

19
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English-speaking Canadians to hold them back#
As Quebec moved toward modernization in the mid-twen
tieth century, the type of nationalism advocated by the
conservatives, i.e. a nationalism which accepted a
traditional society as its framework, became less and
less suited to a society where isolation meant economic
backwardness and educational stagnation,, Nevertheless,
the conservatives continued to preach a doctrine that
French Canadians remain faithful to their past and
preserve their Roman Catholic faith.*Only by following
the guidance of their clergy, by supporting local elites,
and by avoiding fratricidal struggles could they hope
20
to remain true to their roots and their calling.
It was chiefly against industry and the cities that the
conservative nationalists preached. The economy, as they
saw it, had to be at the service of culture and not the
other way around. Unavoidably, industry and the cities were
to French Canadians places of "perdition,” that is, of
assimilation into thelAnglo-Saxon world. Even more, the
conservative nationalists argued, French Canadians should
not even attempt to penetrate such "alien" reaches, for to
do so would cause them to lose their unique identity. In
stead, French Canadians were urged to return to the land,

20
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to develop farm settlements in new areas.
Politically, the conservative nationalists did not
differ from their English counterparts inasmuch as they
sought to consolidate Canada*s independence from both
Britain and the United States, However, conservative
nationalists remained aloof to any proposals to stimulate
pan-Canadianism, They viewed Canada as an artificial union
based on a marriage of convenience. Their patrie(homeland)
was still Quebec,
The conservative nationalists strongly favored de
centralized federalism and made this a part of their
ideology? French Canada's culture could only be protec
ted, they argued, if the government of Quebec had broad
political powers vis-a-vis the central government. Various
later opinions among constitutional scholars concerning the
nature of the federal compact— the "two nations theory,”
the "federal bargain” theory, the doctrine of "associated
21
states” are all grounded m conservative thought.
As for the separatist sentiments of conservatives, one
has no difficulty in finding such pronouncements in the
writings of conservative thinkers such as Abbe^Groulx,
Groulx espoused ”un etat francais” that would be independent
of the rest
21

of Canada, The issue of separatism, however,
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remained a divisive issue among conservative nationalists,
Bourassa and his followers were fiercely opposed to a
separatist solution, Groulx, though opposed to control from
Ottawa, nevertheless distrusted Quebec’s leadership under
Maurice Duplessis, whom he accused of having betrayed the
hopes that had brought him to power in 1 935 » and following
in the steps of Honore Mercier and Alexander Taschereau
in jeopardizing Quebec's natural resources for the benefit
of foreigners.
In addition to the conservative nationalists' opposition
to urban living, industrialization» and modernization in
general, they were also opposed to the liberal philosophies
of individualism and materialism which they viewed as
corrosive influences on French Canadian values. They also
made known their distaste for such things as majority
rule, American style employers' associations, and labor
22
unions acting as interest groups.
As for the political functions served by the conser'vative nationalist creed, conservative nationalism did
flourish in three cultural contexts: 1 ) among the higher
elites, whose interests in religion, politics and business
were supported by the conservative -tenets of Catholicism,
messianism, anti-liberalism and agriculturalism• 2 )
22
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the political culture of the lower elites and those in
prominence locally (parish priests, doctors, notaries) who
used its philosophy to inculcate the virtues of piety and
simple living in training the next generation of French
Canada's elite; and 3) among the ’’masses,” i.e. farmers,
laborers, craftsmen, and factory workers, because it made
them accept their lot unquestioningly.
Liberal Nationalism
Although dominant in Quebec politics from 1840-1960,
conservative nationalism did not remain entirely unchallenged.
From 1950 on, there were a number of individuals who stood up
in the name of the liberal creed. Because liberalism was
often associated with anti-clericism, it was not widely
accepted. Nonetheless, Wilfred Laurier, who was Prime
Minister of Canada from I896 to 191? under the Liberal
banner, obtained widespread support from the French
Canadian electorate. This was due primarily to two facts:
1) by that time the Liberal Party had lost much of its for
mer radicalism in Quebec? and 2) the Liberals were successful
in exploiting the ’’ethnic feeling” among French Canadians,
thereby securing their votes.
It was not until 1950 and the creation of the periodical
Cite Libre that liberal concepts became widely disseminated,
thus paving the way for the domination of liberal ideology.
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Its editors, Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Gerard Pelletier,
fought against the authoritarianism and clericalism that
were part of the conservative nationalist doctrine. The
periodical argued that Quebec had to catch-up to modern
times, Yet, it was not separatist in its orientation. The
model it put forward for Quebec to follow was that of the
European and United States liberal democracies. It made no
attempt to focus Quebec’s attention on the peoples of the
Third Wo r l d , their quest for independence, and the general
trend toward decolonization throughout former colonial
empires. Its editors were somewhat take by surprise when
✓

the separatist R.I.N.

(Rassemblement pour 1 *independence

nationale) was formed in i960.
From a political standpoint,

it was the election of

i9 6 0 ,and the victory of the Liberal party, which marked the
actual triumph of liberal nationalism. It brought to
fruition modernizing sentiments that had been building up
in Quebec. The conservative doctrines of Duplessis that had
kept the government out of the drive for development and out
of the lives of Quebec's citizens, gave way under liberal
nationalism to a party that sought to modernize the province
and attain a measure of political, financial and cultural
sovereignty as well.
The new Liberal regime did flirt with the idea of sep
aratism, especially in 1962-63 under Quebec's Premier,
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Daniel Johnson. It was during the 1960's that Quebec's de
mands for greater autonomy increased over the mounting ob
jections of the federal government and English-speaking
Canada. In response to Quebec's demands and in hopes of
avoiding a major confrontation over autonomy issues, the
federal government established the Royal Commission on
Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963* Nonetheless, the
members

were unable to agree on any political solution

to the Canadian problem. Subsequent provincial-federal con
ferences in 1965 and 1971 were unable to achieve any prac
tical solution to the impasse.
The major theme of liberal nationalism was the motto
"maitres chez nous 9" masters in our own house. Although
Quebec's government did not take an active role in invest
ment , because traditional laissez-faire practices had pro
duced a dependence on American capital, it did take the
initiative in such areas as pensions and the creation of a
large number of public financial and industrial corporations,
especially with respect to the nationalization of electric
power companies under Resources Minister Rene" Levesque.
In the field of education, the state assumed a new role
with the establishment of a Department of Education. Liberal
reforms

included free schooling, open access to education,

establishment of regional schools, introduction of two and

three year CEGEP's,

2lf>

f .
which put an end to the elitist

5

classical colleges, the updating of curricula, and the
setting of higher standards for teacher qualification.
Civil service and governmental reform also became a
major task under the Liberal administration of Jean Lesage,
elected in i960. Competence now became a key factor in
determining suitability for public service rather than
political patronage. On the local level, the Liberal
regime encouraged community development and mobilization.
v
In I9 6 3 , the Bureau d'amanagement de l'est Quebec (Eastern
Quebec Regional Development Office) was created following
federal-provincial agreement.
In sum, the Liberal regime's reforms were instrumental
in opening, at long last, the doors of tradition to the in
fluence of modernization. It gave expression to the provin
cial government's possibilities for action, and strove for
provincial self-reliance. It stressed modernization in all
areas of Quebec society and attempted to strengthen social
organizations to promote change.
Social Democratic Nationalism, Socialist Nationalism,
Revolutionary Nationalism, and the Nationalism of the Parti
Quebecois
Socialism, or even Scandinavian or British-type democratic
2U-

<

College d'enseignement general et professionel, part of
Quebec's secondary educational system between high school and
university® offering two and three-year term academic and nonacademic programs.
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socialism, had never taken root in conservative Quebec.
There were.Marxists and non-Marxist socialists in Quebec
well before the i960*s. However, it is only since the
end of the 1 9 5 0's that they have managed to surface and
t o .form social movements with some following.
The rise of native Quebec socialism coincided with the
"liberation" movement, the decline of the Union Nationals.
party in Quebec politics. The Liberal victory in i960
gave the socialist movement even greater impetus. The
socialists promply took aim at the new Liberal government
as their only source of opposition— the conservative
Union Nationale now having been ousted from power. At the
same time, the socialist movement was influenced by the
changing tide in Quebec nationalism during the 1960's,
and especially by strong separatist sentiments being ex^
25
pressed.
^

The difference between social-democratic nationalism and
socialist nationalism in its Marxist-Leninist form is more
than a matter of degree. A large ideological gulf exists
between social-democratic nationalism as exemplified by the
Parti Quebegois and the Marxist-Leninist brand of socialism
26
advocated by intellectuals such as the Parti pris group than
exists between social democratic and liberal nationalism-25
26
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Parti pris- (position taken)- A radical publication
founded by a leader of Quebec's early revolutionary movement,
G. Maheau.
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particularly with respect to ideology, sources of leader
ship and support, and electoral motives.
While socialist nationalism is doctrinaire and attempts
to arrive at a precise Marxist-Leninist definition of the
theoretical bases of its course of action, social democratic
nationalism is pragmatic and, when necessary, does not
hesitate to adjust its ideological premises to the needs of
effectiveness as shown in the ideological debates that have
27
taken place since 1969 within the Parti Quebegois.
Similarly,
while socialist nationalism assumes that socio-economic
contradictions in Quebec are far-reaching and must necessarily
lead to class struggle, that imperialist capitalism and

the

bourgeoisie must be chastized and the working class supported,
social democratic nationalism holds a consensus view of soc
iety and tries to gain the electoral support of the middle as
well as lower classes.
Perhaps the only major similarity between social
democratic nationalism and socialist nationalism is that
they are anti-system in their orientations. Both aim
at doing away with the Canadian political community, both
attack the existing political regime, and both condemn in
varying degrees and for different reasons, the established
political authorities. What is most significant about
27
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socialist nationalism, however, is that it has helped to
shape the continuing political discussions within the PQ
and contributed to moulding some features’ of the PQ's
ideology. With respect to the above, Dion claims that
socialist nationalists are In touch with the concerns of
the PQ and often close ranks with it. Because the PQ is
the only party which is leftist and advocates independence,
many socialist nationalists support it for that reason and
29
vote for its candidates during elections.
From a philosophical standpoint, socialist nationalism
and the Parti Queipegois" social-democratic nationalism reject
the Canadian political system. They are unable to agree
on the kind of political regime that would best suit Quebec.
In other areas, they are more closely aligned. For example,
both argue that the Canadian Confederation, the political
system born out out of the British North America Act, does
not serve the best Interests of Quebeckers, and that there
is no good reason to think it can be reformed to any sig
nificant extent. In addition, both hold that the government,
the House of Commons, the federal administration and the
Supreme Court, all feature a permanent Anglophone majority
and that it is therefore only natural that they should
first of all serve the interests of the Emglish-speaking majority.

29
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Attempts to correct the situation and to introduce "equal
ity between the partners" have always led to resounding
failures, such as the fiasco of the Commission on Bi
lingualism and Biculturalism and the ineffectiveness of
the Official Languages Act*
Furthermore, in launching an offensive to promote
multiculturalism throughout Canada, as the federal govern
ment has done since 1 972, the government has once again
shown its inability to comprehend Quebec's desires, socialdemocratic nationalists argue* What is more, the relative
position of French Canadians throughout the country is
rapidly weakening, as shown by the 1971 federal esensus.^0
French-speaking minorities, except in New Brunswick, are
dwindling away? it is not

possible to change the demo

graphic, social and economic factors responsible* In a
few years, many claim, there will be practically no
French Canadians left outside Quebec. The ratio of French
Canadians to the rest^of the country's population can only
maintain its downward trend. Even in Quebec, given the
current socio-political context, the ratio of French
Canadians to English Canadians is falling off alarmingly,
particularly in the Montreal area.

3°
Stanley Liberson-, Language and Ethnic Relations in
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62
Moreover, attempting to answer French Canada's demands
by changing the Constitution and revamping the confederation
is ludicrous, according to spokesmen of socialist nationalism.
They feel that English Canada and the federal government have
given ample proof of the unacceptability of such adjustments.
From the socialist viewpoint, Anglophones are right to
oppose political decentralization or the granting of special
status to Quebec, since such measures would weaken Canada.
Hence, the Canadian government and English Canada can do
nothing for Quebec and, therefore, the only logical
solution is to divide the Canadian political system so as
to provide for two strong independent governments, subject
to later arrangements between them to meet common economic,
defense, and other requirements.
Social democrats and socialists also hold in common
similar arguments

•concerning the justifications used since

19^5 by the peoples of Africa and Asia to win independence
and secure their rights to political self-determination.
Both groups draw inspiration from the postwar experience
of colonized peoples to liberate themselves from colonial
powers. Various Quebec independence movements have not been
equally vocal in denouncing the colonialism,

from which, in

their view, Quebec suffers. But they all use anti-colonialist
arguements to some extent: socialist nationalists very
31
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aggressively; social democratic nationalists, such as those
of the Parti Quebegois. more moderately. Such anti-colonial
ist sentiments, though directed primarily against the
Canadian political system, are also directed against the
United States, against whose economic pull Canada itself is
largely defenseless.
It should be noted in historical context that while oldstyle European nationalisms were predominantly liberal, those
that appeared after the Second World War--in Yugoslavia,
China, Korea and Vietnam, Africa and South America--tended
32
toward socialism. More recently, national liberation move
ments have drawn upon more or less homegrown versions of
Marxism-Leninism, Ideologically, Quebec is different from
these, mainly because its postwar independence movements
have had much difficulty in combining their doctrine with
Marxism-Leninism in a way that is credible and attractive to
a wide cross-section of the public.
This is not to say, however, that Quebec has not been the
scene of violent, revolutionary nationalism that has been wit
nessed in both the developed and undeveloped world.
In I963 , a group of young radicals founded the F.L.Q.
/
'
\
(Front du liberation du Quebec)• The founding of the F.L.Q.,
and actually a great deal about the organization, is still

32
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shrouded in mystery. George Shoeters

one of the founders

of the organization, had ties with Castro, but anything
-
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more about potential outside influence is unknown. ^ What
is known is that the F.L.Q. and its militant wing, the
Army for the Liberation of Quebec(A.L.Q.), raised a great
deal of havoc throughout Montreal. Beginning with the theft
of weapons from armories, they graduated to threats of
blowing up a hotel where N.A.T.O. dignitaries were staying
in I9 6 3 » and eventually to planting bombs in mailboxes.*

.

In

.

a communique, they stated their desire 5 1
to completely destroy by systematic sabotage
all symbols of colonial institutions /"federal/ ,
in particular the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
and the Armed Forces, all information media in
the colonial language English that we scorn,
all commercial establishments and enterprises
that discriminate against Quebecois and that do
not use French as their official language.3^'
Premier Jean Lesage offered a fifty-thousand dollar re
ward for any information leading to the arrest of members of
the F.L.Q., but even with police crackdowns little progress
was made because theydid not know the suspects for whom they
were looking. Beyond the fact that the- suspects were young the only
information that came in was speculative theories. Some in
the police and government felt that the terrorists were
Algerian secret army fanatics or communist inspired national
ists, or perhaps a lunatic fringe of the separatist movement.
33
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Only after police raids on college campuses turned up
weapons stolen from armories, leading to a few arrests, did
the rash of bombings cease. Shoeters himself was arrested
and charged with the murder of one of the bomb technicians
who was attempting to disarm a mailbox. The fact that the
violence ended so quickly after a few arrests tended to
support the theory, at least in iy6jt that the F.L.Q. was
a very small organization.
The five-year hiatus of F.L.Q. violence ended in 1968.
By mid-year there had been nine bombings, and by March, 1 9 6 9 ,
there were sixty more. On October 5» 3-970, the F.L.Q. ®s
campaign of terror reached a climax when James Gross, the
/

British Trade Commissioner, was kidnapped. In a communique,
his abductors identified themselves as the F.L.Q. and made
two demands? 1 ) that twenty-three "political,prisoners" be
paid one half million dollars and released? and 2 ) that the
news service read and publish a n “F.L.Q. manifesto denoun
cing "capitalists" in Quebec(whether French or Englishspeaking) and criticizing Quebec's provincial government for
35
allowing itself to be a tool of the "oppressors."
The government first decided on a hard line refusal to
meet the terrorists demands. But as more communiques were
issued, threatening Cross* execution, the government
relented and read the manifesto on October 15® That same
35
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day, Quebec's Minister of Labor, Pierre LaPorte, was also
kidnapped by the F.L.Q. Years later, investigation would
show that the two acts were not planned in tandem. The
F.L.Q. worked in individual "cells" of five to ten mem
bers, and it was only when the "Chenier Cell" decided that
the "Liberation Cell," which kidnapped Cross, was going
to let an advantage slip away that it decided to kidnap
Pierre LaPorte.
After consultation with Robert Bourassa, Quebec's new
ly elected Premier, Trudeau decided that a true conspiracy
of terror was underway and .imposed the Emergency War
Measures Act. Martial law was declared, in effect, for the
entire province and over three hundred arrests were made
without charges and without release of names. At some point
during the period, Pierre LaPorte was killed.
After a tremendous manhunt, an exchange was finally
arranged in which Mr. Cross was freed and his abductors
were allowed passage to Cuba. On December 22, 1970, after an
intensive investigation, LaPorte*s murderers were captured.
They were found to be a 27-year-old school teacher, two
23-year-old laborers, and a 19-year-old former student.
The War Measures Act was replaced by the milder Public Order
Decree which expired in April of 1971.
36 .
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The Nationalism of the Parti Quebecois
The Parti Quebecois has given increased momentum to the
Liberal and Social Democratic forms of nationalism in that
it, too, stresses the modernization of the province and the
use of the apparatus of the state to effect change0 Its goal
is to ensure that Quebec becomes modern while at the same
time retaining its culture and language.
In his Potion Quebec, Levesque noted that traditional
nationalist arguments no longer serve Quebec's current
realities.

“The age of automatic unanimity has come to an

end," he said in Potion. "We are going through a sudden
acceleration of history, whose main features are the un
precedented developments os science, technology, and
economic activity. There are potential promises and dangers
immeasurably greater than the world has ever known.
Levesque stresses in Potion that in order to achieve
a society that will be in full control of its own destiny,
language and culture, it will be necessary to meet three
basic conditions. First, Quebeckers must secure once and for
all the safety of their "collective personality." The
primary prerequisite for this, he claims, is the power for
"unfettered" action by the state in many areas previously
assigned to* the federal government, such as citizenship
39
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and immigration. Second, as a means of achieving this ob
jective, Levesque holds that it will be necessary to have
a strong provincial state, one that will exercise jurisdic
tion over commercial and industrial corporations, financial
institutions, and will have the power to monitor and, to
some degree to control, the movement of investment and
capital. Furhtermore, he holds that the duplication of
jurisdictions in the economic sector between the federal and
provincial governments creates problems for provinces seeking
to plan their economic activity. It thus follows, he claims,
that the third basic minimum is that the government of Quebec
should exercise its power by giving direction to the
economy. In sum, he argues, Quebec's overriding objective
to "to seize for ourselves complete liberty in Quebec, the
right to all eszential components of independence ... the
complete mastery of every last area of decision-making.
This means that Quebec must become sovereign as soon as
ko
possible•"
40
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CHAPTER III
FEDERALISM AND FRENCH CANADA

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the key
point of difference between separatists, such as Rene
Levesque, and federalists, such as Pierre Trudeau, is the
question of Quebec's relationship to the federal structure
now in place. The gravity of the constitutional issue,
according to constitutional scholar J. Murray Beck, is that
"what is involved is nothing less than whether Canada
should remain an orthodox state or whether it should exist
1
at all." Although a new constitution has been implemented
which addresses some of the issues Quebec has raised in
the past, language and cultural rights for example, there
are still questions whether the new constitution will
ultimately resolve the problems Quebec had blamed on the
old constitution.
Quebec, it should be noted at the outset, has never
rested easily within the federal framework and, from time
to time, any number of proposals have been put forward to
accommodate Quebec's desires while at the same time leaving
Canada a united country. Extreme separatists would, of
1
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course, argue that Quebec has no place at all in Canada,
and have urged that the province divorce itself entirely
from the rest of the country. Thus far, however, this
notion has not received the kind of support that would
make it a viable option.
Within the past 20 years there have been numerous
attempts to bring together provincial and federal rep
resentatives to dlLscuss the status of the confederation
and ways to make federalism work for all. These have taken
the form of constitutional committees, federal-provincial
commissions, conferences, panels, discussion groups— both
governmental and academic— plenary sessions, and a host of
extra-parliamentary and extra-constitutional formats* The
fact that Canada's basic law has comeuup for discussion
with such frequency may indicate to some that there is
genuine desire among various groups to reach accommodation
on important constitutional issues? others, however, might
question(with equal justification) the soundness of Canada's
federal system and the prospects for its continuation in
light of this almost continuous effort to frame a new con
stitution. Richard Simeon, for one, holds that,

in I867 ,

Canada's founding fathers did not forsee the necessity of
extensive federal/provincial negotiations. They anticipated
that federal authority would always prevail in case of con
flict with the provinces, as it does in the United States.
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As time went on, however, federal/provincial interaction
increased* The demands of a modern state required a better
means of settling conflicts, as the parliamentary institu2
tions of the nation had failed to do.
Within the past quarter-century the constitutional prob
lem has, by Edward M. Corbett's measure, taken on "an in
creased air or urgency.” This was due, he claims, to Ottawa's
assumption of many areas formerly under provincial control,
an action which aroused discontent "not only in Quebec but in
most of the English-speaking provinces as well."^

Further

more, Corbett notes that the B.N.A. Act (Canada's constitution)
has allowed fluctuations of power over the course of its
existences from federal ascendancy during the early period of
confederation to provincial autonomy in the late nineteenth
century and back to "a unitary, centralized state which
emerged from World War I I . W h i l e ,

during the early 1960's,

there was some evidence of a return to a. degree of provincial
ascendancy, he notes that "the new dynamic of French Canadian
nationalism threatened the very basis of the constitutional
relationship on which th,e confederation rests.
2
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Three questions '.arise from the previous dis
cussion. 1) Why has the constitutional question become more
urgent in recent years? 2) Had a framework ever developed
for the resolution of conflict between the federal govern
ment and Quebec? 3) If so, what was its nature and why does
it not function as a means of conflict resolution today?
It will be hypothesized here that the method of
accommodation previously existing was that of "consociational
democracy" and that, in recent decades, the demand for-in
creased use of extra-constitutional methods has been brought
about by the demise of consociationalism in Quebec-Ottawa
relations•
The Federal Idea in Canada
The decision to adopt a federal system of government in
Canada was the result of the interplay of a number of factors.
It is important to note that before the adoption of the
British North America Act in I 8 67, the relationships then
existing were between separate colonies and territories and
the United Kingdom, not with each other. The absence of a
central government was attributable to the fact that Canada
had not experienced the revolution and war which had driven
the thirteen American colonies together.^ Additionally,

6
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Canadians had good reason to doubt the efficacy of a federal
structure, for at the time Canada's founding fathers were
considering which form of government to adopt the United
States was engaged in a bloody civil war over states'
rights•
In 1867* the British Parliament passed the British
North America Act at the request of the colonies of Canada
(Ontario and Quebec), Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick* This
act entered the three into a federal union to form :i one
Dominion under the name of Canada*
The British North America Act(B.N.A. Act) divided

the

Dominion into four provinces. The preconfederation province
of Canada became the provinces of Ontario and Quebec? Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick retained their former limits* In
1870, the Parliament of Canada created Manitoba* In 1871,
British Columbia entered the union%and in 1873* Prince
Edward Island. Alberta and Saskatchewan were created in
1895* Finally Newfoundland entered the confederation in

^.

19 9

Provisions of the British North America Act gave Canada
complete internal self-government. Later Canada assumed
complete control of its foreign-policy as well* It is now a
sovereign state. Until 1982, certain parts of the Constitution
could be changed only by an act of the British Parliament,

7^
but the new constitution enacted that year places all
amendment powers in the hands of Canada's parliament.
The sole reason that full amendment powers had not been
transferred to Canada under the old constitution was
that Canadians were unable to agree on an amending for
mula©
The B.N.A. Act gave the Canadian Parliament power to
"make laws for the peace, order and good government of
Canada in relation to all matters not assigned exclusively
n

to the legislatures of the provinces."' That is to say,
the residual powers were vested not in the provinces as
in the United States, but in the federal government. Inorder to preclude potential conflict, the Act added a list
of examples of this general power. These included defense,
raising money by any kind of taxation, regulation of trade
and commerce, navigation, shipping, money and banking,
bankruptcy and insolvency, patents and copyrights, criminal
law and criminal procedure, and any "works" declared by
Parliament to be to the advantage of Canada®

Amendments

have added unemployment Insurance and the power to amend
the Constitution, except in regard to the division of
powers between Parliament and the provincial legislatures,
the rights guaranteed to the English and French languages,
7
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the constitutional rights of certain religious denomina
tions in education, the requirement of an annual session
of Parliament, and the maximum duration of Parliament.
Finally, the Act gave Parliament and the provincial
legislatures concurrent ;power over agriculture and
immigration(with national lav; prevailing over provincial
in case of conflict) and amendment provisions for con
current jurisdiction over pensions(but with provincial
law prevailing in case of conflict)•
Quebec's View of the Constitution

As Edward M. Corbett notes,

"If English Canada had

followed the advice of the man who was largely responsible
for the fashioning of the Confederation ,

ord Durha

today's critical situation would have been resolved one
way or the others French Canada would have been well on
the way to complete assimilation, or cultural dualism
O
would be accepted as a matter of course from sea to sea."
At the time of confederation, French Canadians were
quite concerned that their language and culture be preserved
in Quebec(as they felt that this was their homeland), but
were not especially concerned with establishing religious,
language and cultural rights in other provincesc Quebeckers

8
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preferred the federal solution because it would allow
them at least some measure of control over the province's
internal affairs, particularly with respect to language,
religious and educational rights. John A. MacDonald gave
way on the unitary system he preferred when Quebec in
sisted on federalism.
There were several good reasons for Quebec to opt for
confederation. For example, many feared annexation by the
expansionist United States. Quebeckers were anxious to
protect their own institutions and felt that a Canadaian
federal system would be enough to guarantee them. For a
brief time, the federal solution did seem the best avenue.
It provided French Canadians with a means of participating
in the affairs of the nation while giving them a province
where they would be in the majority. Moreover, in I 867,
the provinces did control the governmental functions which
seemed most important for the protection of French
Canada's distinctiveness ’ education, civil law, and mat
ters respecting religious life0 Even such a prominent
and influential legislator as Hector Langevin predicted,
albeit too optimistically(as events were to prove,
the

federal

"in

Parliament there will not be questions of

race, nationality, religion or locality, as the legislature
will only be charged with the settlement of great national

7?
questions which will interest alike the whole confederacy
9
and not one locality only."
At the beginning of confederation, many Quebeckers
did believe that Quebec would be able to maintain its own
language, customs and institutions* Special provisions of
the B.N.A. Act made Quebec bi-lingual in its legislature
and courts. What is more, the Constitution of I 867 made
French one of the two official languages of Canada. Never
theless, not all French Canadians were totally satisfied
with the constitutional arrangement. Many feared that their
minority position

"would be even more vulnerable than ever

in a scheme that united Quebec with the Maritime Provinces
and looked forward to the addition of the Prairie West

and

Pacific Coast territories in the future. Others felt that
the federation placed so much power in the hands of the
federal government that a legislative union was being
created in fact if not in name. A.D. Dorin, a Quebec legis
lator, expressed his reservations when he said, " I know
that majorities are usually aggressive and how the possession
of power engenders despotism. I can understand how a majority*
animated a# this moment by the best feeling might in six or
nine months be willing to trample on the rights of the
minority while acting in good, faith and on what it considered
9
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10
to be its rights."
Another legislator, Outinard, was also concerned about
/

the talk he had heard about a "new nationality" from the
supporters of the confederation. Would this mean the as
similation of French Canada into the English-speaking
"nation?" Even Future Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier, in
an I 87I speech before the Quebec legislative assembly,
declared,

" It-is an historical fact that the federal form

was only adopted for the purpose of preserving for Quebec
that exceptional and unique position it holds on the
American continent. I am jealous to see that this position
is preserved in fact and with the poet I say,
not large, but from my cup I drink.'"

'My cup Is

11

The years following confederation would provide both
supporters and opponents of the federal scheme with evidence
to support their positions. French Canadians, to be sure,
benefitted from increasing economic progress and played an
active role in the policies which were designed to give
Canada its full nationhood status. Certainly, it could be
said that they had almost complete control over political
and cultural matters inside

Quebec. But there were also

disappointments. The first major crisis came in 1885 when
the MacDonald cabinet let the death sentence of Louis Riel
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stande Shortly thereafter,

in the province of Manitoba,

French schools were abolished and English became the
exclusive language in the provincial legislature, even
though a large French-speaking population existed in the
province. Added to these "injustices" were later conflicts
with federal authorities over British imperialismlin
South Africa and the conscription crisis of 1917• What
made these conflicts even more unpalatable was the fact
that while French language rights were being curbed out
side Quebec, the English-speaking minority inside Quebec
rested assured that nothing would ever be done to infringe
upon Its educational and.''.religious privileges. These acts
ultimately made French Canadians more aware of the plight
of French Canadians nationwide. One student of French..
Canadian attitudes, A.I. Silver, suggests that, by 1900,
most French Canadians had become convinced that the
future existence of Confederation was based on maintaining
French Canadian rights throughout Canada.

12

He further

maintains that this attitude goes directly to the root of
the perennial question English Canadians ask of French
Canada:"What does Quebec Want?" The answer, he says, is
that as "spokes-province" of Canada's French Canadian
citizens(no matter in v/hat province they reside), Quebec
12
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wishes to see that French Canadians* rights outside Quebec
proper will always be protected. The fact that Quebec did
not insist upon these rights being upheld throughout
Canada in I867 does not allow one to conclude that such
demands are inappropriate today.’4 Living people change,
and acquire new needs," he holds.

18
■

"Federalism in Ferment?" Minority Versus Majority
When the Fathers of Confederation convened at Char
lottetown, New Brunswick

in I 86 7 , and later in Quebec

City, to.formulate the principles for the union for
British North America, one of the first problems they
had to grapple with was that of the place of a minority in
a majority state. There we:re, of course, several types
of minorities including, in Sir John MacDonald*s view,
the rich. But "the most important minority was French
Canada•*When the French Canadians received their first
legislative assembly through the Constitutional Act of
I79I, they saw it primarily

as an instrument of survival

for their group, and as a defense mechanism against British
authorities and the growing British population who con
trolled the executive and legislative councils. The Act of
Union of 18L1 fused the two parts of Canada into one,
13
Ibid.
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although maintaining separate departments in certain fields
such as justice and education. But these steps did not
alter the basic social and political realities. French
Canadians contindied to speak French in the legislature and
elsewhere, and demanded the full application of respon
sible government, a valuable vehicle for the defense of
their interests. It is important to note that those who
pressed hardest for the dissolution of United Canada in
the 1860's were not the French Canadians but the English,
who insisted that French influence had become excessive.
The federal scheme that came about in 186? was a
result of a process of approximately three years of
negotiations. The process of confrontation and compromise
among differing interests was every bit as difficult for
Canada as it was for the United States in 1787* It could be
said that Canada's task was more difficult, since Americans
did not have to deal with a sizeable ethnic or linguistic
minority in their nation. Moreover, Americans were able to
reconcile differences among themselves, and Canadians have
hot— even in the span of 100 years—

been able to come to

terms with the French Canadian fact. William L. Living^
ston notes that, "Unlike Australia and the United States,
Canada was virtually an invention for bringing together
two quite different nationalities, the French and English
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and the history of Canadian federalism has been very
largely a history of efforts to reconcile the different
values and aspirations of the two groups which comprise
the Canadian nation."

1^

The British North America Act established a limited
official bilingualism, in that in debates in both houses
of Parliament, members may use either English or French,
the records and journals of both houses must be kept in
both languages, Acts of parliament must be published in
both, and either language may be used in any pleading or
process in courts set up by Parliament, Furthermore,

in

1969 Parliament adopted the Official Languages Act, which
declared that English and French enjoy equal status and
are the official languages of Canada for the purposes of
X
the Parliament and Government of Canada.
Except for limited official bilingualism and certain
educational rights for minorities, the Canadian constitution
of I867 provided no specific protection for basic rights,
like freedom of worship, of the press, or of assembly.
Such rights had been protected by ordinary law, but all of
them could be abolished or curtailed by Parliament or the
provincial legislatures. Such action would have been con
trary to the Canadian tradition, however, In i 9 6 0 , the
1^
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Parliament of Canada,accepted in

principle the concept of a

Bill of Rights, though it was not then written into law,
and the present government proposed a constitutional
Charter of Human Rights in the early 1970*s. Both measures
placed such rights beyond the power of either Parliament
or the legislatures and were formally incorporated in the
1982 constitution.
With respect to the amendment process, the constitution
of I 867 provided that each provincial legislature has ex
clusive power over the amendment of the provincial con
stitution (except as regards the office of Lieutenant Governor,
the legal head of the provincial executive), that is to say,
natural resources, direct taxation for provincial purposes,
prisons, hospitals, asylums and charities, municipal insti
tutions, licenses for provincial companies, property and
civil rights, and administration of justice and other matters
of local or private nature.
Thus it appears that, at least on the surface, Canada's
constitution of I867 afforded all the liberties that anyone
could ask for. What the constitution lacked, however, ac
cording to some constitutional scholars, was a purposeful
raison d'etre, Alan C, Cairns, for example,, held that one
major weakness was the nature of the British North America Act
itself which, by Cairns's measure,

"is a document of

monumental dullness which enshrines no eternal principles
15
and is devoid of inspirational contentc" This is d u e » -he
claims, to the fact that Canada lacked the imperative of
revolution and war that gave meaning to the U.S. Con
stitution. Moreover, Cairns holds that significant con
sequences of this lack of purpose were the threats of
secession and the constant bickering over the constitution.
Its apparent longevity has not made it a "living institu
tion.” The new constitution of 1982, although containing
provisions enumerating specific r i g h t s x i s still based on
the British North America Act. Cairns sees much of the
drive for a new document as based on the premise that the
British North America Act is a century old and has outlived
its usefulness."He claims, "the rather trite conclusion
automatically follows that a constitution, or constitutional

16

document, so heavy with years must be out of date.”

The Consociatlonal Model: Conflict and Accommodation in
Canada
Since Arend L i j p h a r V s pioneer study of consociatlonal
democracy a number of political theorists have expanded on
the concept. Lijphart's original study was an attempt to
develop hypotheses concerning how segmented polities, i. e.
15
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16
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those with significant cultural, linguistic, or religious
cleavages, were able to diminish conflict and achieve ac
commodation on issues which tended to divide the polity
along lines of cleavage*
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In his study of Canada and consociationalism, Kenneth
MacRae notes that consociationalism has been approached
from three principal standpoints: 1 ) as a pattern of
social structure, emphasizing the degree of religious,
ideological, cultural or linguistic decision-making and
conflict resolution; 2 ) as a pattern of elite behavior
and mass-elite relationships, emphasizing the process of
decision-making and conflict resolution; 3 ) as an under
lying characteristic of the political culture arising
from circumstances that may antedate the period of mass
....
18
politics•
In the

first approach mentioned above, MacRae contends

that the more a society is segmented around a single
cleavage line,

"the more it is an appropriate site for
19
the development of consociatlonal politics." 7 What
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should be examined, he contends, is to what extent lines
of cleavage appear in institutional structures, and then
to observe to what extent elements of cohesion and cooperation actually emerge in the political system.

20

In the second instance, consociationalism as a pattern
of elite behavior, MacRae holds the most important:-aspect
21
to be ."the capacity and good will of the elites."
Cit
ing Lijphart, MacRae points out that the most important
characteristic is not what particular institutional
arrangement is chosen, but rather how elites cooperate to
counteract disintegrative tendencies in the system. By
Lijphart8s yardstick, three possible outcomes among sub
cultures characterize solutions of the consociational type—
mutual veto, autonomy, and proportional representation;
22
while others— repression, separatism, and assimilation—
do not. That separatism is given by Lijphart as evidence
that a consociational arrangement no longer obtains suggests
the need for a deeper analysis of what has contributed to
the breakdown of consociational democracy in Canada.
The third example, and perhaps the most significant in
terms of our examination of the separatist movement, is the
20
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view of consociatlonal democracy as an underlying charac
teristic of the political tradition. As Lijphart observes,
"In this view, it is the existence of older patterns of
elite cooperation in the premodern period that paves the
way for a politics of accommodation in an age of mass
23
politics."
v He suggests that two possible outcomes of
elite cooperation are; 1) elite

cooperation as a pattern

of learned behavior(a deliberate response to the disin
tegrative perils of segmentation); and 2) elite cooperation
as a long-standing characteristic of the political system
(a factor which helps to moderate tensions as mass party
.2A
formation develops along pluralist lines.)
If consociational democracy

Is to be successful, by

Lijphart's definition, four requirements must be fulfilled:
1) the elites must be able to recognize the dangers of
fragmentation? 2) they must have the same commitment to
maintaining the system; 3) they must be able to transcend
subcultural cleavages at the elite level to work with the
elites of other subcultures, and 4) they must have the
ability to forge appropriate solutions that will accommodate
25
the divergent interests and demands of the subculture.
23
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Other factors which contribute to elite accommodation are
the existence of external threats, a balance of power
among subcultures, and popular acceptance of government
by the elite cartel."Over time," Lijphart holds,"inter
elite cooperation becomes habitual and consociational
norms become more firmly established."

26

Canadian Applications: Methods of Elite Accommodation
In order to understand the mechanism of consociational
politics in Canada, one must look for evidence of accom
modation not in compromise among parliamentary parties,
but within the party in power and in the workings of the
federal system. With respect to this, Presthus argues
that "the cabinet may be regarded as the prime symbol and
ultimate agent of natural synthesis among the political
27
elite."
MacRae concurrsrthat "longstanding and firm
traditions require the cabinet to be faithfully represen
tative not only of the provinces but also of religion and
language, even to the extent of some sacrifice of effic,,28
lency.
In this context, there are a number of historical exam
ples of how consociationalism has operated in Canada. Prime
Ministers during the early years after confederation sought
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to achieve balanced representation in the cabinet, not
only of provincial interests but also of language and
religious groups. In 1873, Alexander Mackenzie's cabinet
consisted of "five Catholics, three members of the
Church of England, three Presbyterians, two Methodists,
one Congregationalist and one Baptist."

29

7

Even prior

to Confederation, there existed an institutionalized
form of consociationalism during the Union Regime of the
1840*s, which combined the present-day provinces of
Quebec and Ontario, in which there developed a system
of double prime ministerships and twinned ministerial
portfolios In ministries that were carefully balanced to
give equal weight to French and English sections of the
province 9 £
Moreover, both'sections of the ’province developed a
two-party System and each of the foiir parliamentary groups
worked primarily In loose coalition with its counterpart
in the other section. That is to say, the Lower Canada
Bleus worked with Upper Canada Conservatives, while the
Lower Canada Rouges worked with Upper Canada Reformers.
Although this pattern worked for a while, during successive
elections,the coalitions became increasingly unbalanced
and the result was political.' deadlock. The proposal for
29
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a "double majority,” in which the dominant group in
each section would collaborate regardless of party
platform, became untenable when the dominant Blues
of Eastern Canada could not work with the anti-Catholic
reformers of Western Canada.
Confederation, with its division of United Canada into
the provinces of Quebec and Ontario, solved the problem of
provincial deadlock by giving each province its own,
separate legislature. Nonetheless, the prospects for
achieving the same kind of consensus between French
and English-speaking groups that had been obtained in
the pre-confederation days of United Canada grew slimmer
as the entry of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia titled the
balance in fovor of the English-speaking majorityo The
province of Manitoba, which entered confeaeration in

1870, ,

had consociational institutions similar to those of United
Canada, including an ethnically balanced Upper House,
equality for the English and French languagesP and a
denominational school systeme The provinces of Alberta
and Saskatchewan also adopted these same patterns.
V/hat upset the consociational balance in all three
of these newer provinces was a massive English-speaking
migration during the latter half of the nineteenth century.
In Manitoba, a statute of IS90 made English t,he sole official

language. In 1882, the Northwest Territories adopted a
similar measure, with the approval of the federal govern
ment. The 1905 Sifton Amendment provided the Prairie
Provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan with the constitu
tional means to curb minority rights in these provinces.
While French Canadian influence was curbed elsewhere
in Canada, the province of Quebec itself became the channel
by which French Canadians made known their discontent.
Quebec's leadership thus became the tool by which French
Canadians vented their dismay over what they believed to
be a violation of the compact made between the two cultures
during confederation, namely, that French Canada's language
and Roman Catholic re3.igion would be honored and protected
nationwide. Thus,

it fell upon Quebec to shoulder French

Canada's cause and take it to the federal level.
Although Quebec and the rest of French Canada wished to
see a restoration of French rights throughout the country,
Quebec did not, however, push the issue too heavily in
the federal Parliament. As long as Quebec itself did not
suffer adversely, and as long as It remained conservative and
traditional, nothing was done to challenge confederation.
But the adoption of a federal system in I 867 did add another
dimension to the consociational pattern which had prevailed
under the Union Regime. Whereas before the division of
United Canada, English and French groups had worked out a
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pattern of accommodation within the province, confederation
placed the new provincial "boundaries atop the axes of
cleavage already existing between English-speaking Canada
and the majority of French-speaking Canadians, Thus, French
Canadians in Quebec began to see themselves as a distinct
religious, cultural, linguistic and political

entity.

As

MacRae observes:
We encounter here a situation of overlap
ping cleavages by which province, language,
and religion are linked and interrelated.
In this respect, Quebec is indeed a subcul
ture that departs significantly from all
other provinces and from the Canadian aver
ages • And if the image of a famille spirituelle can no longer do justice to Quebec *s
diversity, the image of a Lager» a defensive
complex in a hostile environment, is not in
appropriate , 30
Throughout the late nineteenth and into the twentieth
century, there were other occasions where Quebec opposed
federal authorities in the name of French Canada: the Boer
conflict of 1900 and the conscription crises of 193-7 and
19^1* Two reasons that these crises did not divide

the

confederation were* 1) that Quebec? still remained a
traditional society in which its language and religion were
protected, and 2) the consociational pattern of pre-confed
eration days had been supplanted by one in which Quebec's

30
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political elites reached accommodation with federal elites
concerning how crises were to be managed.
The importance of the elite model lies in the fact
that "even in the absence of national identity or consen
sus, if there are strong limited identities or subcultures
it is possible for the political leaders of these units
consciously to practice accommodation at the elite level in
order to maintain the political system and make it operate
31
effectively."^
This is done through keeping "transact
tions among antagonistic subcultures in a divided society—
or similarly, among different nationalities in a multicul32
tural state— to a minimum."^ Noel adds,'
In the perfect(i,ec most extreme) case of consociational democracy each of the units in the
system would be perfectly encapsulized, There
wcmld therefore be no horizontal communication
whatever at the mass level. Instead, there
would be only vertical communication between
mass and elite within each unit, and com*",
munication across subcultural boundaries would
be entirely a function of the political elite.
Two important differences, however, between the theor
etical terms of the consociational model and actual political
systems are, 1) that even when the actual subcultures are
separated by a language barrier there is always a certain

31
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amount of horizontal communication between the elite of one
subculture and the masses of the other. 2) Even if it is
theoretically possible that consociational democracy could
function satisfactority, if among the masses of the differend subcultures there was absolutely no attachment to the
national political system and no sense whatever of a
national identity, some popular support is always present.
What distinguishes the consociational political system,
Noel notes,

"is the relative weakness of its mass national

sentiments and the overcoming of this weakness through
accommodation at the elite level."
Elites and the Party System
In answer to the question "Who constitutes the elite?,"
MacRae suggests that the answer be sought in the polity's
political parties because of their natural propensity to
appeal to a wide spectrum of interests. In addition MacRae
holds that a study of the elites in the political parties
is useful in determining the success of accommodation efforts
and is crucial to gauging how well the polity copes with
segmentation.
An examination of Canadian parties and those cited by
Lijphart in his studies of Europe reveals, 1) that the
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Canadian political parties have traditionally had low
ideological profiles; 2) Canada has an electoral sys
tem that places a high premium on winning single mem
ber constituencies; and 3) there exists a strong ten
dency toward single-party control of the legislatures
and one-party ministries. European examples— the Nether
lands, Switzerland--by contrast demonstrate a tendency
toward more ideological parties, proportional represen
tation and coalition ministries like the Swiss federal
pattern. Similarly, Canadian provinces tend to single
member constituencies and one-party ministries.
The political history of Canada shows that federal
politics in the first half-ohntury after Confederation
v/as characterized by a two-party system in which both
Liberals and Conservatives sought to obtain as wide a
spectrum of support as possible. Though other parties
appeared on the scene during the

1 9 2 0 ®s

and became an

enduring part of the political edifice, the two-party
system remained. Those third parties that did arise—
the Progressives, the C.C.F., and Social Credit-r- held
that their aim was not to create permanent minor groups
but to simplify the party system by forcing a realignment
of political loyalty nationwide, Each of these third
parties sought to achieve major party status, and cam
paigned accordingly before the electorate. The lack of

the third parties' ability to become a significant force
in federal politics may be explained by the fact that
no federal party has sought to become identified as the
representative of a specific province, region

u religious

denomination or cultural group. Thus, consociational
democracy in Canada has taken place within the party in
power at the federal level and not in compromise among
various parliamentary parties.
The Breakdown of Consociational Politics? Causes and
Consequences
The modernization of Quebec and the decline of the
tradition-oriented Duplessis regime brought about a
simultaneous decline in consociational politics. First,
the Union Rationale was a provincial party and as such
was not active at the federal level as a major party.
Duplessis was content that as long as federal authority:'
did not interfere with Quebec's traditional way of life,
and his control over the province, there was no need to
challenge Ottawa on any matter. Thus, the Union Rationale
was autonomy conscious, but only insofar as Duplessis
sought to keep Quebec out of the mainstream of the
twentieth century.
The coming to power of the Liberal regime in

9?
i960 marked an important watershed in Quebec’s economic and
social developmentc The Liberals strove for a modern state,
a "Quiet Revolution," under the direction of Premier Jean
Lesage. As D.C. Thompson points out, "It has been argued
that the radical modernization of Quebec since the death of
Maurice Duplessis in 1959» has exorcised the preoccupation
with survival and replaced it with the leitmotif of enanouissement .“M o r e o v e r , Lion Dion observes,
Nowhere else, perhaps than in Quebec during
this period, has the new order challenged
the old so suddenly and so brutally. Nowhere
else, perhaps, is the social framework so
channel this tide of social change. Few
societies have experienced such profound
changes In so short a space of time as
Quebec during the last decades demographically, In education, in religious outlook
and in political life, these changes have
taken on themagnitude: of a .‘revolution. . .
At a dizzying pace, traditional values have
been discarded, the elite dispossessed, the
leadership contested.36

Among the most significant changes brought about by the
modernization process were,l) ideological changes, in which
Quebec became more secularized in Its attitudes and beliefs.
The Church, which had once held sway over the province’s
educational and intellectual establishments gave way to
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state control in education and social policy; 2) demographic
changes in the province's rural base, the mainstay of the
Church's power and a bastion of conservative values, began
to erode during the 1 9 2 0 's soithat by the 1 9 6 0 's the
transformation to an urban society was complete; and 3)
political changes, In which Quebec's party system underwent
a fundamental shift from being controlled by a traditionoriented provincial party &nd came under the Influence of
a pro-federal party dedicated to the extension of French
Canadian rights.
Although not a separatist party, the Liberal regime
did seek to secure French Canadian rights, ‘particularly
with respect to the use of the French language, both in
Quebec's business community and in the federal bureau
cracy. The Liberals did not advocate that Quebec attempt
to; form a new nation, but did insist that French Canadians
be given a more active role in the affairs of the entire
confederacy, and that this role allow them to retain their
language and culture0 In order to achieve this, they adopted
a much tougher bargaining stance vis-a-vis Ottawa on language
and fiscal issues. As such, the Liberals did not reinforce
the lines of cleavage with respect to Quebec alone, but
attempted to extend the notion of a bi~lingual Canada
to ;all the provinces and throughout the federal government.

The Parti Quebe^ois, meanwhile, concentrated its
efforts on Quebec alone. Like the Liberals, it was
dedicated to a modern Quebec, but it sought to achieve
a unilingual Quebec that would not have to bargain with
Ottawa concerning the ways and means that French rights
would be preserved. Thus, the P.Q. did seek to delineate
the lines of cleavage to coincide with Quebec's provincial
boundaries. Whereas under the Liberals, the "lines of
correlation between political parties and any of the axes
37
of cleavage had been conspicuously absent,"
Quebec
under the P.Q. was to be a sovereign state with only
loose ties to the rest of the confederacy. Thus also, the
P.Q. by its actions, does not conform to the consociational
pattern established by Lijphart in that 1) its elites
do not recognize any danger of fragmentation, 2) they do
not have the same

commitment

to maintaining the system,

3) they have difficulty In transcending subcultural
cleavages at the elite level and working with elites of
other subcultures, and 4) they seem unprepared to forge
solutions with other elites that will accommodate divergent
interests in the polity. Moreover, the P.Q. appears to fit
the mold of an anti-system party which, according to

“^MacRae, p. 247.
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Giovani Sartori, is a party that "undermines the legitimacy
of:'the regime it opposes.1

The rise of a modern Quebec

along with the establishment of a more expansion-oriented
Liberal party and a separatist-oriented Parti Quebejpois
prompted C. W h i t e , J. Millar and W. Gagne to observe that
"the Confederation, and in particular Freneh-English

relations, can be viewed as a consocia.tional democracy,
which!)has been faltering for some time and which has since
i960 almost completely broken down."

39

Response to Crisis; Federal/Provincial Diplomacy
As Simeon noted in the beginning of this chapter,
Canada's founding fathers did not anticipate the need
for extensive federal/provincial negotiations because
they believed provincial and federal interests would not
overlap. The emergence of a modern Canada, along with
with a modern Quebec in the 1 9 6 0 *s, forced a reexamination
of this original assumption. With all provinces now
demanding a larger role in the making of national policy,
the Pearson regime(1963-I968) began a series of federal/
provincial conferences. These meetings provided contact
between ministers and civil servants at both levels of
38
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so that common problems could be discussed.
The name given to these conferences, this process, was
"co-operative" federalism. Prior to the Pearson regime,
provincial premiers met on a one-to-one basis with federal
authorities who left them "little room for maneuver" and
"little choice but to accent the nackage deal the federal
40
government offered them."
Supporters of co-operative federalism, such as Jean
Luc Pepin, held that federal/provincial conferences were
a pragmatic way of dealing with the shortcomings of the
constitution." It is illusory," he says," to expect the
constitution to cover all circumstances; the broad dis
tinction between general and particular interests has
never really been valid. The aim should be to achieve
the joint participation of all the governments in the
principal functions of the state."

Li,l

Moreover, supporters

of co-operative federalism argue, each level of government
maintains separate jurisdiction over different aspects of ■;
the same sub ject( even though-' the distinctions disappear
as close co-ordination of policy is attained). As Corbett
points out,

when discussing relations between the central

government and Quebec,

40;
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The criterion is aptitude tjurisdiction is de
termined by ’/'hat each order of government is
best equipped to do in principle, but also in
accord with the needs of the moment* Special
ization is decided on the basis of competence,
with the best qualified government assuming
responsibility regardless of any additional
requirements except the agreement of the two
nationalities
However ideal the concept of co-operatrive federalism
may sound, it is not without its critics, many of whom are
French-Canadian nationalists. Opponents of co-operative
federalism charge that neither the federal parliament nor
the provincial legislatures are given an adequate role
under the system. Their .major objection >:is that in these
closed sessions, with a few dozen advisors, the Prime
Minister and the provincial premiers reach decisions on
important matters of mixed jurisdiction* Following the
discussion, the premiers then seek legislative approval,
but the result is that both federa.1 and provincial legis
lators are asked merely to approve the decisions that
43
have already been made.
One suggestion to remedy this defect was put forward by
Professor Norman W a r d , who has recommended a Ministry of
Federal-Provincial Affairs in Ottawa* This would bring
issues to the floor of the House of Commons on a continuing

Ibid *, p. 1 67 »
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basis and abolish the need for federal-provincial confer
ences, which tend to be executive rather than democratic
meetings. Ironically, the concept of a Ministry of Provincial
Affairs is not new. There was a Secretariat of State for
Provincial Affairs during the first few years following
confederation but this office was abolished in 1873 during
a time of Increased federal ascendancy.
French Canadian! nationalists also express reservations
about the way in which co-operative federalism brings abouta blurring of judicial lines implicit in ad hoc appraisals
of which government— federal or provincial—

is best

equipped to deal with a given set of issues. As cooperation
advances 1 the distinction between federal and provincial
jurisdictions becomes lost. Hence, they argue, cooperative
federalism is a major step toward a unitary state. It is a
myth, they charge, that in the long run will result in a
continuing intrusion of federal power into areas the Con
stitution allots to the provinces. Of course, if written
constitutional limitations wezeutaken literally, the federal
government would have little to do with programs such as
education, regional economic agencies, or social security.
However, the demands of these programs are now beyond the
means of the provinces and hence, by attempting to meet
these demands, the federal government relies on ad hoc

1 04

solutions to avoid the separations of power defined by the
Constitution. Written constitutional guarantees are thus
superseded by expediency, the Quebec nationalists claim,
leaving basic rights to "the mercy of governments and
politicians whose successors may feel free of all restraint
where the minorities' constitutional rights are concerned.1'
A.W, Johnson has outlined what he feels to be the four
main alternatives for the direction of Canadian federalism.
The first is to move toward more centralization, on the
assumption that as all nations, including Canada, will move
toward a "global community", ethnic and regional interests
will become submerged. The second is to strengthen the
regionalization of government, on the supposition that the
advantages of unity can be preserved even though such
regionalization would weaken the federal governmento

The

third is to have“greater regionalization in Quebec only,
assuming that a higher degree of centralization would prevail
in the rest >of Canada. The fourth

- alternative is to

"somehow marry the stronger regional governments and the
strong central government on the assumption that strong
federal and provincial governments can somehow reconcile and
harmonize their priorities."

lil±
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A • Centralization versus Decentralization
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Concerning greater centralization, Johnson holds "that
there is a strong case for this based on the fact that
greater interdependence between the provinces exists
today than ever before in terms of social, and especially
economic, ties. However, as a tool for solving the ques
tion of Quebec's need for more independence, Johnson
readily admits that it will fail."Quebec would rather
separate than be submerged, and the peoples and premiers
of English-speaking Canada y/duld have to become uncharac
teristically submissive before a substantial centralization
of government could be realized." ^ 5
Similarly, Johnson maintains that progressive decen
tralization offers some attractions in that it would
conform

’to

Quebec's demand that more power be concentra

ted in the provincial capital. This would allow other
provincial governments to pursue

:the-rregional and provincial

economic programs to which they are committed, and allow
Quebeckers to be "masters in their own house." On the
negative side, Johnson notes,

"the cost of this alternative,

too, is high. The vehicles of national economic policy would
tend to remain static, or be diminished, as provincial
economic powers grew. Federal fiscal policy would decline in
k5
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importance as the federal resources of the central government were progressively transferred to the provinces."
B. Special Status
An additional way to balance the forces of unity and
diversity in Canada— the first of the two which lie between
the extremes of centralization and decentralization— is to
provide for a greater regionalization of government in
Quebec only. This increase in regionalization could take
the form of a special status for Quebec within the present
federal structure, or it could call for giving to that
province "associate state" status.
Johnson acknowledges that, unlike the case with pro
gressive regionalization throughout the whole of Canada,
which would seriously weaken the central government,

"it

does not follow logically that the same price would be
paid if that course were to be followed only in Quebec."
The four concepts that constitute the "state particulier" are;
1 ) that under such an arrangement, the government
of Quebec would assume full responsibility for
most if not all federal-provincial programs and
would receive from the federal government a fis
cal transfer which would fully compensate the
province. The government of Quebec would also
be compensated for new federal-provincial programs-^such as medicare--whether or not the
46
47
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province undertook a program similar
to that required in other provinces,*
2)

the government of Quebec would assume
all responsibility for certain purely
federal programs, principally the
family allowances and old age security
income maintenance programs, and would
be compensated by means of a fiscal ••. . transfer from the federal government j

3)

the government of Quebec would gain the
right to be consulted with respect to
other federal policies, including fiscal»
tariff and trade policies and probably
monetary policy;
the government of Quebec might expect to
assume certain aspects of federal juris
diction, such as the right to conclude
international agreements in the fields
of provincial jurisdiction.

As with the previously-mentioned possibilities, the
special status option also has disadvantages as well as
advantages. Concerning fiscal questions, especially with
reference to taxes, some 100 percent of the individual
income tax and between 50 and 100 percent of the corpor
ation taxes would be transferred to the government of
Quebec.1 This would m e a n ,that federaljtax.es would fall
most heavily on provinces other than Quebec,, while the
economic benefits would be felt across the whole country.
The offshoot of such a special status situation would
also mean that the people and governments of the other

Ibid.f p. 106.
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provinces would have to accept the application of these
policies in their part of Canada, thought not in Quebec,
and rely on voluntary co-operation of the .government of
Quebec for the application of similar policies in that
province•
Federal monetary and trade policies would naturally
continue to apply throughout the whole of Canada? however,
they would be formulated in the context of special consul
tations with Quebec, unless, of course, the other provinces
were to insist upon similar rights* Just how extensive
this consultation would be and what it would involve is
a moot point* If it were to mean, for example, that Quebec
would have the right to express its views on federal
policies, the situation would not be much different than
it is now. If, on the other hand, there existed some con
stitutional obligation upon the government of Canada to
gain Quebec's consent, or if Quebec had veto power over
legislation, then it Is difficult to visualize any region
in Canada being prepared to give Quebec a priority voice
in these economic policies.
Similarly, special status would call for Quebec's
exercising full control over all federal regional develop
ment policies, and some advocates of special status state
in their writings that Quebec should also have a voice

in general economic policies— fiscal and credit, tariff and
trade, and manpower training— since regional economic
measures can function properly only if they operate in
harmony with these general policies. Moreover, special
status in the field of economic regional policy could come
to mean the use by the government of Quebec of a range of
special powers for the purpose of influencing its indus
trial and resource development: its larger share of the
corporation tax, its control over special federal regional
measures, its right of consult with the central government
on federal economic policy, as well as the usual loan
guarantee':-and industrial estates programs to be found in all
the provinceso The question would remain, however, if,
!' 1 f

given the different economic interests of the several
provinces in Canada and the keenness of competition between
them for industrial resource development funds, wpuld
’’special status” be acceptable to the people and the govern
ments of the other provinces?
Another significant question about special status is
its effect on social policy and the distribution of benefits
and costs of the federal programs Involved. Shared-cost
programs have already been the subject of intense discussion,
and Quebec now enjoys a "special status" with respect to
some programs in this fieldo Newer federal-provincial

110
programs, however, have not provided any special options
for Quebec: the province, like all others must start
a universal and public medical care program, for example,
in order to qualify for the new federal medicare grants.
And, like the other provinces, Quebec has been told that
when Its medicare program is well established, new fiscal
arrangements will be considered under which it could
assume full responsibility for its program. To have
given Quebec special status without such a stipulation
would have been tantamount to giving the province full
compensation whether or not a qualifying program were
started in the province. Similarly, for this program to
work, it is assumed that the other provinces would re
frain from asking for similar treatment.
A further question which arises with respect to the
special Issue is- that concerning social policies which
are stricltly federal and designed to achieve income re
distribution. The government of Quebec would become the
sole agency responsible for income maintenance programs
such as family allowances and old-age security pensions.
Tax Issues with respect to "special status" are even
more complex. It is obvious that tax revenues from the
rest of Canada would have to continue to flow into Quebec

Ill
if taxes were not to rise as a result of the provincial
government's assumption of full responsibility for income
redistribution. Since income In Quebec is below the
national average, the current federal Income redistribution
measures that now apply automatically across Canada result
In a net influx of some 200 million dollars per year for
Quebec. Under special status, Parliament would continue
to make tax payments to Quebec but would forego any con
stitutional right to make payments to persons in Quebec.
Again, there is also considerable doubt as to whether tax
payers in other provinces would be willing to accept the
proposition that they ‘ ought to make contributions to
maintain the revenues of the government of Quebec while
having no say, through federal representation, concerning
how those revenues would be distributed. And would not
the possibility arise that other provinces would demand
similar privileges if they felt the need in the future?
What his more, under a special status arrangement, the
government of Quebec would have superior constitutional
powers in relation to those enjoyed by other provinces, par
ticularly with respect to its ability to influence Canada's
economic policy and its competitive advantages in the fields
of industrial and economic development. The question
naturally arises, from the perspective of other provincial

112
governments, whether the present intergovernmental arrange
ments would persist in the face of this new balance of
power. Could not Quebec, with its special ficsal status
and equalization payments, to which the citizens of other
provinces have contributed, finance competitive tax in
centives to industry? In short, wJould the special fiscal
status enjoyed by one provincial government force a re
adjustment designed to bring into balance the fiscal power
and responsibilities of all provinces?
Concerning the operation of the machinery of government
in Ottawa, Parliament would no longer have jurisdiction with
respect to income redistribution measures, new federalprovincial programs, or regional economic development.
Thus, the Quebec government would be recognized as the
responsible spokesman for the views of Quebeckers concerning
federal'

economic policies; Quebec cabinet ministers would

replace Quebec's own members of Parliament on many heretofore
federal matters. The Parliament of Canada would come to
legislate on two classes of questions, those in which
Quebec

M.P.'s had a vote,>and those in which the opposite

was the case. Hence, the broader the range of respon-"
sibilities transferred to the government of Quebec, the more
Parliament would be legislating with respect to the nine
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other provinces only* Simply put, Quebec's M.P.'s would
have the same say in forming a federal government as
did the others, although they ■.wo.uld be less affected by
it. The dilemma is that there would be two classes of
voting in Parliament, but there could only be one govern
ment. On a more concrete level, Johnson concludes with
respect to the above,

"The extent of this transfer of

powers, if carried to the conclusion advocated by some,
would be a relatively independent Quebec, associated with
the rest of Canada to the extent that it was advantageous
to do so. Parliament would legislate for the two parts
of Canada only in respect to such matters as tariffs and
trade, currency and monetary matters, and defense«'

h,9

Johnson notes that one of the major ironies of the
adoption of ''special status" is that although Quebeckers
would be to a greater degree "masters in their own house,"
they would be the subjects of what would be more like a
unitary provincial state and that "for Canadians in other
provinces, too, special status would lead more in the
direction of a unitary state, as it became easier and
more convenient to centralize powers in Ottawa." T?ne
resulting paradox, he claims, is that in an attempt to
strengthen the forces of diversity by greater regional
ization, the forces for pluralism would be diminished.
49
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C . The Associate State Option
A final option to be discussed in this chapter is that
of an "associate state." The main thrust of this option
would be to create two sovereign states, one English and
one French, and to delegate authority from each to a
new confederal body of limited powers. This arrangement
would .'.be, according to some advocates, analogous to the
European Common Market in terms of the powers given up
by its members. Other proponents hold that the associate
state should be given broader powers, including trade
and monetary policy and international relations. Johnson
notes that "whatever the case, this approach seems to
assure a centralization of powers in both states— a kind
<1
of 'dual* centralism." ^
The "associate state" option, in contrast to other op
tions previously discussed, would make the notion of a
federal regime superfluous, for under this option Quebec
would be, in effect, a separate country. Three features of
the "associate state" option are that 1 ) there would no
longer be a federal state or federal government machinery
as currently constituted. Each state would influence common
economic policies, which would be developed through nego
tiations written into the new confederal agreement. 2)
51
Ibid.

Each

state would have its own regional development policies,
subject to the agreed economic policies, and 3) each state
would have its own income redistribution and its own
social security measures.
Such an arrangement, in short, would do away with the
need for parliamentary representatives: by substituting a
confederal apparatus in which delegates appointed by the
governments of the two member states would make all
decisions. And it would be assumed that mutual selfinterest would be relied upon to force a reconciliation
of the conflicting inter^stssof the two states.
The idea of an "associate state" comes ^closest to
/

Rene Levesque's idea of "sovereignty-association," and
for all practical purposes the two concepts are one in
the same. Levesque first put forth his idea of "sovereignty
association" in his book entitled Option Quebec as part of
the P.Q. manif e s t o i n 1968. However, it should be noted
that, rather than being a concrete plan of action, Option
Quebec could best be described as a polemic expressing
Levesque's views of the inadequacies of the current federal
structure in terms of Quebec's linguistic and cultural needs.
Levesque begins Option by rejecting the notion of
"special status" which he describes as a concept that
only "gives one the impression of security..., as if Quebec's
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sovereignty meant anything more than a simple political
<2
rearrangement in a marginal area of North America*"-^
What is m o r e , Levesque s ays ,
The moment it was suggested, the absurdity
of this alternative became apparent: apart
from the fact that the Canadian federation
was to have inflicted upon it a constitu
tional deformity that would make it an ob
ject of curiosity in the world— a fact
that we knew from the enunciation of the
thesis— the "privileges” accorded to Que
bec* •.would give rise to just as vehement
protests in other provinces as independence
itself*53
Levesque suggests that his ’’sovereignty/association
plan would create a Quebec that is both "sovereign” and
"independent" of the rest of Canada while at the same time
it would retain an "economic association" with the other
nine provinces* According to Levesque, such an arrangement
would "conform to the second great trend of our times: the
new economic groups, customs unions, common markets, etc. *
He envisions a "new" relationship of two nations, one with
its homeland in Quebec and another free to rearrange the
rest of the country at will which would be freely associated
in the new adaptation of the current "common market** for
mula, making up an entity,which would, perhaps— and if
so very precisely— be called a “Canadian Union."

He

Rene Levesque, Out ion Quebec(Montreal:McClelland and
Stewart, 1968), p. 9.
53
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suggests that such a union would included the following
features:!) a monetary union;2) common tariffs?3) a pos
tal union;4)

joint Quebec/Canada administration of the

national debt; and 5) co-ordination of policies. With
respect to foreign policy, Levesque holds that Quebec
and Canada would have equal participation in the for
mulation and participation in defense policy "in pro
portion to our means." ^
Levesque stresses in Option that it Is necessary to
create a state which is both modern and French. The old
methods of retaining Quebec's uniqueness In language and
culture by adherence to traditional values no longer serves
Quebec's interests in a modern world. Levesque observed
In Option that Quebec's traditional society is gone; that
today most Quebeckers are city-dwellers and workers; that
the old policies of survivance no longer serve Quebec's in
terests •
In order to achieve a modern society, Quebec must meet
what Levesque terms "three basic minimums•" First, he states
that Quebecois must "secure once and for all the safety or
our collective personality. The prerequisite

to this,is,

among other things, the power for unfettered action in
fields as varied as those of citizenship. Immigration and

and employment•*' Second, as a means to attain the above
objective, it will be necessary for Quebec to maintain a
strong provincial government," one that would exercise
jurisdiction over commercial and industrial corporations,
money and banking, and would have the power to exercise
a reasonable controllover the investment of our capital*.'" -57
Third, it will be necessary to eliminate the duplication
of jurisdictions between the federal government and the
government of Quebec." The fact that certain economic tools
belong to the federal government while other powers whose
exercise also influence economic life belong to the provin
ces creates:a difficult problem in the rational planning of
economic activity

The government of Quebec should,

therefore, exercise its powers by giving direction to the
economy,

rationalizing its marginal industries and
58
developing secondary industries."
The financial arrangements Levesque suggests between
Canada and Quebec would consist of 1) a common currency
and 2) a common market. The first would be achieved, he
claims, by a treaty of "five years duration" during
Quebec’s transition period from federal state to "associate
state." At the end of this initial period, he says, "we
would have created for once an original model which would
56
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be sure to inspire imitation by any number of countries." The
second feature of the union, the "common market," he holds
is already established elsewhere i n 'the world." The heart
of the common market," he claims,"is the customs union,
which forbids member states to levy tariffs on goods ex
changed between them." Like the common currency arrangement,
the customs union would require the conclusion of another
agreement which would call for "prior negotiations during
which it would be possible’to rectify certain anomalies."

60

As for how a sovereign Quebec would be financed,
Levesque asserts that,

"in achieving its political liberty,

Quebec naturally would take back complete control of its
61
fiscal resources." Past fiscal relationships with Ottawa,
he contends, have proved disadvantageous for Quebec, as
the benefits Quebec receives from federalism have not
kept pace with the amount of federal taxes extracted from
the province. By severing financial ties with Ottawa,
Levesque holds, the "vast" sums Quebec spends on the federal
bureaucracy could be channeled into projects of exclusive
benefit to Quebec and would "put an end to the infernal
squandering of money that has gone on shamelessly in Ottawa
for years, at the expense of Quebec taxpayers as well as
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taxpayers elsewhere0" J
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Concerning the relationship between Quebec's government
and private investment, Levesque contends that "the level
of private investment in Quebec has nothing to do with (and
no one has brought forth the slightest proof to the con
trary)

political developments," ^

He attributes

Ontario's higher level of investment to its "direct con
nections" to large sums of U.-S, capital and Ottawa's
favoritism toward the province. In an independent Quebec,
he suggests, one method that could be used'to obtain
additional revenue for the province would be a transformation of the

system of "concessions•" By this, Levesque

means that Quebec would be less incluned to allow exploita
tion of its natural resources such as forests and minerals,
by companies controlled from outside the province without
a substantial return to the province in terms of tax
revenues. Such companies would ;also be required to take
more direction from the government of Quebec in how they
ran their operations as well as conceding a larger role
for Quebecois in the management of enterprises inside
Quebec•
As for those who argue that such measures would bring
about "capital flight" from the province, Levesque maintains
that corporations such as insurance and trust companies
63
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would merely be required to incorporate in Quebec if they
had not done so already. To those who raise the specter
that corporations will transfer their profits abroad,
Levesque states,
This happens and will always happen whatever
the political system. The process will reach
a level that can be termed that of "serious"
flight only if conditions are unfavorable for
the reinvestment of "mobile" funds. The only
efficient solution, apart from emergency
measures, such as the control of the movement
of capital, is to create the best possible
conditions for business to flourish. In no
way does this require us to perform a col- o
lective act of licking the investors' boots,
but rather we must pay strict attention to,
such things as better technical training,
As with special status, there are significant ques
tions raised by the associate state/sovereignty association
model. First, would the mutual interdependence of the two
entities guarantee the survival of the French Canadian
nation in the face of the significant economic and political
pull exerted by the United States and Canada? Although
proponents of an associated state assume a "common market"
arrangement, it is possible that, for example, British
Columbia and the Prairie provinces would prefer to align
themselves closer to the United States than to Ontario
and Quebec, Or, perhaps, the Atlantic provinces might
draw closer to the New England states.
65
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Even assuming that the associate state model were
established and functioned just as its advocates suggest,
it seems logical to

ask whether Quebec would be less ex

posed to external(i•e • non-French) influences than Canada,
in general, is now? Struct countermeasures to obtain
rigid regulation of Quebec's financial institutions might
restrict capital from the rest of Canada and the U.S. to
the point of choking off development and investment. Such
a precipitous fall in investment capital might well cause
French Canadians to abandon their cultural and language
demands and seek employment outside the province, thus
draining away manpower.
Steps to Patriation of the Constitution
The I93I Statute of Westminster, which removed Canada
from the authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom
except for the B.N.A. Act, recognized Canada's right to
conduct its own foreign policy, and clarified the position
of the Governor General as being an emmisary of the Monarch
and not of the government of Great Britain, began the pro
cess of patriation. However, over the ensuing three decades,
the provinces were unable to agree on any amending formula,
so'that full patriation was not possible.
In 196^, the provincial attorneys general submitted
a proposal for amendment to the provincial legislatures.
However, the Quebec National Assembly vetoed the idea on
the basis that it did not give greater constitutional powers
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to the provinces. During the next five or six years, Quebec
continued to insist that the provinces(read Quebec) be
given greater powers. The 1971 Victoria Conference agreed
in principle to a charter that included an amending formula,
but Quebec and Saskatchewan would not give it their approval.
In 1976, the provinces agreed that patriation should be
tied to substantive constitutional change.
In terms of the political situation in Quebec, 1976
was also a crucial year in that the Parti Quebecois,
dedicated to a sovereign province of Quebec, was elected
and announced its intention to place a referendum before
Quebec's electorate to determine whether the province
should remain within the Canadian federation. A "yes" vote
on the referendum would have made all questions with
respect to constitutional change superfluous. In 1980,
however, the referendum on sovereignty/association was
rejected, and the federal government again stated its
desire for a re-examination of federalism with the patria
tion question being given top priority.
Quebec's objection to patriation stemmed from the fact
that, as Corbett notes, "French Canadians have traditionally
been in a paradoxical position on this question. They have
constantly striven for the fullest degree of autonomy, but
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they have been unwilling to abandon any external safeguard
against possible encroachements by the central government
on the rights of the provinces or minorities." Corbett
further claims that, traditionally, Quebec feared that
the transfer of the amending power would permit the majority
of the provinces to modigy the constitutional balance of
power to the detriment of one province with a Frenchspeaking majority."
Constitutional Change, Levesque and the P.Q.
At the time federal-provincial negotiations were taking
place in 1981, Quebec's Premier, Rene Levesque, gave three
reasons for not signing the proposed amendment agreement.
The first, he claimed, was a gap in the formual for
amending the constitution. Second, the held that the clause
guaranteeing Canadians freedom of movement, with the prospect
of the immigration of a large number of non-French-speaking
Canadians into Quebec, could alter the province's linguistic
balance. Although at the time the government pointed out
that the provisions of Bill 101, which established French
as the language of work in the province would remain con
stitutional, the Supreme Court of Canada later struck the
bill down, thus adding to Levesque's apprehensions.

Third, Levesque held that the Charter's provisions concer
ning minority language rights would limit the powers of
the Quebec legislature,

inasmuch as the new constitution

would impinge upon the Quebec Assembly's ability to
negotiate reciprocal agreements with other provinces
concerning language rights. Although the government
held that other provinces had offered to reciprocate

on

the question of the language of primary education, Levesque
held that the Charter's provisions did not go far enough
to protect French-speaking minorities. That is to say,
•theThe Constitution promoted a bi-lingual Canada, but
Levesque desired a. unilingual Quebec.Fourth, Levesque ob
jected to the fiscal provisions of the Charter. In April
of 1981, Levesque had agreed, along with seven other
provincial premiers, to accept a basic formula for provin
cial compensation. The provision that a province could
"opt out" of any amendment which impinged upon provincial
powers, while at the same time the province could receive
federal financial compensation, was dropped in November.
Levesque held that the right to financial compensation
had been crucial in his earlier decision to support that
provision of the charter.
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Analysis of Levesque's Criticisms
Whether the new constitution will provide the protec
tion of language and culture that Quebec seeks remains open
to question. First, Levesque's concern that the immigration
of non-French-speaking Canadians would eventually dilute
the French-speaking population may have some merit if it
is assumed that all non-French-speaking residents will
continue to have their children educated in English.
English-speaking Canadians in Quebec, coupled with
immigrants from outside Canada, might, over time, diminish
the use of French among the province's population.
A more serious question arises in the area of con
stitutional amendment,

for the constitution can be changed

if such a change has the approval of seven provinces and
at least half the population. If all the predominantly
English-speaking provinces decided to amend the charter in
a manner unfavorable to Quebec, they will have the
requisite numbers to put the action through over Quebec's
objection. Moreover, population trends might change in
future years to the entent that the western provinces,
Alberta and British Columbia, with their predominantly
English-speaking populations, could be decisive factors
in altering the nation's population patterns.
With respect to education, since there is no prohibi
tion limiting the number of English-speaking schools

in
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Quebec, there is reason to assume that English-speakers in
the province will increase rather than decline. Although
French schools in other provinces need not fear an ab
ridgement of their rights, as happened in Manitoba in
1890, it would be ludicrous to assert that the French in
Quebec will undertake any large-scale migration in order
to establish larger French-speaking enclaves in other
provinces© Hence Levesque's concern that French Canadians
could well find their numbers diluted, and thus his
belief that immigrants should learn French, not English.
Nonetheless, there are many— among them Prime Minister
Trudeau— who declare that Levesque is unduly alarmist In
his assertions that French Canadian rights do not have
equal protection under the new constitution and will soon
be

trampled

upon by English Canada. In the first place,

they argue, French schools both inside and outside Quebec
would be in no danger of being displaced, as were those
in Manitoba earlier. The only real dilemma French schools
would face would be to convince immigrants that it is more
advantageous to learn the French language than the English
language.
Second, concerning the constitutional amendment issue,
it is difficult to forsee a situation in which all the
English-speaking provinces would adopt any measure so
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distasteful to Quebec as to cause the province to recon
sider leaving the Confederation. Mow that French Canada's
cultural and linguistic rights have been entrenched in
the Constitution, there would be little reason for Quebec
to fear the amendment procedure as adopted in the new
constitution of 1982, unless English Canada deliberately
sought to eliminate the entrenched provisions concerning
French language rights and French Canadian culture. Although
such a possibility exists, it is highly improbable that the
English Canadian provinces would take such action.
The New Constitution; A New Direction for Canadian
Federalism?
On April 17, 1982, Queen Elizabeth II formally signed
a proclamation patriating Canada's constitution. The act
placed all decision-making powers formerly held by the U.K.
Parliament at Westminster into the hands of the Canadian
Parliament•
The basic framework of the new constitution remains
the British North America Act, now referred to as the
Constitution Act of 1867. The major addition to the
constitutional body of law is the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. What makes the new Charter different from the
one passed by the House of Commons at the suggestion of
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Prime Minister Dieffenbaker in i960 is that it is en
trenched in the constitution, whereas the previous law could be amended, repealed, or superseded by other laws.
The new Charter cannot be altered except by a constitutional
amendment that would require the action of the federal
government and at least seven provinces which have at least
half of the population.
Certain articles of the new constitution bring it in
line with the constitutions of other western democracies,
such as the United States. These enumerate specific free
doms, of conscience and religion, thought, opinion and
expression, and association. The right of universal suf
frage is guaranteed as are limitations on the duration
of Parliament. Other provisions assure freedom of movement
in and out of the country, prohibit illegal search and
seizure, protect against arbitrary arrest, cruel and un
usual punishment, and enumerate the rights of accused
persons•
Section 16 specifically addresses the question of
language rights. It entrenches English and French as
the official languages of Canada and gives equal status
and equal rights to both languages in their use in all
institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada.
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Presumably, this would prohibit such actions as those
taken by the Province of Manitoba in I8 9 0 , which did
away with French language guarantees, particularly with
respect to education.
Concerning educational and linguistic guarantees,
Section 23 entrenches the rights of linguistic minorities
to education in their language. It guarantees all citizens
of the nationrwho ^received their primary education in
either French or English the right to have their children
educated in the same language, if it is the minority
language of the province in which they reside. The section
also provides that children have the right to be educated
in the minority language of the province of the province
whether or not their parents had received their education
in that language.
Section 25 gives further protection to minority
language rights such as those of the Canadian Indians,
whoowish to educate their children in Cree. Section 26
holds that such language guarantees are Mconsistent with
the preservation and enhancement of the multinational
heritage of C a n a d i a n s A s

Canada Today points out,

Section 26 has significance since Canada
has always emphasized its cultural diver
sity. The United States in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries considered
itself a ’’melting pot” in which immigrants
became culturally homogenious. Canada pur
sued a different image, a ’’mosaic,” in
which distinct cultures~-French, English,
Ukranian, German, Scottish, Irish and many
others--remained distinctive but harmonious.

CHAPTER IVV
THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT AND
THE RISE OF THE PARTI QUEBECOIS

Although organized separatist movements and parties
are of relatively recent vintage in Quebec, French Canadians
have dreamed of having their own nation ever since the
time of the British conquest of 1760. This was especially
true during periods of intense friction and discord such
as the Riel affair, the conscription crisis and, more
recently, the conflict over language rights and constitutional
guarantees•
Most observers agree that modern separatism began in
1 9 5 7» when Raymond Barbeau formed the right-wing Alliance
Laurentienne. This movement exhibited strong clerical and
corporatist tendencies, but in terms of actual support, its
following was small. Three years later, another separatist
movement, this one on the left, was organized under the

/
name Action Socialiste pour 1*independence nationale (ASIQ );
it, too, had limited support.
A more moderate group, the Rassemblement pour l*independence nationale (RIN), appeared the same year as
/

the ASIQ under the leadership of Andre d'Allemagne and
1

James William Hagy, "Queoec Separatists: The First
Twelve Years," Queens Quarterly,(Summer 1969), Vol LXXVI-2,
p. 229.
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Marcel Chaput. Chaput split with the RIN over its refusal
to back him in a provincial election and formed his own
separatist party, the Parti republican du Quebec (PRQ).
Barbeau asked his followers to throw their support to the
PRQ. Nonetheless, the PRQ proved to be a short-lived party,
as it was beset by financial difficulties from its beginning.
The Philosophy of Separatism— Causes. Reasons
Perhaps the most articulate explanation of the
rationales

for separatism has come from the pen of Dr.

Marcel Chaput. Chaput*s book, Pourquoi Je Suis Separatiste
(Why I am a Separatist), is significant in that it lays
down, in.concise and detailed form, practically every
significant pro-separatist argument that has been made
either before or since the book*s publication in 1961.
In his introduction to Pourquoi. Chaput makes the
following claim:
The world is made up of separatists. The man
who is master of his home is a separatist.
Each of the hundred nations striving to main
tain its national identity is separatist.
France and England are mutually separatist,
even in relation to the Common Market. And you
who long for a real Canadian constitution, you
are a separatist. The only difference between
you and me is that you want Canada to be free
in relation to England and the United States,
and I want Quebec to be free in relation to
Canada.3

2Ibid., p. 2 3 0 .
3
^Marcel Chaput, Why I am a Separatist, trans. Robert A.
Taylor (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishers, 1975)»
p. iv .
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Chaput goes on to describe his basic arguments in
favor of'-a separatist solution to Quebec's aspirations.
While acknowledging that a break from Canada would not
resolve all of Quebec's problems and, in fact, would
create many new. one s, he nonetheless holds the selfdeterminist view that "it is highly desirable that a
1l
•normal man or nation be free.”
Chaput defines what he calls the "six dimensions of
separatism," which is an answer to those who ask about
the actual desirability of an independent Quebec, 1)
Quebec's independence would allow French Canadians to en
joy the liberty to which they are historically entitled.
2) Political independence is desirable because it would
take the French Canadians out of their position of numerical
helplessness. 3) Economically. political independence is
desirable for Quebec because, without control over political
power, economic independence remains a dream. 4) Culturally.
Quebec wojAld benefit from independence by being a unilingual
country. 5) Sociallv. Quebec's independence would be desirable
in that it would "contribute to making life in Quebec a co
herent whole," Politics would support the economy and both
would contribute to culture, thus allowing French Canadians
to develop their own institutions oriented toward the French'
Canadian way of thinking. 6) Psychologicallyt independence

h
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would be desirable because the French Canadian would no
longer feel as a second class citizen. He would have a
nation and a culture he could call his own.-*
To those who say that the federal government in
Ottawa would react with force against separation, Chaput
cliams that all free nations of the world would champion
Quebec's desire for political independence, and that the
United Nations would be obliged to send a peacekeeping
force in the event of an invasion by either the federal
government or the United States. Chaput even exclaims in
Pourquoi, "The more I think about ' it, the more I am temp
ted to wish for such an invasion, because it would be
the most certain and speedy way for us to gain independence.
He sees Ottawa's reaction in such an eventuality as
one of desperation and disorder, a feeble attempt to make
piecemeal concessions in the areas of bilingualism and
the appointment of a few French Canadians to top civil
service posts. He enveighs against French Canadians consid
ering such proposals, urging that "we don't want to correct
injustice; we want to throw off our minority status."^
He concludes by saying in Pourquoi that, above all, in
dependence is a matter of will. ,fIf a nation is based

5
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essentially on a collective will to live, then its indepen
dence is essentially a matter of will ... Never in the his
tory of the world has it been easier for conquored peoples
to attain independence .

We are living in the twentieth
Q
century, the Golden Age of independence•”

Radical Separatism; Revolution and the F.L.Q.
Although all of the previously-mentioned political
parties spurned violence in favor of a political solution
to Quebec's demands, this changed in 19&3 with the formation
of the F L Q , a small group of young fanatics calling them/
/
selves the Front de la liberation quebecoise.
Because the FLQ, both in its program and actions,
represents an aberration from the tactics used by other
separatist organizations in their pursuit of an independent
Quebec, the FLQ's methods cannot be considered representative
of the means by which most Quebeckers would seek a break
with English Canada. Nonetheless, their deeds and words
do demonstrate the mounting frustration felt by many young
Quebeckers with the status quo and the slow pace of change.
A great deal about the FLQ remains shrouded in mystery.
One helpful insight has come from Dr. Gustave Morf in his
Terror in Quebec: Case Studies of the F L Q . Morf has put
together a number of details about the backgrounds of some

8
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of the members of the FLQ through intervies he conducted
with the terrorits after their confinement to the peniten
tiary •
The FLQ was an imported movement, modeled on the
Belgian resistance during World War II, the Algerian
National Liberation Front, and the Cuban revolution.
In general, most of the organization's

members had

problems at home, unhappy family lives, and difficulty in
school, while a few came from good middle-class families.
In many w a y s , the FLQ members represented the highly
emotional, demanding, and rebellious adolescent culture
of which they were a part.
Because of his age and wartime experience, George
11
Schoeters may be considered the father of the FLQ.
Schoeters himself was an illegitimate child, born in
Belgium, who never knew his father. At the age of twelve,
he became acquainted with the Belgian partisans who
organized the resistance

against the Nazis. The partisans

employed him as a spy and messenger because of his youth
and small stature. He observed the Belgians defending
themselves against the Nazis with lies, deceit, fraud,
civil disobedience, bombs and murder.

"It is not surprising,"

observes Morf, "that a young man brought up in these cir
cumstances ... would have a difficult time after the war in
12
adapting himself to an orderly life."
10

^
Gustave Morf, Terror in Quebec: Case Studies of the
FLQ (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1970), p. 20.
11
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In 1951 > Schoeters emigrated to Canada through the
efforts of a friend whom he had met

in Europe, and sub

sequently joined the "Young Catholic Movement." He was
placed with a family in Montreal (his first real family)
and worked, briefly, as a restaurant helper in British
Columbia, moved back to Montreal after a year in hopes of
becoming an electrician, and finally entered the
University of Montreal, where he studied economics and
sociology.
The atmosphere at the university at that time was
highly nationalistic, and it may be that he was influenced
by the more militant students there. It appears that he
often took part in discussions and that his experience
as a freedom fighter gave him a certain prestige.
In 1957# he married a French Canadian girl from a very
good family and was, by his own account, quite happy. But
his interests soon became diverted to other areas. Morf
remarks,

"He was obviously a restless person, always in

search of something new, something better, something
different.1,13
Not long after his graduation from the university,
Schoeters met Fiedel Castro, who came to Montreal on a
visit following his successful revolution in Cuba. Con
vinced of the sincerity of Castro's invitation for
13
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students to come to Cuba to help with agrarian reform, he
and his wife went to Cuba; she returned shortly thereafter
because she was pregnant. Schoeters remained in Cuba for
approximately one year, but he came back a somewhat dis
appointed man. He saw that Castro's theories left much to
be desired when put into practice.
Ever restless, he did not remain long with his family.
In 1961, he visited Rome, Tunisia, Turkey, Algeria and
Switzerland. While in Algeria, he was in touch with the
National Liberation Front. Upon his return to Canada, he
became a member of the R I N , but he did not find it radical
enough. He then formed the Reseau de resistance (RR),
which was inspired by the Belgian resistance but was con
tent for the moment to paint slogans on walls.
Finally, part of the RR split away and called itself
✓

/

the Front de la liberation quebegoise, or FLQ. As with its
Belgian, Algerian, and Cuban models, this was to be the
underground movement devoted to defeating the English
"occupant" by force. Schoeters himself had brought instructions
from Algeria for making Molotov cocktails and time bombs.
He himself did not participate personally in the dynmite
thefts or the construction of bombs; his role was more in
the nature of a co-ordmator.

14
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A detailed recital of the bombings and kidnappings of
the FLQ during the I960*s and early 7 0 * s, and Trudeau's
imposition of the Emergency War Measures Act, is not
necessary here. Many of these incidents have been
described in the previous chapter on Quebec nationalism,
and thus the reader is referred to those pages. What will
be asserted is that the FLQ, condemned for its acts of
violence and failing ultimately to ‘'liberate" Quebec
from the clutches of the English

"oppressors," nevertheless

did succeed in obtaining its goals of riveting Canada's
attention on Quebec and generating publicity for its
cause•
While the more moderate

members of separatist movements

certainly loathed such violence, the concerns of the FLQ
with respect to job discrimination against French Canadians
and "outside" exploitation of the province were picked up
by the "ballot box" separatist groups such as the RIN.
Shortly after the FLQ arrests in 19&3 and 19&L, the RIN
reiterated its demands 1 ) that there be more acceptance
of the French language and culture? 2) that there be
better job opportunities for French Canadians? and 3) that
there be special rights and privileges for Quebec. It
claimed that only lip service was being paid to the notion
of a "bi-cultural" nation, guaranteed by the British North
America Act. It cited the fact that only 13 percent of the
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government jobs nationwide went to French Canadians, who
represented 30 percent of the population. Also, both industry,
and natural resources continued to be controlled from
1 *>
outside the province. Premier Lesage took steps to appease the nationalists
and to strengthen his position. For example, he demanded
that federal tax reforms be implemented so that more revenue
would Iflow back to the province of Quebec. Prime Minister
Pearson at first delayed any fiscal revamping and in
stead sought to pacify the nationalists by other means.
There had been a proposal to use an adaptation of the
Union Jack as the Canadian national flag, which was
understandably anathema to the Quebe<jois. Pearson then
proposed three maple leaves on a white background with
vertical blue bars on each side--ostehsibly representing
union from sea to sea. The Quebegois were certainly happy
about the alternation, but it hardly placated their

s

economic desires. Lesage and Resources Minister Rene

Levesque were soon at work preparing yet another set of
programs for Quebec, and further demands for Ottawa.
In March of 1965» the Lesage administration put out its
long-range economic plan. Citing the dichotomy between
Montreal and the rural areas, uneven growth, and per capita
income in Quebec that was 13 percent below the national
15
"Trying to Blast a Nation Apart," Business Week
(June 1, 1963), p. 100.
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average. The top priority was the achievement of* more
provincial control over tax revenues. Further, there
was the omnipresent need to get the Quebegois into more
places of economic authority. The plan, for which Levesque
is credited, included: 1 ) nationalization of electric
power (as it was felt that the economy could be shaped
in the desired direction by preferential rate schedules
to French-speaking companies); 2) the establishment
.S S

S

/

*

of the Societe Generale du F m a n c e m e n t du Quebec as a
general investment corporation(this would supply
advanced capital to firms that were in French Canadian
ha nds); 3 ) the construction of a 225 million-dollar
steel mill; and 4) increased investment in human resources,
especially through education.
But with the Liberal Lesage administration already
spending a huge budget on agricultural development, highways,
and social services, the capital needed to implement
Lesage*s proposals did not exist. Thus, Lesage restated
his demands in modified form, requesting that a minimum
of 47 percent of Quebec's personal income tax revenue be
returned to the province. Pearson gave in to Lesage*s
demands•
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In 1966, Daniel Johnson’s Union Nationale Party ous
ted the Liberals after a six-year tenure. A. post-mortem
on his administration is not necessary, but the charge
that he attempted to do too much (or too little, from
the separatist point of view) should be answered. First,
his policies were generally sound. He realized that
education needed more attention and funding, and was
willing to implement much-needed reforms. The fact that,
as the young became more educated, they became more
dissatisfied with their lot in life as French Canadians
cannot be laid at Lesage's feet. French Canadians had
been in an inferior position for years, and their reaction
was inevitable. What many largely ignored at the time
was the fact that Lesage had taken a major step toward
modernizing the province and moving Quebec into the
16
twentieth century.
Federalists were anxious in I966 about how well the
separatist parties would do. V/hen the two separatist parties
that ran candidates, the RIN and the newly-formed Ralliement Nationale (RN), did little more than splinter
some of the Liberal vote, federalists were overjoyed. To
be sure, this splintering was probably the reason for
the victory of the UN party; but the achievements of the
17
RIN and RN for the separatist cause were negligible.
16

Claude Ryan, "Quebec Changes Government," Foreign
Affairs 45 (October 1 9 0 6 ), p. 151*
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The Formation of the Parti Quebecois
In 1 9 6 7 f Rene Levesque

formally broke away from the
/

Liberal party and published his Option Quebec. This
six-thousand word volume outlined Levesque’s vision for
Quebec and Canada. As far as being a concrete bludprint
for action,however, the work left much to be desired.
Levesque’s biographer, Peter Desbarats, holds that Option
✓
Quebec is "disjointed and emotional ... the work of a
propagandist rather- than a political philosopher."

18

Levesque appealed in Option directly to French Canadians,
whom, he asserted, constitute a nation no matter in which
province they reside. It is only in Quebec, however, that
French Canadians can actually claim a specific, geographical
area for themselves, an area where their customs and lan
guage will be totally accepted, an area over which they
must exert greater economic and political control if they
do not wish to see the province dominated and controlled by
outsiders, i.e. those of non-French origin.
In Levesque’s view, Canada is a political entity com
posed of two separate nations, English and French, and the
advancement of the former was achieved largely through the
exploitation and domination of the latter. In order for
Quebec to truly develop, it will be necessary for the
18

✓
Peter Desbarats, Rene: A Canadian in Search of a
Country (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1 9 7 6 ), pi 129•
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province to claim greater control over such areas as in
dustry and commerce, citizenship and immigration, certain
aspects of internalional relations, savings institutions, and
internal agencies of development and industrialization.
Other areas of importance to be negotiated with the federal
government include territorial claims between Quebec and
Labrador, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. These
demands, Levesque hold?-, are the "bare minimum" that Quebec
should require.
Levesque®s Opt ion

did not get the complete sympathy

and endorsement of the French Canadian press. The Montreal
Star editorialized that Levesque®s proposal was nothing more
than "a union constantly seeking ad hoc solutions through
permanent consultive committees, which sounds like the
19
federal parliament under another name," Another critic,
Renaude Lapointe of La Presse.held that, as contemporary
Quebecois

are "better educated, more dynamic, and more in

fluential than ever before," Levesque's suggestions should
be totally rejected. He accused Levesque of failing to
admit that "90 percent 'of our weaknesses and shortcomings
20
are our own fault."
The prototype of the Parti Quebegois
was Levesque's
— =*-----Mouvement Souverainete Association. founded in 19^7* IT was
formed from the union of Levesque's separatist group
19
20
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with the RIN and the R M . The aim of the group was to
unify all elememts which supported independence in
Quebec# Levesque found some difficulty in uniting the
RN and the RIN with the MSA. The rift between these two
organizations resulted largely from a personality conflict
between RN leader Marcel Chaput and Pierre Bourgault of
the RIN# Nevertheless, all three leaders realized that
none of the separatist organizations, by themselves, were
capable of mustering the necessary political and financial
support to forward the separatist cause# Thus a compromise
was reached when Levesque absorbed the RN and the RIN into
the MSA. At the convention unifying the three groups, the
MSA declared its intention to become a political party
within six months#
✓
Levesque’s Parti Quebegois was formally launched in
1968, In his opening address to the delegates of the PQ,
Levesque did not actually call for independence; instead
he advocated a new program of participatory democracy
that would go against the "outdated and rigid social,
economic, and political structure#" 14
When the FLQ began its campaign of bombings, robbery
and arson, the Quebec provincial government requested help
from Ottawa to combat the terrorist

wave# Levesque himself

was among the most outspoken in denouncing the terrorists
14

,

John Saywell, The Rise of the Parti Quebegois
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977)» p« 23#

14?

Nevertheless, he continued to call for changes in the
system that would, he argued, make it more responsive
to the needs of Quebeckers, He appealed especially to
youth and labor, stressing that society had to make a
place for the newly-enfranchised students and the un
employed •
As the 1970 election campaign began to take shape,
it was clear that the primary contest would be between
the Liberals and the Parti Quebecois, A poll conducted
just prior to the election showed the Liberals with
37 percent of the popular support, the Parti Quebegois
with 29 percent, the Union, Nationale with 15 percent,
1S
and the Creditistes with 15 percent*
Levesque con
tributed to the success of the PQ in a number of wayss
he appealed to the youth, to the left, and to the dis
contented. Although his program was nationalist, his
tone was subdued. He asked the Quebecois not to believe
that the economic price of independence was too high,
and pleaded with them to withdraw their old fears and
their subservient attitude towards English Canada and
the local establishment.
Levesque’s tactics also had an effect on the strat
egies of other parties. The Union Nationale, for example,
called for a referendum on independence before 197^ unless a new
15
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co n s t i t u t i o n had be e n drafted.

M a n y of the Liber a l s

in other provinces wai t e d to see w h e n Pierre T r u d e a u
and the Liberal g o v e r n m e n t
c o unter the challenge

from Levesque.

did not a c t i v e l y intervene

were other federalists
means,

in Ottawa w o u l d

C a n a d i a n controlled

A l t h o u g h T r udeau

in the campaign,

w o r k i n g hard,

to assure a L i ber a l victory.

intervene to

there

through va r i o u s

One En g l i s h -

investment firm a d vised

to ship their securities and liquid assets

its clients
outside the

16
province until after the

election.

In addition,

E n g l i s h language M o n t r e a l dailies played

the

up these moves

as a sure sign that a PQ v i c t o r y would me a n finan c i a l
collapse
effect

for the province.Whether such actions had any

in per s u a d i n g the n o n - c o m m i t t e d to vote L i b e r a l

r a t h e r than PQ or UN cannot be determined. W h a t

is

c ertain is that they increased the separatists*

anger

and did n o t h i n g to ease the discord b e t w e e n French and
E n g l i s h w i t h i n the province.
The PQ and the E l e c t i o n of 1970
W h e n the results

of the 1970

el e c t i o n became apparent,

it was clear that the PQ had susta i n e d a m a j o r defeat
despite what

earlier opi n i o n polls had forcast.

b r e a k d o w n of support showed the following:

16

^

Saywell,.p. 36.

The actual
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Party
Liberals
Parti Quebecois
Union Nationale
Creditiste
Others

Seats
72
7
17
12
0

17

% of Total vote
41.8

23.0
19.6
11.1
^•5

The federalists, who touted the triumph of the Liberals
as a resounding "no" to separation, could not hide the
serious economic and social problems that remained. What
was also obvious was the shift of electoral support for
the various parties. Urban voters rejected the Union
Nationale outrightt while the rural areas (traditionally
/
bastions of support for the UN) supported the Creditistes
in larger numbers than ever before( taking nine seats from
the UN and three from the Liberals). The Creditistes also
swung the balance in: the Liberals favor by siphoning
support from the Union Nationale and assuring the Liberal
vict ory•
The PQ's strength came overwhelmingly from the urban
areas. In the lower-income areas of Montreal, it won five
seats and did well in other areas of the city, running
second to the Liberals in all other election districts of
the city. Except for the four overwhelmingly English
constituencies, the Liberals secured only 373»757 votes
17
Ibid. , p.

44.
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to 2^9»251 for the Parti Quebecois.

The PQ also showed

strength in the suburbs of Montreal, polling more than
one fifth of the vote. In Quebec City, it bested the
Liberals in the more depressed areas and ran a close
second in the suburbs.
Election observers noted that seven out of ten voters
rejected separatism. This number included all those who
supported the Creditistes and the Union Nationale. despite
the UN's ambiguity on the constitutional issue. The PQ's
analysts drew other conclusions, however. They claimed
that the Liberal candidate, Bourassa, owed his victory
19
to English-speaking Quebec. ^ They supported their argument
by citing the conclusion of one analyst, Bernard Smith,
who had divided the constituencies in the city of Montreal
into areas ranging from 80-90 percent to 0-10 percent
French Canadian. His findings showed that English Canadians
had voted Liberal and that the difference between Liberals
s
and the Parti Quebegois often varied with the percentage of
non-French voters in the constituency• Only in 9 of the
38 seats in Montreal and its environs, he argued, did the
Liberals secure a higher percentage of the French Canadian
vote than did the P Q . ^
Examining the French Canadian vote as a whole, he conclu
ded that French-speaking Quebec had given the Liberals 32.6
18
Saywell, p. ^5 •
19 Ibid. ,
20Ibid. , p. ^6.

percent of its support, 28.7 to the P Q , 2E.2 to the UN and
1^.5 to others. Because of this, some Believed that, with
this election, the line had been drawn between French
21
and English Canadians in Quebec.
The PQ charged that the influence of non-French-speaking
Canadians tended to distort the parliamentary process. Leves
que stated that the

English-speaking voters (Anglophone bloc)

had swung the tide in favor of the Liberals. He also charged
manipulation by the English-speaking media®" I have never
experienced such disgust,'1 Levesque said," as that which I
experienced because of the way information was manipulated
in the Anglo-Saxon establishment at Montreal with its
propagenda media, its disrespect for a population which it
22
treated like natives."
19?l“-?6--Building Support for the P.Q.
The constitutional reforms called for by Trudeau cul22
m m a t e d in 1971. m the so-called Victoria Charter. The
Charter proposed the continuation of the federal state in
basically the same form, adding a few articles to entrench
language rights and giving Ontario and Quebec a veto over
constitutional amendment. Opposition from Quebec came swiftly,
as Premier Bourassa was unable to quell the nationalists who
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held -that the Charter did not go far enough in areas of
decentralization or special status for Quebec*

Bourassa,

complying with the nationalists ' demands, refused the
Charter's provisions* The stalemate produced a situation
in which many French-speaking intellectuals were more
drav/n to the idea of a separate state*
The PQ announced its intention to run separatist
candidates in the next federal election, claming that
a poll showed that 53 percent of Montreal's French-speaking
population supported its objectives* Meanwhile,
there were those like Prime Minister Trudeau who argued
that separatism was no longer a real challenge* Those
who were already for separatism might be more intense
in their beliefs, he argued, but actual support had
declined. A different view was taken by distinguished
political s c i e n t ist Lio n Dion, director of research
for the Bilingualism and Bicultural Commission, who held
that without more radical and imaginative solutions than
those already proposed, the country would have to
accept the inevitability of a separate state of Quebec.
Dion proposed the right of self-determination for Quebec
and all other provinces, large-scale institutional
bilingualism in the federal civil service, major

2lp .

Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy:
The making of recent policy in Canada(Toronto: Univer
sity of Toronto Press, 1972), pp* 116-117*
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jurisdictional and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n b y the
federal g o v e r n m e n t , and an end to the t h i n k i n g on such
concepts

as

"special status" and the

"No power in the w o rld," D i o n said,"
sp e a k i n g Quebegois

"two n a t i o n s theory."
can stop French-

from s e e i n g t h e m s e l v e s as a unique

25
s o c i e t y and nation."
The P Q , meantime,
the

c o n t i n u e d to draw s upport from

intellectual c o m m u n i t y and also found allies

the trade union movement.

In September,

came forward with a docu m e n t
future

in the present

entitled

economic

"Quebec has no

and its only c o n c l u s i o n

that Quebec should be a socialist

labor leader Louis Laber g e

the CNTU

system." The q u e s t i o n of

se p a r a t i s m was v i r t u a l l y ignored,
was

1971?

in

state.

However,

called for a united front to

oppose the capitalist system and came out

in favor of the

Parti Quebegois as the b e s t p a rty for the workers.
sequently,

the F^Q (Quebec

F e d e r a t i o n of Labor)

Sub

adopted a

po s i t i o n paper wh i c h called for Quebec's right to selfdetermination,

i n c luding

i n d e p e n d e n c e r if it was a c h i e v e d

2?

in accordance with the n eeds and a s p i r a t i o n s >bf the workers.
The FTQ h e l d that F r ench should be the only w o r k i n g language
in the province and gave
for a gen e r a l strike,

its executive a m a n d a t e to call

if necessary.

""Ibid.. p. 56.

26
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Support from the radical trade union movement provided
the PQ with an opportunity to corner some of the vast labor
vote. But it also involved a degree of risk in that the
party might alienate a large segment of its middle-class
support along with the more' moderate trade unionists.
Because Levesque refused to move any further to the left,
he faced opposition from both inside and outside the party.
He had contemplated resigning, but he felt he had a role
to play in preventing the party from being taken over by
the left.
At the P Q *s 1971 convention, Levesque handily defeated
/

the more radical Andre baroque for the party's leadership
position. He faced sterner opposition from 1,200 delegates
who wished to abolish minority schools(i.e. schools for
English-speaking residents in Quebec) in any future in
dependent state. The left-wing elements of the party
continued to exert pressure, asking for active PQ invol
vement in labor strikes and demonstrations. Only by
a narrow vote of 6-5 was the party's executive committee
able to turn down a resolution demanding the party's official
participation in a planned demonstration that many felt
27
would lead to violence.
(
Labor leaders reacted with extreme disgruntlement to
the PQ's decision not to participate in the demonstration.
27

.
Ibid 0
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Levesque, however, tooka strong stand against the more
radical labor leaders and invited the FTQ's Robert Burns
28
to "go if he wants to," He attacked any who advocated
violence, and reiterated that the Parti Quebecois had
committed itself to the achievement of independence through
democratic means.
It was because of Levesque's intervention that the
radical labor movement was forced to shelve, at least
for the time being, its demands for a more leftist
Parti Quebecois. In the wake of the FLQ bombings and
kidnappings of 1970 , and the rift with radical labor, the
PQ suffered some loss

of membership. Indications were

that phrty membership had fallen from 80,000 to 30,000
* 29
between 1970 and 1971* Nonetheless, Levesque realized
that if his party were to to become more than a terrorist
group or radical labor organization, he would have to keep
a tight rein on those who threatened to make the PQ any
thing other than a legitimate party with broad appeal
to all classes.
Levesque's aim In 1972 was to devise a campaign strategy
that would keep the Liberals on the defensive. His method
was to introduce a variety of separatist charges that would
attract media attention, build PQ membership, and increase
Ibid., p. 61.
29
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support for the PQ in the upcoming by-elections. The PQ
campaign focused on such areas as patriation of the con
stitution, the low number of Quebeckers in the federal
civil service, the cost of federalism, the difference
between Quebec's 13 million and Ontario's 200 million
dollars per year of federal research money, Ontario's
higher standard of living, and Ottawa's treatment of
Quebec's agricultural sector.
The PQ's hopes for victory were dashed in the
Tremblay by-election of April, 1972. Labor support for
the PQ in the election had been questionable after
Levesque's equivocation on support for the unions.
After spending considerable time and effort in the cam
paign, and with only two parties running, the results
dealt a heavy blow to Levesque and his party.
By 197 3 1 "the PQ had begun mending fences with the labor
moevment, pasting over differences concerning strategy and
methods for a time. Although the PQ's platform of 1973
had a more socialist orientation, there were futher
attempts by more radical labor members to shift the party's
platform still further left.

30

For example, the platform did

call for changes in economic planning, regulation of foreign
ownership, financial institutions and other areas dealing
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with social policy.

But some m e mbers

of the r a d i c a l

labor movement d r afted a or o g r a m entitled Ouand nous
serons vraiment

31

.

chez nous , w h i c h p r o posed such things

as. direct wo r k e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n
went so far as to require
to workers'
however,

soviets

in m a n a g e m e n t and even

in d u s t r y to turn over power

in an independent Quebec,

Levesque,

persuaded the party c o n v e n t i o n to dr o p such

radical proposals.
What

emerged from the PQ's c o n v e n t i o n that year

was a m o d ified pr o g r a m that was still far to the left
of anything proposed b y the other n a t i o n a l parties.
It called for Increased n a t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l planning,
the abolition of finance
trols

over f i n a ncial

companies,

institutions,

urged s t r i c t e r c o n 
requested nationalization

of such companies as C a n a d i a n Pacific,

and a d v o c a t e d

gr e a t e r control over f o re i g n investment and foreignowned companies.

L e v e s q u e ' s m a j o r c o n t r i b u t i o n to the

pl a tform was a se c t i o n de aling with the F r e n c h language-,

which stated that French would be the sole official and
w o r k i n g language

in an Independent Quebec,

In order to increase

Its credibility,

the PQ drew up a

proposed Quebec budget to a c c o m p a n y the 1973 pl a t f o r m
ba s e d on the 1 9 7 3 - 7 ^ p r o v i n c i a l budget.
creases

in the volume

salaries.

It pr o p o s e d

in

of services and in civil service

Levesque stated that Quebec would take

31
Saywellr p. 77 •

its share
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of the federal debt, since a portion of that debt was in
curred by Quebec, As for corporations, he said that pro
visions would be made for the incorporation of those
companies that had previously been Canadian. Corporations
would have to abide by the rules of a Foreign Investment
Code as it pertained to foreign ownership, and a certain
percentage of the corporation would have to fall under
Quebec ownership.
The remainder of the platform called for the establish
ment of a central bank, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
a customs union with Canada, In addition, the possibility
of a common currency between

the two nations was discussed,

although Levesque admitted thatithis would be one of the
most difficult things to achieve, Quebec might have to be
prepared to issue its own money in the event that Canada
did not agree to a common currency,
In order to ease

s
the economic fears of many Quebegois,

and despite its pro-independence rhetoric, the FQ made a
concerted effort to persuade the electorate that a vote for
the PQ would not necessarily mean a vote for independence,
Levesque noted that two referenda had been necessary before
Newfoundland entered the confederation. No moves would be
made In the direction of independence until the Quebec
population had given its full approval through referendum,
Levesque insisted.
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Support

from the trade unions, w h i c h had. w a v e r e d

the period 1971-72,

in

a g a i n came to the PQ in 1973. The

PQ wel c o m e d labor's support,

but was careful not to a l l y

itself w i t h the m o r e ‘m i l i t a n t trade u n ion leaders.

CNTU (Confederation of N a t i o n a l Trade Unions)

The

issued a

statement that was not a b s o l u t e l y P Q , but was definitely/a n t i - L i b e r a l • The FTQ held

in its s t a t ements that the

B o u rassa r egime was the most a n t i - l a b o r g o v e r n m e n t
Quebec history.

in

FTQ lead e r Louis Laberge called on his

me m b e r s to support candidates s y m p a t h e t i c to the labor
movement,

adding that most of these

/

P a r t i Quebegois.

could be found in the

33

The election returns

in'the fall of 1973 p r o vided the

Liberals w i t h the v i c t o r y they sought.

L i beral leader

Robert B o u r a s s a fs c a m pai g n had been skillful,
ge neral the province's

and

in

eco n o m y was doing we l l despite

inflation and u n e m p l o y m e n t « m here had been little l a b o r
unrest,
trol

and g o v e rnment

sp e n d i n g had been kept

in four budgets without increased taxes.
As

in 1970,

popular vote,

the PQ increased

this time

except East Montreal.
10 percent

33

under con-

34

'

its p e r c entage of the

in every r i d i n g (election district)

It also showed gains of more than

in 2k c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , re c e i v e d over 4-0 p e rcent

Ibid., p. 87.
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of the vote in 26 ridings, 21 of which were in Montreal.

35

The Liberals, however, had a distinct advantage in that in
50 seats there was no contest at all. The Liberals received
twice as many votes as their nearest competitors.

The Liberals had built their campaign on Bourassa*s
personality. The Liberals' slogan "Bourassa construit,"
"Bourassa builds," implied that Levesque destroys. The
Liberals* platform, A New Plan of Action, was a 75-page
"review" of Liberal accomplishments and promises to do
even more. For example, it promised to create tax exemp
tions for small and medium-sized business and increase
family allowances. In short, the government relied on its
record and attacked separatism as a movement that would
cause Quebec catastrophic economic and social harm.
The PQ had concentrated its efforts toward diminishing
the perceived economic consequences of a separate Quebec,
and stressing that cultural sovereignty would be worth the
price. The Liberals countered that cultural sovereignty
would continue to receive their attention, but it would not
come at the heavy costs that would follow a PQ victory.
35I b i d . . p.

97

16 1

During the election, Levesque had warned that a serious
situation would exist if the English-speaking minority in
Quebec kept a party in power that was not supported by
a majority of the French-speaking electorate# This was
another reference to his contention that the Anglophone
bloc had too much

control over Quebec politics# Ironically,

the results of the 1973 election showed that, while Englishspeaking Quebec had overwhelmingly supported the Liberals,
the PQ had gained support from the non-French-speaking
electorate# The PQ had increased its percentage of the
English-speaking vote to six percent, twice that of 1970.
This support came primarily from the low-income sections
of Montreal, but there was also a small amount of white
and blue-collar support outside Montreal. No white collar
support came from Montreal itself.
An opinion poll taken after the election showed that
the major reason for the Liberal victory was the party's
stand with respect to retaining the constitution, as
opposed to actual voter satisfaction with the government's
performance# While 81 percent of Liberal voters stated that
they voted Liberal because of the party's stand on the con
stitution, only U0 percent held that theirs was a vote of
satisfaction with the government.

37
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Following the election, Levesque held that the Liberals'
scare tactics with respect to separatism had succeeded ■ and
that one day Quebeckers would realize their dreams; of
becoming a separate nation. Levesque continued to mediate
in the PQ's internal conflicts between moderates, like
Claude Morin, and radicals such as Robert B u m s ,

Some in

the PQ, such as Morin, began to sense that a change in the
party's rhetoric would be necessary before it could defeat
the Liberals, and Morin himself began to speak of "in
dependence in stages" and even of the possibility of a cul
turally sovereign Quebec within an economically unified
Canada. This sounded almost like Bourassa's suggestion on
the eve of the election that there should be a culturally
secure Quebec linked economically to Qanada.
The Liberals ended the year without giving further
details concerning their attitudes toward constitutional
reform and cultural sovereignty, but it was clear that they
would have to take some initiative in these areas if they
were to counter the separatist challenge and contain Levesque.
The following two years would determine how successful they
would be both with respect to cultural sovereignty and their
management of the province's economy.

I 63
Prelude to 1976; The Liberal Party in Disarray

The years 197^ and 1975 proved a time of transition for
the Parti Quebecois in its attempts to broaden support and
analyze past mistakes. Ironically, during this period, it
was the Liberal Party that took the initiative in the
area of cultural sovereignty. Sensing dissatisfaction within
the province because immigrants were being educated in
English, the Liberals passed Bill 22, making French the
official language of the province, requiring that French
be the language of usage in the provincial government, and
mandating the use of French in the internal affairs of the
business world. ^
The most controversial of the bill's provisions concer
ned its requirements in education. It mandated that French
be the language of instruction in the public schools, and
that the teaching of English could neither begin nor cease
without the approval of the Ministry of Education. Further,
an even more controversial point of the bill required that all
children in the province take an examination to demonstrate
their skills in English. All children failing to show a
knowledge of the English language on this examination were
to be placed in French schools. The children of Anglophone
parents could continue to attend English-speaking schools and
38
Postgate and McRoberts, pp. 18^-18 7 •
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be educated

in English,

immigrant

c h i l d r e n w o u l d have to

enter French schools.
The PQ V i c t o r y
F e e ling secure w i t h the Liberals'
in 1970 and 1973s
stated

earlier v i c t o r i e s

Quebec's L i b e r a l Premier,

in January,

1976,

that he did not feel the n e e d to

call an ele c t i o n that year. No n e t h e l e s s ,
1976

Robert B o u r a s s a ,

b y the fall of

B o u r a s s a held that he n e e d e d a m a n d a t e to deal w i t h

the federal govern m e n t
challenge

on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mat t e r s and the
39
from the trade unions.

A l t h o u g h other Lib e r a l s stated their c o n fidence
w i n n i n g any contest

1976,

in

province to undermine

much had h a p p e n d e d

support for the party.

cost overruns on pbbllc projects
hydroelectric

in

in the

Tremendous

such as the James B a y

inst a l l a t i o n and the M o n t r e a l Olympic Games

40
had put severe strains on the prov i n c e ' s budget.
investigations

supported suspicions

In addition,

that some Lib e r a l

politicians had b e e n g u i l t y of serious m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n

41
of ca m p a i g n fun d s , i f not actual c r i minal misconduct.
dication

of public

discontent was r e v e a l e d

with the g o v e r n m e n t had

in

in a public

opinion poll conducted by the Center for Public
Research in the S p r i n g of 1976,

An

Opinion

It showed that d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n

Increased from 35 percent

In

30

* R a ymond H u d o n ," The lp?6 Quebec Election,"
Q u a r t e r l y (S n r i n g 1977)» Vol. 14, Mo. 1•, p. 18.

40

' T h i d 9 , p.
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October of 1973»

to 5^ percent in November, 1974,

to 66

percent in January, 1976.
The Liberals* troubles continued to multiply through
out the spring and summer months of 1976. Teacher walkouts
continued because of their dissatisfaction with Bill 22.
Labor unrest among public sector employees caused work
stoppages in the

high schools and hydroelectric facilities

that enraged the general public.
Quebec's educational establishment remained in disarray,
as immigrant children were compelled to take crash courses
in French. Families were upset by the government-required
testing, and provincial courts were flooded with parental
appeals. Some parents openly defied the law, and some
school officials admitted thousands of students who had
failed the English-language test.
The government announcement that it would gradually ex
tend the use of French to include air-traffic control
brought outrage from the English-speaking Pilots and Con
trollers Association. Only after considerable pressure from
English Canada did the Quebec government relent on this plan.
The French Canadian reaction to the English triumph in the
air traffic control dispute was intense. Two key Quebec
ministers, Jean Marchand and Guy St. Pierre, resigned, and
42
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the French-speaking pilots, controllers, and technicians
sought to have the decision not to use French in Quebec's
airports reversed by the courts. The Quebec legislature,
the National Assembly, showed its support for the Frenchspeaking controllers by passing a resolution giving the
controllers $25$000 to help defray the controllers* legal
fees •
All the while, the PQ took stock of the situation,
Levesque in a press interview said,
The cup is full and any attempt to impose more
French will provoke a violent reaction from the
English-speaking community ,,. That is plainly
what is involved; English Canada is moving now
to a rejection of Quebec's demands. Without
openly wishing that Quebec would leave, not
going so
far as to throw us out the door if
we don't
decide to go, it is certain that En
glish Canada is no longer in the mood to
tolerate
either the smallest concession to
Quebec or any acceleration of bilingualism, ^
Moreover, the PQ and other French Canadian observers
noted the fact that James Richardson has resigned from
the Trudeau Cabinet to protest the possible entrenchment
of French language rights in any new constitution, thus
adding to French Canadian suspicions that English Canada
was not really interested in offering French Canada any
protection for its language and culture.
^3

Ibid,
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By Septermber,

1976,

it was clear that m a n y L i b e r a l

party members w a n t e d B o u r a s s a to call an election.
they wi s h e d to dispel
Quebeckers

First,

the b e l i e f that the m a j o r i t y of

favored the Parti Q u e b e g o i s , Second,

Bourassa

h i mself held that he ne e d e d a man d a t e to c h a l l e n g e
T r u deau's move to patria t e the constitution. At the same
time,

B o urassa b l a s t e d the PQ's propo s a l s for " s o v e r e i g n t y /

association" as b e i n g unrealistic,

unworkable,

extreme

and dangerous.
The Liberals made t h e i r platform public
document

entitled P r o g r a m

initiatives

in the areas

76,

judiciary,

and b udget

In particular,

The pro g r a m o u t l i n e d L i b e r a l

of labor law,

federal and p r o v incial powers,

in a c a m p a i g n

public finance,

the S u p r e m e Court and the

ceilings and e q u a l i z a t i o n payments.

the p l a t f o r m stressed r e f o r m in the right-

to - s trike law.
Levesque

followed an astute s t r a t e g y of not g i v i n g the

Liberals more a m m u n i t i o n on the s e p a r a t i s m issue.

The PQ

kept a low profile and did everything to avoid m e n t i o n i n g
separatism.

Bourassa,

however,

c o ntinued to c h allange

L e vesque to a debate on the economics
federalism,

of separatism, and

and Levesque' s r e fusal to debate b r o u g h t

of PQ cowardice
mained unmoved.

from the Liberals.

Levesque,

however,

charges
re
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The PQ continued to capitalize on the general dis
satisfaction with Liberal economic policies. Moreover,
it had vastly improved its regional and local organizational
structures and was successful in raising $1,200,000 in
campaign funds. The PQ made every effort to play down
the separatist issue despite Liberal attempts to draw it
out during the campaign. Time and again, Levesque urged
PQ members to organize, to campaign vigorously, and to
eschew the ideological debate. The PQ*s strategy was to
concentrate on Bourassa*s record and to stress that it
offered the only viable alternative. Carefully wording its
campaign literature, the PQ also emphasized that, if
elected, no move toward independence would be made without
the approval of the plan through a province-wide referendum.
The Verdict-The Vote of November 15, 1976
When the results were counted, it was clear that the
PQ had gained 41.^ percent of the vote, or 71 seats. The
Liberals, meanwhile, had dropped from 102 seats in 1973
to 26 in 1976, Even the Union Nationale showed a gain of
11 seats, or 18.2 percent of the vote. The actual breakdown
was as follows:
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The breadth of the PQ victory was also apparent, with
the party registering gains in West Montreal (Anglophone)
and Eastern Quebec. The party dominated in urban and
semi-urban Quebec, with the exception of some of the
non-French ethnic ridings in Montreal. If one considers
the vote in terms of language, it is clear that the PQ
gained 5^ percent of the French Canadian vote, while
French Canadians accounted for 26 percent of the Liberal
vote. With respect to the geographic distribution of the
French-speaking vote, support came from Montreal, with
73 percent, and 50 percent elsewhere in the province.
Analysis of 1976
While one observer contends that,

"Although no one

expected that the Liberals would emerge unscathed ... no
one anticipated the slaughter of November 15**' he is only
partially correct. On the one hand, after the election,
while most major newspapers such as the New York Times ,
The London Times and the Washington P o s t , carried stories
dealing with the "surprising" results in Quebec, The Wall
Street Journal, on the other hand, reported the
results as casually as if Rockefeller had won another
gubernatorial race in New York. Perhaps the reason
Hudon, p. 2 3 .
^^Saywell, p. 12.
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was that the Journal is largely unconcerned with political
issues such the the "cultural problem," but, more likely,
it was because the paper places heavy emphasis on
economic issues. Moreover, the election that brought
the PQ to power was a result of the desire for economic
change that superseded the fear of the separatist movement.
A sluggish economy with high inflation, high unemployment,
a record budget deficit, labor unrest, and charges of
corruption was an accurate description of Quebec under
the Bourassa administration. These were the issues which
Levesque stressed and, as in the 1973 election, he
attempted to downplay the separatist part of the PQ plat
form. Bourassa, however, without a strong economic record
to show, waged his entire campaign on the anti-separatism
issue, a tactic that, in the end, failed.
Furthermore, Levesque also deserves considerable
credit for a masterful campaign. He was able to keep
distant from the radical movements and thus obtain the
support of the middle class. He also stressed the more
fundamental issues important to all citizens, such as
adequate services and a higher standard of living. What
is more, the separatist issue, upon which his party was
predicated, was not neglected but certainly de-emphasized,

at least publically. Indeed, he tried at all times to
equate Quebec autonomy with economic benefits. Bourassa,
on the other hand, having torn the country apart with
the language issue, and faced with a miserable economic
past, had to propound on the evils of separatism as his
sole campaign issue.

CHAPTER V
TRUDEAU AND LEVESQUE; THE CLASH OF IDEAS
To understand the conflict between separatists and
federalists, it is necessary to examine the fundamental
debate between Rene Levesque and Pierre Trudeau. This
debate, which began in the i960 's , is the backdrop to
everything that has occurred in the 1970’s and 80 *s. Thus,
the purpose of this chapter is to examine the background
and respective world-views of both men, to trace their
relationship to the present, and to discover how their
beliefs may contribute to Quebec's future in Canada.
One observer has accurately capsulized the conflict
between Trudeau and Levesque. Desbarats notes that,
Trudeau saw the separatist movement as an
expression of the "profound insecurity and
ancient fears" of the French Canadian people,
and as an anachronistic attempt to "shut the
doors and block the frontiers" against the
outside world. For Levesque, the movement
was exactly the opposite; an escape from
the stifling restrictions of Confederation
to the freedom and responsibility of adult
nationhood•
Both men looked at the history of French
Canada since the conquest and saw the same
stroy of shame and humiliation, and reached
opposite conclusions. Each saw freedom in
his own option, and saw the other as a
prisoner of Quebec's past.

Peter Desbarats, Rene; A Canadian in Search of a
Country (Toronto; McClelland and Stewart, 1976), p. 17^.
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Trudeau's ideas are best expounded in two books,
Approaches to Politics and Federalism and the French
Canadians. In Approaches, Trudeau's aim is to examine
those theories which have been used to justify the uses
of power throughout history, and to point out some of the
uses and abuses of power by the corrupt regime of Maurice
Duplessis in Quebec during the 193°'s, ^0's and 50's.
Approaches is a more general work, devoted to Trudeau's
feelings concerning the relationship between ruler and
ruled. In Federalism, however, he takes a closer look
at the history of French Canadian development, and examines
such things as the nature of constitutional conflict, the
history of French-English relations, and the origins of
Anglo-Canadian and French-Canadian nationalisms,
Levesque's ideas can be garnered from his major work,
✓

Option Quebec, and by examining a number of articles he
has written concerning French Canadian demands and the
platform of the Parti QuebeQois. It should be noted
that, whereas Trudeau's writings deal with political
philosophy, Levesque's tend to be more polemical and
aimed at a specific audience he is attempting to con
vince regarding the desirability of an independent Quebec.
We shall begin by looking at Trudeau's ideas.
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Trudeau and Quebec
An observer of the Canadian scene and recent biogra
pher of Pierre Trudeau has stated:

"Whatever expectations

others attached to him, Trudeau himself has never made it
a secret that it was the Quebec issue that led him to
enter politics and eventually become Prime Minister."
Trudeau claims,

2

"Each man has his own reasons, I suppose,

as driving forces; but mine were twofold: one was to make
sure that Quebec wouldn't leave Canada through separatism,
and the other was to make sure that Canada wouldn't shove
Quebec out through narrowmindedness•
Any attempt to deal with Trudeau's handling of the
Quebec Issue must take into account the fact that many
of the problems existed long before he became Prime Minis
ter? some of them were beyond his control and a few are a
direct result of his own actions. Some observers contend
that, in some ways, Trudeau contributed to the spread of
separatist sentiment in Quebec. Others, however, hold that
he contributed far more to the containment of that sentiment,
and that there is reason to believe the situation might have
been far worse without the role he played.
2

4

George Raswanski, Trudeau (New York: Taplinger Press,
1978), p. 311.
“
3
Pierre E. Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians
(New York: St. Martins, 19*68)', P* ix.
4

Radwanski, p. 312.
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Brief Biographical Sketch
Pierre Elliot Trudeau was born in Montreal in 1919*
After graduation from Brebeuf College in 1940, he studied
law at the University of Montreal. While at the university,
he opposed the conscription of Canadians for service
in Europe during World War II and actively campaigned for
Jean Drapeau, the mayor of Montreal and an anti-conscrip
tion candidate. Following his graduation from law school
in 1943, he worked as a law clerk for a short time. Short
ly thereafter, he quit work and embarked on a world tour
which lasted several years. During the l950*Sf Trudeau
became actively interested in politics and founded a
political journal, Cite Libre. He joined the Liberal
party in 19^5 and was a successful candidate for a seat
in the Canadian Parliament in I9 6 6 . He became Minister
of Justice in 19^7 and was elected Prime Minister in
1968 •
Federalism and the French Canadians
Trudeau states in his forward to Federalism and the
French Canadians that the only common factor to be found
in his thinking over the years has been his opposition to
accepted opinion. Like many progressive Canadians of his
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day, Trudeau observed the stifling influence of the
Duplessis regime on Quebec’s society: its opposition
to modernization;

its corruption; its lack of progressive

ideas. "I fought this regime until its downfall in i960.,"-*
Trudeau remarks.
Trudeau argues that, while he desired change during
the Duplessis days, he was also a fierce supporter of
provincial autonomy. With the coming of the "Quiet
Revolution" and the Lesage administration, however, the
forces of change and modernization carried the notion of
provincial autonomy to the extreme. The province’s politics
lacked a balance between provincial autonomy for Quebec,
on the one hand, and the possibility of excessive federal
dominance, on the other.
Moreover, while the Quebec modernization drive pro
duced a greater sophistication, a higher level of
eduation, and a more urban outlook among Quebecois,
the forces of Quebec nationalism, instead of lessening,
turned from being inward-looking and defensive to being
aggressive, demanding, and, in some cases, separatist.
5
^Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians, p. xix.
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This modernized nationalism produced a greater sense
of grievance toward English Canada. It found its
greatest appeal among the province's youth and the
labor movement. Trudeau:claims that his decision to
enter politics in 1965 came in response to his desire to
counter this extreme form of nationalism.
Trudeau inveighs against the notion of nationalism
primarily because he feels it is a threat to democracy.
His stance is grounded in the belief that "a truly
democratic government cannot be 'nationalist * because
it must pursue the good of all its citizens, without
prejudice to ethnic origin."^ Moreover, Trudeau maintains,
the history of nationalist movements has brought about
the worst possible situations for people caught up by
their spurious logic. The greatest tragedy of nationalism,
he claims, is that much suffering and death have taken
place to defend an absurd concept. "That is way the principle
of nationalism has brought to the world two centuries
7
of war, and not one single final soultion," Trudeau argues.

6Ibid., p. 1 5 6 .
7Ibid.. p. 158.
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As for the separatists who espouse the doctrine of
sovereignty, Trudeau holds that "those who procliam it
for the nation of French Canada are not only reactionary,
they are preposterous." He holds that the French Canadians
could not constitute a perfect society any more than
Q

"the five million Sikhs of Punjab."
Trudeau also holds that separatists err in their
assumption that independence and progress are essentially
the same. Unlike many nationalistic thinkers of the
developing world, Trudeau rejects the notion that "good
9

government is no substitute for self-government."

He

adds that such emphasis on sovereignty above all else
gives indication of the separatists*

"muddled thinking"

because self-government does not mean national selfdetermination or "showing off one's linguistic brilliance."

10

He attacks nationalists such as Marcel Chaput, who draw
on the experiences of Asian and African states to claim
independence. The fact that a state has within its
boundaries people who speak more than one language or have
more than one religion, Trudeau argues, does n-ot necessitate
a separate state for each one of these groups. India, Trudeau
notes,

is a sovereign republic in which four languages are

recognized along with eight principal religions, several
Q
Ibid., p. 170.
9

10

.
Ibid., p. 151c
Ibid., p. 152•
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of Which are implacably opposed to each other. Other states,
such as Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Malaya and Burma, also have wide
divergences in ethnic and religious character. If all
of these states incorporate so many different languages,
attitudes, religions, and ways of life, why cannot the
Canadian federation embrace two cultures and two languages,
Trudeau asks?
The history of progress and civilization, Trudeau
claims, is the chronicle of subordination of tribal
"nationalism" to wider interests. The nation is not a
biological reality, that is, a community that springs
from the very nature of man, and history has shown that
man has done very well without it. What is more, he
remarks,

"the tiny portion of history marked by the

emergence of nation states is also the period of the most
degrading collective hatred the world has ever seen."

11

Like the protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, Trudeau
argues that nationalism often gives rise to power-seeking
megalomaniacs, like Napoleon.

"Napoleon," Niebuhr claimed,

"could bathe Europe in blood for the sake of gratifying
his overweening lust for power, as long as he
could pose as the tool of French patriotism and as

11

Ibid., p. 157*
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the instrument of revolutionary fervor#"

12

Federalism and the Constitutional Question
Trudeau is both sympathetic and highly critical of
the way in which Quebec has managed its own affairs over
the years# On the one hand, he acknowledges that Quebeckers
have suffered under an intense prejudice from AngloCanadians. "From the moment of delivery of the Royal Pro
clamation of 1?6 3 ," he claims, "the intention was obvious:
18
the French Canadian was to be completely assimilated." J
Because the British would not allow themselves to occupy
an inferior position,

"they invented all kinds of strategems

by which democracy was made to mean government by the
14
minority#"
The fact that Quebec remained a solid bastion of French
culture and language gave rise to an aggressive AngloCanadian nationalism that, in turn, resulted "inevitably"
in a more intense French Canadian nationalism. Quebeckers
were thus faced with two choices, according to Trudeaus 1)
they could respond with a rival version of the French
Canadian nation; 2) they could scrap the idea of a nation
state and move toward making Canada a multi-national state.
The first choice, he notes, was, and still is, that of the
separatists or advocates of independence.

1^
^

12
Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society(New
York: Charles Scribner*s S o n s , 1932), pp. x-xii.
13
Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians, p c 162.
14
Ibid.
15

Ibid., p. 164.
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English intransigence aside, Trudeau is quick to
point out that French Canadians themselves did a number
of things to exacerbate an already miserable situation.
For one thing, he takes a critical view of the place
democracy has had in Quebec's past. French Canadians,
he holds, never really believed in democracy for them
selves "and English Canadians have not really wanted it
16
for others." Before 1763» Trudeau notes, French Canadians
were under the authoritarian rule of the French monarchy,
the Church and the seigneurial system. British rule,
according to Trudeau, brought to French Canada the first
principles of self-government. He cites the observation
of Lord Dorchester to the Colonial Office in 1788 that
three quarters of the French Canadians were actually
opposed to any form of self-rule. Thus, when the Con
stitutional Act of 1791 brought in some measure of
representative government,

"Canadiennes were neither

psychologically nor politically prepared for it."

17

Moreover, once Quebec had actually joined the Con
federation in I 867 , its government made no attempt to
make the best of the situation by modernizing the province,
Trudeau says. It did nothing to use manpower and investment
advantageously and was "downright regressive In the measures
18
it took." The basic characteristic of Quebec's economy
1 Ibid.. p. 1 0 3 .
^ Ibid. , p. 104.
18

Ibid., pp. 16-17,
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for more than a century was the absence of a coherent
policy on both public and private Investment. He then
compares the policies of the English-speaking provinces
favorably with those of Quebec in terms of their em
phasis on directing corporations, nationalization,
education, health insurance, and all public projects to
the benefit of all those in the province.
Quebec's major fault, therefore, lay in the failure
of its government to assume the role that modern govern
ments have taken in assuring an activist

direction and

regulation of economic forces. In the name of French
linguistic and religious values, and believing in a
non-interventionist role for the provincial government,
Quebec severely hampered its ability to compete with
those provinces which had modernized. Hence, Quebec
remained in the backwaters largely due to its own
decisions*— or at least the decisions of certain groups
within the province, namely the bourgeoisie and the
clergy.
To be sure, English Canadians had contributed to the
skepticism with which French Canadians viewed their
democratic institutions. Trudeau cites the facts that:
1) although French Canadians comprised 9^ percent of
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the population of Quebec, they comprised only 60 percent
of the representatives of the provincial assembly^? 2)
French

Canadians were

in a minority in both the

elective and non-elective bodies— the Legislature and
Executive Council. Moreover, some British administrators,
such as Governor Craig,

"did much to quash what might
19
have been a nascent belief in democracy."
The French Canadians were left with two possible
choices for the democratic institutions at their command;
1) to obstruct and sabotage the federal parliament, similar
to the Irish strategy at Westminster

or 2) the outward

acceptance of the parliamentary game but without any in
ward allegiance to its principles. The French Canadians
opted for the latter, Trudeau says, "because the rebellions
of the 1830*s and 18^0*s showed that sabotage led to
,,20
suppression."
The result of all this was that French Canadians
spurned all ideologies except nationalism

and supported

those which stood for ethnic rights. Because they felt
unable to share equally with Anglo-Canadians the rights
and privileges of Canadian citizenship, they "resolved
to pursue only the French Canadian weal, and to safeguard
21
the latter, they cheated against the former."
Ibid.. p. 105
20Ibid., p. 106.
21I b i d . , p.

107.
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The Realities of Separatism
With the forgoing arguments as background, Trudeau
turns his attention in Federalism and the French Canadians
to the realities of Quebec's economic and political
situation in North America and the possibilities for
achieving independence. First, he notes, the economy of
Quebec is closely linked to that of Canada, and both are
dominated by the United States* Each of these areas tends
to benefit from the free-flowing movement of capital,
employment, and technology. Second, French is the mother
tongue of five or six million people, while English is
spoken by one hundred and eighty-two million* Hence,
Quebec is one of the few territories in the entire
Western hemisphere in which French-speaking people are
grouped in sufficient numbers to be a political society.
However, the realities of the North American economy
and the linguistic dimensions of Quebec society are such
that "no amount of exhortation— even incorporated into
22
a constitutional document--can change." What is always
ignored among separatists, Trudeau states, is the fact
that all classes benefit from the free movement of goods
and knowledge, capital and technology, while all classes
suffer a lower standard of living if the state takes

22

Ibid., p. 9 .

185
steps— in the name of linguistic and cultural autonomy—
to interdict the flow between provinces and states not
of the same language. For Trudeau, the consequences of
a separate state of Quebec would bear most heavily on
the working classes. It is they, he says, "in the end
always have to pay; it is they who would suffer most
from a lowering of the standard of living, who would be
hardest hit byna period of political and social stagnation,
and who would be the first to suffer from unemployment
and destitution."^
The flow of technology and the creation of research
facilities is of primary importance in the economic
development of a nation, Trudeau says. He cites the ob
servations of French economist Louis Armand, who noted
that the possession of raw materials , capital, and labor
are not enough to allow a nation to advance in the modern
world. What is important is "the number and quality of
research workers ceaselessly contributing to the progress
of science and technology. What their researchers need is
equipment that costs billions of dollars, and quickly
2U
becomes obsolete."
To have these items, Armand says,"it
is not enough to be wealthy: you must be colossally rich."
Armand concludes that "needs destroy the ideas of nations,
impose a sharing of manpower, markets and capital. There are
25
no longer any solution on a national scale."
23
Ibid. , r>. 15*
24Loui^ Armand, quoted by Trudeau m
the French Canadians, p . 13.
25

Ibid.

Federalism and'
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Trudeau feels that Armand's warning should be heeded.
Laws and constitutions that bring about a situation that is
not favorable to the entry of capital and technology result
in a "country ... hopelessly outclassed economically ...
its industries soon outdated and inefficient."

26

He urges

that nations must be willing to sacrifice some of their
national sovereignty or be willing to pay the price in
economic and social backwardness. Those who argue that
such openness to foreign capital results in economic
dependence, sometimes described as "colonization" or
"colonialism," have missed the point entirely, Trudeau
claims.

"The answer," he says,

" is to use foreign capital

within the framework of rational economic development; to
create indigenous capital and direct it toward key sectors
of the future: computers, services and industry in the age
of nuclear energy." Hence, Trudeau maintains, the separatists'
approach to economic Independence is so much wasted effort;
it is a solution "whereby more energy is consumed in combating
disagreeable but irrevocable realities than in contributing
28
some satisfactory compromise."
Federalism and Constitutional Change
In answer to those who claim that constitutional guaran
tees are the solution to Quebec's problems, Trudeau holds

26
27
28

Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians, p . 13 •
lb id.. pp. 11-12.

lb id •
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that it is an illusion to think that language and culture
can be safeguarded merely by changing the wording of a
document. Trudeau addresses French Canada's two major
demands for constitutional change: 1 ) the demand for
an "entrenched" Bill of Rights that would enumerate and
make unassailable French Canadians' rights with respect
to language and culture, and would prevent discrimination
against French Canadians in employment; 2) the demand for
a "special status" for Quebec within the framework of the
Canadian federation.
Trudeau, however, has always opposed a special con
stitutional status for Quebec, arguing that it would be
utterly impossible to implement. How, for example, could
a constitution be created that would give Quebec greater
powers than other provinces without simultaneously reducing
Quebec's power in Ottawa? How could Quebec be made the
national state of French Canadians

with really special

powers without abandoning at the same time demands for the
parity of French and English in Ottawa, and thouughout the
rest of the country? Moreover, he says, a culture "makes
progress through the exchange of ideas and through
challenge " and special status is "an option that in the
long run ... can only tend to weaken values protected
29
against competition." 7
29
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Reasons for Quebec to Opt for Federalism
Trudeau holds that Quebec's most viable option is to
remain within the current federal structure, though with
some changes. The federal system now in place offers more
in the way of concrete, practical solutions to Quebec's
needs, he believes, than any sweeping changes proposed by
the separatists. Formal proposals could be made to in
corporate a "Bill of Rights" into the constitution, to
change the organic law relating to the central government
to give it a more authentically federal character, and to
enact provisions for greater decentralization. Trudeau
argues that "natural forces are presently favoring
30
provincial autonomy," and that if those who ask for con
stitutional change would wait a bit longer the provinces then
will have established more autonomous administrations that
will be difficult to dislodge,

"and Quebec will have found

several allies in its struggle for an improved federal
system •
While the Canadian constitution created a country
where French Canadians could compete on an equal basis
with English Canadians, Trudeau notes that "unfortunately
... the rules of the constitutional game were not always
upheld."^2 This meant that French Canadians' educational
30
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and political rights were ignored throughout the country,
and thus they came to believe that they were secure in
those rights only in Quebec. What will be required, he
states, is a transformation of these "rules of the game."
The constitution must be worded s.o that any French-speaking
community, anywhere in Canada, can fully enjoy its lin
guistic rights. Specifically, this would mean that, in
education for example, French-speaking people must have
identical rights concerning taxes, subsidies, and legislation
on education. Moreover, absolute equality for the two
languages would be required at the federal level, and
"official status" would be given to the two languages in any
province where French-speake.rs constitute 15 'percent of
the population or more.
Trudeau notes that while written constitutional
guarantees would be of great help in solving the current
33
impasse, "an immense transformation of attitudes" will
be necessary on the part of both French-speaking and
English-speaking Canadians:
If this is achieved sterile chauvinism will
disappear from our Canadian way of life and
other"useful reforms will follow suit with
out much difficulty. If, on the other hand,
this essential is not achieved, there is
really no point in carrying the discussion
any further, for this will mean that Canada
will continue to be swept periodically by
the stroms of ethnic dispute, and will
gradually become a spiritually sterile land,
from which both peace and greatness have been
banished. 3^
33jbid. , pp. 50-51•
3^
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Rene Levesque-The Man and the Dream
John Saywell has written of the man behind the
current Quebec independence movement;
The catalyst in the movement for indepen
dence was Rene Levesque, Without him it
is unlikely that /the election victory/
of November 15 would have happened—
certainly not as early as 197&» Not only
did Levesque
ensure high visibility and
credibility to the movement for indepen
dence, but he also earned, in Quebec and
across Canada, a reputation as a sound
and progressive politician. In less than
ten years he hed built a party that could
appeal as a real, indeed the only, alter
native to the Liberal government of
Robert Bourassa. It was a remarkable
accomplishment, 35
Levesque's career, even before his entry into politics,
was every bit as varied and cosmopolitan as that of Pierre
Trudeau. In fact, were one to make characterizations, one
could say that Trudeau's exposure to politics and world
affairs came as a result of a bohemian wanderlust coupled
with the fact that he was rich enough to fulfill his
dreams. Levesque, on the other hand, worked his way around
the world and showed more drive and purpose in reaching
his goals than Trudeau, who is where he is today largely
by chance.
Like Trudeau, Levesque was a product of the professional
35

/
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class* His father, Dominique Levesque, was an attorney in
the town of New Carlisle on the Gaspe/ peninsula in Quebec*
Rene himself was born on August 22, 1922, in the village
of Paspebiac, not far from New Carlisle*
Levesque attended the local, secular elementary
school, where he recalls that the teacher spoke better
English than French, because it was a bilingual school*
At age eleven, he entered a Jesuit seminary school, where,
he remembers, he became more conscious of problems other
than his owns politics, nationhood, language and French
Canadian rights, for example* He notes that Quebec
during the 1 9 3 0 ’s was a province under the. control of
business monopolies, such as the one which controlled
hydro-electric power* Many, including the Jesuits, called
for government-sponsored economic reforms, to "put an
end to economic dictatorship" and ensure a more equitable
distribution of wealth* ^
Levesque remembers that during his high school years,
a group of young political activists formed Action
liberale nationale, or National Liberal Action Party,
which espoused social and economic liberation for French
Canadians and which, as Provencher notes, was at that time
38
"the only real provincial party*" Other groups, such as

s ^ Jean Provencher, Rene Levesque: Portrait of a
Quebecois(Montreal: The Gage Press, 1976), pT 12 •
37

Jeune Canada, L'Association Catholique de la Jeunesse
Canadienne (Catholic Association of Canadian Youth)

,

and Jeunes Patriotes (Young Patriots) demanded roles
of greater importance for Quebecjois in the province's
industries, decried the domination of foreign capital
and rejected confederation. One youthful organizer*
✓
Rudolphe Dube, published Leur inquietude under the
pen name of Francois Hertel. Hertel argued that indepen
dence for Quebec was inevitable:
Why is Quebec always crawling on all fours?
Because of Ottawa. In my opinion, as long
as the federal system keeps Quebec under
Ottawa's wing, we will never accomplish
anything. Whichever political party saves
us will have to present as the first and
most important part of its program with
drawal from Confederation. 39

Interestingly, in i9 6 0 , when the Liberal Party program
was £eing re-examined, Levesque would recall the platform
of the Action liberale nationale.
Between 1933 and 1937» while Levesque attended Laval
secondary school, he continued to hone his writing talents
publishing short stories in the student newspaper. In 1937
he became an announcer and news editor at the local radio
station in New Carlisle, a position that was to influence

39
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greatly his later career. Following his father's death
the same year, however, his mother moved the family to
Montreal.
In 1938, Levesque enrolled at Gernier College,
another Jesuit-run institution. His journalistic in
terests continued there, as he became a regular con
tributor to the school newspaper, often writing on
economics and international affairs. His pattern of
political success in later life may have been forshadowed by an article called L*esprit. sportif dans
la vie

(The Sporting Spirit in Life)in which he wrote,

"If you have higher goals than your own personal
success, do not forget that you are a French Canadian,
that your young people have been mired in lassitude
for generations and that if the masses do not act
this nation— your nation— is lost. Every descendant
of the 60,000 defeated in 1?60 must stand up and be
40
counted•"
Following his high school baccalaureat in 1940,
Levesque worked part-time in broadcasting at a radio
station in Quebec City while pursuing studies in law
at Laval University. It was at Laval that Levesque ran
afoul.of the school's strict disciplinary code. He

Ibid., p. 30.
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was expelled for smoking and forced to stay out of class
until he apologized* He did not apologize and did not
return to class. He told his mother, after the rector
appealed to her to persuade him to return,

"I'm not

interested in passing those exams, because I'll never
practice .law. All I want to do in life is write, nothing
else•"
By 1943» he turned to professional reporting. In
December. he enlisted with the Office of War Information
(OWI) in Montreal

to cover the. war in Europe. His bi

lingual abilities assured his position , and he was sent
to London to cover the last two years of the war. His
work brought him recognition from both European and
North American broadcasters, and upon his return from
Europe in 1946 Levesque was offered a position on the
staff of the Canadian Broadcasting Company's International
Service. In 1951» he returned to war reporting, this time
as a correspondent with the Canadian brigade attached to
the United Nations Combat forces in Korea.
Levesque's return to peacetime broadcasting gave him
the opportunity for numerous assignments and interviews.
He covered the coronation of Queen Elizabeth and was
granted the first interview allowed a western journalist
41
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with Nikita Khrushchev after his rise to power.
In the mid-1950's, Levesque resigned his position
with the CBC to become a freelance journalist. He was
quickly offered the opportunity to produce and host
a weekly news and information program, Point de M i r e ,
which drew praise from both journalists and the
general public for its high standards and accuracy.
Before the late 1950's, Levesque had shownJlittle
interest in anything other than journalism. This changed
when be became Involved in a labor dispute

between the

producers and management of the CBC. In 1959» the
producers appealed directly to the federal government
to:' intervene to break the stalemate between the two
parties. Prime Minister Dieffenbaker and Labor Minister
Michael Starr refused, an action Levesque later said
persuaded him to enter politics.
Levesque accounts for his decision to enter politics
in four ways: first, he had developed a taste for politics
during the producer-strike? second, he felt the need to
bring about the defeat of the Union Natlonale.? third,
he approved of the Liberal program? and fourth, he was in
fluenced by the strong sense of justice exhibited by
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the Quebec Liberal leader, Georges-Emile Lapalme, along
with Lapalme*s fervent opposition to the Duplessis
regime. What made the Liberal platform of i960 so
appealing, Levesque said, was its emphasis on educational
and civil service reform, economic planning, the
creation of a ministry of natural resources, the es
tablishment of hospital

insurance, and the creation of

a labor code and workmen's compensation*boards•
Levesque was approached by Jean Lesage, then
Quebec's Premier and leader of the Liberal party, to
run in the next provincial election in 1962. He was
successful in his bid for the riding, despite the fact
that the Union Nationale had placed another candidate
named "Rene^ Levesque” on the ballot. Under the Liberal
administration, Levesque was named Minister of Public
Works.
Levesque began with a sweeping reorganization of
the Ministry of Public Works. He spoke often on public
policy issues pertaining to resource development,
education,,and culture. His public statements began to
arouse discussion among both English and French Canadians,
especially when he said that Quebecois were living under
43
the "yoke of colonialism." He called for Quebecois to

k-2.
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"realize.e•*

destiny through the exercise of intelligence
44
and expertise and not through 'revenge of the cradle,'"
He announced his intention during the next session of
the government to introduce a bill proposing the creation
of a general investment corporation,

and stated his

desire that the province's hydro-electric industry be
placed in the public sector. At an international confer
ence on resources, he told his audience that Quebec in
tended to assert itself in the field of natural resour
ces •
We in Quebec feel it is essential that the
responsibility for these foundations — in
this field as well as in many others— must
rest with us at the provincial level. The
constitution has delegated these respon
sibilities to us, and, in terms of our
national interest, it is of vital impor
tance to French Canadians that the day-today handling of economic affairs such as
planning and policy-making, no matter what
their nature, be left to u s . ^3'
Levesque further questioned the means and purposes
of confederation. It was, he told a Montreal audience,
"an experiment compromised by a cumulative series of
errors repeated unthinkingly for decades. If the necessary
adjustments are not made, the experiment will simply
46
fail." Levesque's statements had a disquieting effect
on the English-speaking community. He once told a
44
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group of English-speaking listeners, "We

French Canadians

have no real need of you* The great threat to confederation
lies in the fact-that

we are *.*, only interested in it
47
out of a sense of obligation rather than real concern.”
If Levesque's statements caused concern among
English-speakers, his later actions wodld prove even more
alarming to many. For example, in I96I , Levesque announced
his intention to restructure completely Quebec's hydro
electric industry. His decision stemmed, he said, from
the fact that, under the Union Nationale, Hydro-Quebec
had been forced to make large capital investments to
produce electricity that was sold to private companies,
many of which were controlled from outside the province.
Quebec's consumers, he argued, were being forced to foot
the bill to enrich outsiders. "Amalgamation.will put :to
an end," he said, "to the massive subsidies being paid
out to non-residents of the province." He meant, in other
words, to nationalize Hydro-Quebec.
The storm of protest over Levesque's decision gave
ample opportunity for public discussion of the proposal.
Although his reports were filled with statistics about
the use of power, he made the reasons for the decision
clear in an address to the Canadian Club.

47
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Our province must grow and it must do
so in a way that benefits the majority
of the population. This means that— and
let us be very clear and frank about this
in a way that continually benefits the
French Canadian nation, which has and
will only have one physical base, to call
its own: the Province of Q u e b e c . ^
While many in the provincial cabinet disagreed
vehemently with Levesquevs decision to nationalize
Hydro-Quebec, Premier Jean Lesage, one of the most
outspoken opponents of the move at first, later backed
/s

him. The Liberals 1962 campaign slogan, ,fMaitres
59
chez n o u s ,.w fitted well with Levesque's action. The
Liberals asked the people of Quebec to support the
nationalization of electricity, principally because
it would mean "the end of our colonial status and the
real beginning of economic independence.” The Englishspeaking community, however, was less enthusiastic.
Mr. McDiarmid, President of Lincoln National Life, said
that Levesque was a " 'Robbespierre' who acted as if all

52
aristocrats should be guillotined.” Another English
53
businessman compared Levesque to Castro. Despite these
attacks, the Quebec electorate voted a resounding "yes”
to the question of nationalization in a provincial
referendum.
If 9
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During the mid-1960's, Levesque continued to question
the value of Canadian federalism. He told a Toronto
audience that "to be honestly Canadian, I shouldn’t have
to feel like a native leaving his reservation every time
I leave Quebec. I d o n ’t find two great cultures. I feel
like a foreigner." J

In an interview with the Toronto S t a r ,

he said. "Confederation isn't sacred, you know. It is
just a bargain made 100 years ago. It has become a bad
bargain. Sometimes the only thing you can do with a
bad bargain is to get out of it, and that can be done
democratically.
When questioned about what changes he would make in
the I867 BNA Act, however, Levesque was less explicit.
As one observer notes,

"Levesque replied that he did not

know for sure and expressed the fear that discussions might
be reduced to a question of semantics ••• Levesque believed
in the virtues of planning as a means of realizing Quebec's
'social contract,' but since that had yet to be defined,
Quebec was unable to describe its basic principles to
English Canadians."^
Some hint as to what adjustments Levesque had in mind
came in a 196^ meeting of the Young Liberal Association.
At the meeting, Levesque maintained that,
54
55
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"Quebec is
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suffering within the confines of an outmoded, obsolete con
federation, and the status quo is untenable.

• •/e J ither

Quebec will become an associate state within Canada, with
a status guaranteeing it the economic, political and cul
tural powers necessary for its growth as a nation, or else
57
Quebec will become independent.”
While the debate concerning confederation continued,
the radical FLQ emerged with its answersbombings and in
timidation. Levesque at once declared the violence an
unacceptable tool to achieve independence. His view was
that “any person or group can advocate political or social
changes, however, radical they may appear to be to certain
people, and can use legitimate channels to gather support.
In this context, physical violence and terroritst tactics
58
are criminal and stupid.”
Levesque's reaffirmation of Quebec's uniqueness and
his denunciation of the terrorists struck a responsive
chord with many Qpebegois. Writer and filmmaker, Jacques
Godbout, wrote of him:
Although he thought of himself as a pop
ularizing journalist, he had become the
first citizen to communicate intelligent
ly with his fellow citizens. Ren^ Levesque
was a myth long before he realized it.
Rene Levesque, our. latest and most modern
myth, came from a long line of heroes:
After all, we've made Papineau a household
word. What will happen to Levesque? A mag
nificent burial or revolution? 59
57Ibid., p. 205.
58Ibid., p. 207.

59

Ibid•, p. 208.

202

Levesque appealed especially to members of the trade
union movement, whom he supported in various strike actions
against such firms as the Noranda Mining Company. Although
some feared that Levesque's siding with the trade unionists
against Noranda foreshadowed a proposal to nationalize
the mining industry, Levesque said he intended no such
thing. Instead, he concentrated on his earlier questioning
of the structure of federalism and constitutional reform.
In an interview with the Montreal newspaper, Le Devoir,
Levesque said, ’’Today's conflict is no longer the traditional conflict between majority and minority. It is a con
flict between two majorities? the English-speaking majority
in Canada and the French-speaking majority in Quebec. We've
taken a long time to get started but we're on our way, and
6o
Quebec's evolution can't be stopped now."
Levesque again threw himself into the fray with state
ments about the treatment of French Canadians. He said
that many businesses were "arrogant and ignorant" of the
fact that 80 percent of Quebec's population is French,
and he warned them to be "civilized" and respect the
61
French position while there is still time.
He followed this
with a statement that "the awakened French Canada is not
against any group or its rights, only against the entrenched
62
privileges of a dominant minority."
60
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By 1966, the Liberal party's promises# though
thoroughly debated, had not been implemented. Reform
was slow in coming, with little evidence that the
Liberals had done much to effect basic change. Lesage
rearranged his cabinet, putting Levesque in charge of
the Ministry of Family and Social Welfare, where Levesque
announced his intention to introduce a program of medicare
for the poor, a universal health insurance plan, and a
comprehensive social welfare policy#
While the Liberals knew that they had not satisfied
everyone with

respect to their proposed reforms, the

election of 1966 proved to be a tremendous upset. The
Liberals gained only 5° delegates while the Union
Nationale under Daniel Johnson elected 5 6 . Some at
tributed the Liberal defeat to the Union Nationale's
fresh approach and aggressive election strategy; others
held that the newly-formed RIN(Rassemblement pour l fin
dependence nationale), by being on the ballot in 13
ridings, had made the difference between Liberals and
the UN. The Montreal newspaper. Le Devoir took a harsher
line toward the Liberals and editorialized that,
The Liberals were the architects of their
own defeatsthey were too sure of themselves
and at the same time incapable of masking
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or reparing the numerous flaws that had
appeared here and there in their machine
before it was too late. They succumbed
once again to their usual weakness— com
placency. 6 3
Whaever else might be said, it is certain that the defeat
did lead to some soul-searching by the Liberals to discover
what had actually gone wrong.
The Liberal defeat did nothing to make Levesque tone
down his anti-colonial rhetoric. Provencher remarks that
Levesque became more convinced that Quebec was a colony,
"an underdeveloped society ... lacking in character and
pride, though paradoxically well fed and comfortable, lulled
by the elite and its puppet kings into the kind of utter
mediocrity that would be fatal to it .•••

64*

In I96?, Levesque escalated his campaign against
Quebec*s colonial status on a speaking tour of the western
provinces, in which he said, "Quebec is the same as
Rhodesia— a privileged minority governs a deprived majority." ^
At the same time, he warned English Canada,

"Either Quebec

gets a new deal or eventually it will get out."

66

Although still a deputy and member of the Liberal party,
Levesque found himself increasingly at odds with the Liberal
leadership over the constitutional question® At the Party's
executive committee meeting in the fall of 1 9 6 7 , the agenda
63Ibid.. p. 2 2 k.
6^ Ibid.. p. 227.
5Ibid., p. 231.
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was set for six subjects to be given priority in the
forthcoming party convention, an agenda that did not
include the constitutional 'question. While the party
executive later changed its position to allow dis
cussion of the constitution, they charged the party’s
Political Commission on Constitutional Affairs with the
task of preparing the report to be submitted to the
delegates, leaving Levesque out of the discussion
entirely.
Levesque decided that the time had come for a
direct confrontation with the party's leadership. One
of his supporters, from the Laurier riding, placed
the question of sovereignty before the delegates in
no uncertain terms in a document entitled,"What Does
Quebec Want?" which declared,
For our own good, we must dare to seize
for ourselves complete liberty in Quebec,
the right to all the essential components
of independence, i.e. the complete mas
tery of every last area of basic collec
tive decision-making,..., This means that
Quebec must become sovereign as soon as
possible. • •
There is no reason why we, as future neigh
bors, should not voluntarily remain assoc
iates and partners in a common enterprise,
which would conform to the second great
trend of our timessthe new economic groups,
customs unions, common markets, etc. • • •

206
Nothing says we must throw these things away?
on the contrary, there is every reason to
maintain the framework.
V/e propose a system that would allow our two
majorities to extricate themselves from an
archaic federal framework in which our two
very distinct "personalities” paralyze each
other by dint of pretending to have a third
personality common to both. 67
The Liberal leadership made it clear that they had
no intention of adopting Levesque's call for an indepen
dent Quebec. Eric Kierans, a member of the party executive,
stated that separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada
would "hurl the peonle of Quebec into misery, poverty,

68
and unemployment." The Liberal party’s 1966 convention
was marked by strife and disunity between members who
supported Jean Lesage and those who favored Levesque.
Kierans stated that it was time to "sweep separatism out
'6,9
of the Liberal party and Quebec once and for all." He
further suggested, in his opening address, that, now
that his proposal had been rejected, Levesque and his
supporters should leave the party. Levesque submitted
his resignation and made official his break with the
Liberals•
Although Levesque had been ousted dhe facto from the
Liberal ranks, he had the nucleus of a new political
67
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organization with the other disenchanted Liberals who
resigned with him. A group of Liberals and ex-Liberals
gathered in Montreal on November 18, 1 9 6 7 , "to shape
and organize the sovereignty-association thesis which
70
has arisen in every part of Quebec . " 1 While some wanted
to name the orgainzation after Levesque himself, e.g.
Mouvement Levesque. Option Levesque or Theses Levesque,
he was strongly opposed to the suggestion.

"I am only

an instrument of the movement and that is all I want
to be," he declared. Not wishing to form a new
political party, at least for the moment, the group's
ad hoc steering committee decided to keep the format
of a political organization, giving it the name MouvementSovereignty Association (MSA)•
There was still a great deal of vagueness concerning
what the MSA's program would be like. Levesque held that
the movement

would have "no dogmas," would be "a popular

movement organized by and for all the people," and
would use the state as the "driving force" for political
change since, the party's leaders claimed,

"the majority

of those measures which have done the most

-to shape Quebec's
73
evolution since i960 were taken by the government."
In order to give wider dissemination to his views on
7°Ibid.. p. 2 H-5 .
71Ibid., p. 247.
72Ibid.. p. 249.
73Ibid.. p. 2 5 5 .
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the independence question, Levesque released his book
Option Quebec in January, 19680 It was a book that he
described as a Vlittle sovereignty/association dic7A
tionary." The book's release did, in fact, do much to
give Levesque the attention he sought, for crowds of
ordinary people and journalists flocked to autographing
sessions. More important, however, was that in I9 6 8 ,
Levesque broke away from the Liberal party and formed
the Parti Quebecois. Up to that time, the separatist
movement had lacked a single, jcentral leader. By 1968,
Levesque had become a very popular figure, as he had
led the opposition against Duplessis and had pushed for
the nationalization of Hydro-Quebec. Moreover, he had
a ready-made base of support when he left the Liberal
party. During the 1960's the Liberal party was the only
quasi-leftist party with any substance in Quebec politics,
s-

and it was Rene Levesque who provided the leftist tendencies.
When Levesque left the Liberals, the party moved more to
the center,.lleaving a vacuum which the PQ filled.
With his views on the subject of independence clear
after the publication of Option Quebec, he now had the
second necessary component of a real political force, a
political party— the PQ—

which he would use to implement

his ideas of sovereignty/association in the 1 970 's and beyond.
7^
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CHAPTER VI
THE PQ IN POWER-1976-1983
Levesque's first order of business was to assure the
place of the French language in Quebec society. Despite
strong hostility from the English-speaking minority in
Quebec, the PQ government introduced the controversial
Bill 101 in the Quebec Assembly. By a 7^-21 vote, the
Assembly passed the measure that would make French the
sole official language in the province, and it proclaimed
- the right of the French-speaking majority to use its
language everywhere in the provinces in business, in
industry, and in .government. It retained the controversial
requirement that all persons coming to live in Quebec
must send their children to French-speaking schools. The
Bill also required that companies operating in Quebec be
able to communicate with their employees and the public in
2
French, or be fined.
The only concession that it made to
companies was to allow them to conduct court proceedings

MUse of French Ordered," The Washington Post. April
2, 1977, p. AlO.
-------2
Henry Giniger, "Quebec Introduces Language Bill in
Assembly with Few Concessions to English-speaking Minority,"
The New York Times, April 28, 1977, p. A8.
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in English, but only if all parties to'the litigation
agreed. Private companies were given until 1983 to meet
the requirements? 1) that executives and personnel have
a satisfactory knowledge of French; 2) that the number
of French-speaking personnel at all levels be increased;
and 3) that French be used in all documents and inter
nal communication. It authorized the establishment of a
French language office to see that these regulations
were carried out and enforced.
English Canadians reacted sharply to the measure.

h

Prime Minister Trudeau termed the legislation "unacceptable"
and a violation of the "human rights" of English-speaking
C a n a d i a n s . L e v e s q u e countered that,

"the evolution of

Quebec is that the majority is going to act like a majority,
and some people can't take that ... It's too bad, but that's
the way it is,"^ Trudeau

further charged that the PQ was

encouraging separatist sentiment and influencing public
opinion by attempting to pass off its own propagenda efforts
as unbiased "news." He claimed that the French section, of
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was espousing separatism
through biased news reports, and decried that the PQ had in
filtrated television and radio news and was "destroying the
country." "Almost everyone," Trudeau told the Canadian
3
. .
. . .
Henry Giniger, "Quebec Regime's White Paper Declares
Province a French Society," The New York Times. April 2.
1977, p. 6 c .

H-

Peter Ward, "Language Issue in Quebec is More than
a War of Words, World N e w s . May 13# 1977# p« 6.
5
"Trudeau Calls Bill Unacceptable," The New York Times,
April 29# 1977, p. A5.
^Ib id.

211

Parliament, ’’including high officials of the CBC, would be
prepared to concede that the overwhelming majority of CBC
employees are of separatist leanings. -

He congratulated

Andre Ouellet, Minister of Urban Affairs, for drawing up
a list of those employees ’’out to destroy the country" and
promised that they would be removed.

8

Many, however, felt

that Trudeau was not countering the separatist challenge
on concrete issues, but merely engaging in a witch-hunt.
A practical politician, however, Trudeau realized that
he would have to negotiate and compromise with the separatists
if he wanted to keep the confederation intact. Declaring in
an address before Parliament that his government was will
ing to consider constitutional changes to advance the
cultural aspirations of the disaffected French-speaking
minorities, he announced the formation of a new governmental
group to be called the Task Force on Canadian unity, and
maintained that to save Quebec and halt the developing rift
between the two language groups, English-speakers must
a
become reconciled to more French in their lives. What is
more, for the first time, Trudeau acknowledged a willingness
.
.
10
to face the constitutional issue.
I cannot emphasize
strongly enough that the question of unity is .not
7
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1977, p. 14.
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confined to the issue of language nor confined geographically
11
to the province of Quebec."
He listed numerous dissatis
factions in other provinces, such as the feeling of
westerners that their interests were under-represented in
a central

government dominated by more populous Ontario

and Quebec and the unhappiness of the once-prosperous
eastern provinces over their economic imbalance with the
more

affluent central and western areas.
The Ottawa government announced that it would be

willing to allow the Parti Quebecois to go ahead with
its proposed provincial language legislation because of
what Secretary of State Roberts called the "insecurity
of French Canada about the future of its language in
12
an overwhelmingly English-speaking country."
The Anglophone community was not receptive to the
Liberal government's overtures to the French Canadian
community concerning minority and language rights. The
major English language school board in Quebec, for ex
ample , stated that it

would accept pupils whether or not
they qualified under Quebec's new language law. 13 Because the
defiant schools faced a cut-off of funds from the Quebec
provincial government, English-speaking parents launched
a drive to set up

private

schools to avoid having to

11
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12
Ibidc

Henry Giniger,"English Language Schools in Quebec
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send their children to French ones.
Meanwhile, the Anglophone business community in Quebec
began to react to the new laws. Despite Levesque's asser
tions that business need not fear the PQ government, a
report released in the spring of 1977 showed that 91
companies had moved their corporate headquarters out of
the province between the time of the November 1976
election and February 1977*

1

Trudeau, to whom the PQ was

anathema, was nevertheless a French Canadian deeply con
cerned about the well-being of his home province. He
"implored" and "beseeched" companies in Quebec not to
play into separatist hands by stempeding to English-speaking
Canada.

"The best way to insure a separatist victory is

not to stay and fight but to run away," he said in a Mon
treal press conference. Nevertheless, in a move to shore
up the province's sagging economy, the Quebec government
threatened to take over the Asbestos Corporation, a subsidiary of the U . S .-controlled General Dynamics Corporation,
if it refused to sell its facilities to French Canadian
interests. One year later, the huge Anglo-controlled Sun
Life Assurance Company, Ltd. moved its headquarters from
17
Montreal to Toronto. (
1^
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As if Trudeau's problems with Quebec were not enough,
the separatist drive in French Canada

promptedrestiveness

in the western provinces, where dissatisfaction with the
18
federal system was much in evidence.
In March 1977»
British Columbia's Premier, William R. Bennett, proposed
that Ottawa replace the "rigid federal system," as he
called it, with a more "flexible" union of five regional
groupings: the Atlantic provinces? Quebec; Ontario? the
Prairie provinces-Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba? and
British Columbia.

19

Bennett held that the 110-year old

framework, devised when British Columbia was still a
separate territory, was unsuited to modern-day Canada.
His plan called for the five regional bodies, working with
in the ten provinces, to exercise control over local tax
spending and the executive powers now vested m

Ottawa.

20

Bennett's proposals were carried a step further
by three groups that advocated an independent western
state to include British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan,
Manitoba, and the Northwest Territories and the Yukon. The
source of dissatisfaction for the western provinces, they
claimed, stemmed from economic grievences against federallycontrolled tariffs and freight rates that hit western pocketbooks especially hard. They claimed that the protective
18
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tariffs imposed by Ottawa made imported good more expen21
sive than they should be.
Fixed rates by Ottawa caught
the western provinces "coming and going" one critic con
tended, as they kept up the cost of shipping raw products
to eastern factories and bringing the same materials
back in the form of fabricated articles.

21

"You can

make a good economic case against confederation," con
tended Douglas Christie, president of the New Committee
for Western Independence.

22

Meanwhile, many in Quebec's English-speaking minority
continued to express doubts and fears about the passage of
language legislation designed to make French the primary
language of the province in all matters of commerce,
23
business, government and education.
Quebec's legislature
made no major concessions on Bill 101, and Camille Laurin,
Quebec's Minister of Cultural Development, told a news
conference that the English-speaking community was being
"unduly alarmist."

2k- The English-language press countered

by citing Article 37 of the Bill, which forbade employers
from requiring the knowledge of any language other than
French as a condition of employment, unless the employer
could prove that the job required such knowledge. The PQ
government continued to insist that the purpose of the
21

22
23
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legislation was to increase the role of French Canadians
in the economy, on the ground that, up to that time, they
had been kept in subordinate positions.

2hf

While English-speaking groups throughout the province
mobilized to resist what they felt was a grave infringement
on their liberties by the PQ government, other groups,
such as the Canadian Institute for Public Affairs, held
discussions concerning the English-speaking provinces®
lack of effort to make their French-speaking minorities
feel at home, and the encouragement that such a lack
2<
gives to separatist sentiment. ^ One noted critic of Canada's
language policies, Marc Lalonde, the federal minister of
health and supporter of Trudeau's bilingual.

policies,

warned a Toronto audience that if the rising elite of Frenchspeaking young people in Quebec are deprived of opportunites
in the public and private sectors,

"they will find the

temptation to have these opportunites in a separate Quebec
quite irresistable."

26

Lalonde further denounced Ontario's

provincial government for "equivocal results," despite Its
claim to the provision of a full range of services for
French-speaking Ontarians. Noting that the rate
of establishment of French schools had been slow, he warned
that "English-speaking Ontarians should not comfort
2A
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Press, Newport News, Virginia, September 19» 19?7» P • 12.
25
Henry Giniger,"English Canadians Pressed On Quebec:
Many in Ontario Are Urging Greater Regard for French Can
adian Sensibilities," ^he N ew York Time-s, March IS, 1977.
p. 19.
26

Ibid.

218
government on the fight to keep Canada unified, it would
supplement the work of the six-man team formed earlier
31
by Trudeau, called the National Unity Group, ^
In a speech opening a two-day Parliamentary debate
on national unity, Trudeau outlined his ideas for con
stitutional changes to deal with linguistic rivalries
and other Influences affecting national unity, Trudeau
set up a constitutional advisory borad under Donald S,
Thorsen, a former Duputy Minister of Justice, Among the
changes recommended was a provision transferring respon
sibility from the provinces to the federal government
for educational affairs affecting what Trudeau called
"official language minority groups,"

32

Under the transfer,

the federal government would be able to provide remedies
In cases where provincial governments had been slow or
unwilling to provide French schools in overwhelmingly
English-speaking communities. Thus, the education of Quebec
children from English-speaking homes would be under rules
determined by Ottawa, not Quebec, Trudeau proposed that
the controversial language policy advocated by the PQ be
changed to shift the empahsis to language training in the
schools. This was suggested in order to accommodate reluctant
and often resentful English-speaking civil servants, who
were passed the age of easily learning a second language,
31

Ibid.
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Levesque’s campaign to secure independence with
association began to take shape in the spring of 1977«
From the start, the PQ government was engaged In an
increasingly bitter battle on four fronts; 1 ) opposition
from the federal

government in Ottawa, 2) the other

provinces, 3) the business community, and 4) the local
English-speaking minority. All had in common their opposition
to Levesque's attempt to make Quebec almost exclusively French.
The English-speaking minority v/as particularly aggressive,
because it believed that Levesque's efforts were directed
toward restricting its size and the use of its language. A
group of 115 prominent English-speaking educators, business
men, and members of professions denounced Levesque's proposal
for the exclusive use of French as "a document which con
veys the impression that the English-speaking minority can
and should be suppressed• 33 The group forwarded a
statement to the government in Ottawa which defended bi
lingualism as an economic necessity for Quebec and asserted
that the English-speaking minority had made great strides
toward learning French. The group dismissed as outdated
the "stereotype" picture fostered by Levesque's government
of a monolithic, wealthy and powerful English-speaking
minority dominating a poor and underprivileged French
•4. . 34
ma jo nty
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Levesque insisted, however, that the "stereotype”
picture referred to by the group was not inaccurate
and was precisely the situation that obtained in Quebec,
His new language policy, he said, was designed to correct
the imbalance. In a radio address, he stated that, while
all English-speakers were not millionaires,'"collectively,
as a community, the English minority in Quebec has always
been in a dominant position.
Quebec's English-speaking business community strongly
opposed Levesque's language measures. Its view, epitomized
by Earl W, McLaughlin, president and chairman of the Royal
Bank of Canada, held that businesses that conducted
their affairs internationally had to operate in English,
and that Levesque's language legislation would not be
likely to encourage head offices to establish or to remain
in Montreal. McLaughlin did not state at the time that
the Royal Bank would move out of the province if the language
policy went into effect, but he did say afterward that this
would occur if Quebec became

independent•^

The Montreal

Board of Trade backed McLaughlin's statements by publishing
a study of 13 major corporations with head offices in the

35 lb id •
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province. The study asserted that the province would
lose a billion dollars per year if the head offices
37
moved out.
By the fall of 1977 $ Quebec's language
policy had, according to John F. Sims, forced 150
businesses out of the province and led both corporations
and individuals to transfer hundreds of millions of
dollars to other parts of Canada or the United States.
Levesque

was careful to refute fears that a government

dedicated to the preservation of its majority language,
and to an independent Quebec, would disrupt common economic
and military* ties, especially when it came to joint management
and defense of the St. Lawrence Seaway, NORAD and NATO.-^
On economic and commercial issues, however, Levesque's
previous statements over many years concerning the excessive
influence of foreign capital in Quebec's economy could not
be ignored.
Levesque stated that his blueprint for the new economic
order he envisioned, or "independence with association," was
based on a "northern common market," which economic thinkers
of the separatist movement claimed would include the United
States.^

Quebec's Minister of Finance, Jacques Parizeau,

when questioned about barriers that might exist between Quebec

37Ibid.
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and the other provinces, stated that "it would be absurd to
have a tariff battle between Quebec and Ontario."

41

These

are Canada's two great industrial centers, he noted, and a
significant part of the production in the Montreal area is
geared for the Toronto market and vice-versa.
A critical mistake, Quebec's Minister of Industry and
Commerce, Rodrique Tremblay, held is that "Canadian national
policy for 100

years has been to force Canadians to look

from nopth to south, and instead look from east to west a
policy reinforced by tariff policies, transportation and
.*
42
communications systems."
All of the PQ's statements notwithstanding, Levesque's
assurances to

financial and industrial leaders in Canada

and the United States that a vote for "separation" (a
word banned from his administration®s vocabulary) would
not mean national ization" could not hide the fact that
emotional issues might make Levesque's dream of a "common
market" impossible. Trudeau warned Levesque not to take
such an arrangement for granted. And even

Parizeau himself

doubted that there could be a common currency between Quebec
and the rest of Canada because of the importance exchanges

41
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42
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have in economic policy.
Amid the threats of business flight in the wake of
the PQ victory and the subsequent language legislation,
Levesque attempted to assuage fears that might lead to
Quebec's economic collapse. Careful not to use the words
"separation" or "separatism," he spoke instead of
" s o v e r e i g n t y / a s s o c i a t i o n ® H e approached the financial
and industrial leaders in Canada and the United States
to reassure them that there would be no wholesale takeover
of existing investment or prohibition of future investment,
only "necessary" changes to make it more responsive to
Quebec's interests.

44

Again, Prime Minister Trudeau warned-

that Quebec (read Levesque) should not take the PQ plan of
an econcmic association or common market for granted if the
province left the confederation.
In the fall of 1977 came the revelation that a security
unit of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had illegally
broken into Parti Quebecois headquarters in Montreal in 1973»
and had seized records and other information. v The PQ
immediately put its propaganda machine into high gear,
charging federal officials with "scandalous acts" and com
paring the RCMP to the Watergate conspiritors. Although
43
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the federal government did

order an investigation of the

RCMP's activities, the PQ spokesmen told reporters that
they had long suspected that the RCMP had been spying on
them, despite the Mounted Police claim that the breakin had been undertaken for reasons of "national security."
At the time of the break-in, Premier Levesque was in
France seeking support for his cause, French President
Valery Giscard d'Estaing told Levesque that he could count
on French "understanding, confidence and support" regardless
of what path Quebec decided to take.

47 Before he left France,

Levesque was named to the Grand Office of the Legion of
Honor by Giscardj but this time France was not about to
provoke an international incident similar to the one de Gaulle
provoked in Quebec in 19&7*
The remainder of 1977 saw both federalists and separatists
jockying for position in the propaganda war for the minds
and hearts of French Canadians* Acrimoneous accusations
were directed by separatists at federalists and viceversa. Separatists charged that the province has lost almost
nine billion dollars since 1961 because of its association
48
with Canada,
They released several polls purportedly showing

49

strong support for independence, '
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In the spring of 1978, Trudeau celebrated his tenth
anniversary as Canada's Prime Minister, and the longestruling democratic leader in the West* Yet, for a man
who had been elected to office largely on a platform of
national

unity, Trudeau might well have wondered if his

ten years in office had amounted to anything* The nation
was more divided that at any time since he had first
been elected in I968 . The Canadian economy had gone from
prosperity to financial slump, and inflation, which had
been at 5*6 percent in 1 9 7 6 , had risen to 9*5 percent by
*
1978. Unemployment had risen from 5*i percent in 197^
to 8*3 percent in January, 1978*
By the spring of 1979, Trudeau's policiticaL fortunes
had suffered a dramatic reversal. The Progressive Con
servatives, led by 39-year old Joe Clark, defeated the
Liberals— large

on economic issues. The Conservatives

won 135 of 282 seats compared with the Liberals*114. ^
Clark's western background— he was b o m

in a small town

at the foot of the Rockies' in Alberta— led many to
suspect that he was not the right man to deal with Quebec
and would not be very sympathetic or effective with the
French Canadians. In an interview on Public Television's
■^"In Office A Decade: Trudeau's Hardest Task, To Keep
Canada Together,” Daily Press. Newnort News, V A , Aoril 6 ,
1978, p. 37.
51
"Clark Leads Conservatives to Victory over Trudeau,"
The Arizona Daily S t a r , Tucson, Arizona, May 23, 1979, p. 2.
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MaoNeil-Lehrer Report. Clark sought to dispel notions
that he could not handle the Quebec issue. He told
Robert MacNeil:
First of all we will make clear that the pro
posal put forward by the government of Quebec
^sovereignty/association/ is absolutely in
compatible with any Canadian federal system
and that it would be most improbable that
there would be any possibility of association
working. They can*t have it both ways; they
can't have political independence and economic
association ... There's just no soft option.
Nevertheless, Clark recognized that Quebec did have legitimate
grievances, and he told MacNeil:
There has grown up in Quebec a legitimate deter
mination to find more cultural freedom as a people.
The great majority of the people of that province
speak French, not English, as their first language.
They have fe.lt far too limited within the context
of our present constitutional arrangements. They
have sensed that the rest of the country, and par
ticularly the former government^were not prepared
to move to make the kind of changes that would
allow them to achieve their cultural freedom here
at home in Canada. So what we've got to do as a
new government is to demonstrate that it is possible
for us to introduce
the kinds of reforms that give
Quebeckers more cultural security and yet remain
within a strong,, large nation. The former govern
ment had taken quite a rigid line on a question
like jurisdictions over resources, which is im
portant in wealth generating terms. I think we
can convince a number of Quebeckers who would
prefer to stay in Canada but who are concerned
that the status quo might force them out. I think
we can persuade these people that they are, with a
new government here, better able to find the future
they've been looking for within a reformed Canadian
federalism. 53
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However much the Quebec issue concerned Clark, it was
his handling of the economy which, by the spring of 1980,
had turned his political

fortunes around. Austerity

measures to cut the inflation rate had produced even
higher unemployment and fear of a major recession. His
advocacy of an 18-cent-per-gallon gasoline tax was strongly opposed throughout Canada*

Clark insisted that the

austerity measures were necessary to rectify years of
"free ride" fiscal policies under the Liberals, but Trudeau
retorted that Clark's budget punished the middle and low
income groups'while hardly touching the affluent.
In the national elections of February 18, 1980, the
Liberals regained their supremacy over the Conservatives,
thus placing Trudeau at the helm once more to deal with
the separatist challenge. ^

Levesque had declared his in

tention to hold a referendum on the issue of "sovereignty/
association" upon his election in 1976, and even before
Clark's defeat Levesque had fired the opening salvo in his
campaign to persuade the province to seek independence•
He introduced a 118-page white paper that recited the long
history of the sensitive relations between English and
French Canada, and asserted that it was too late to strike
up a new relationship within the existing framework. In.
5^
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an emotional appeal to the province*s electorate, Levesque
declared that he expected "at the great crossroads of the
referendum to choose the only road that can open the
horizon and guarantee us a free, proud, and adult national
57
existence •"v
Levesque, however, was careful to dispel the fears
that a "yes” vote in the referendum would mean a sudden
rupture in economic ties with the rest of Canada, for
public opinion polls showed that Quebeckers did not want
58
outright independence."'' The PQ campaign slogans made
no reference, to s e par at ism ,but claimed instead that
sovereignty/association meant that French and English
Quebeckers would live as equals. Federalist opponents
of the P Q , however, charged that a "yes" vote in the
referendum would mean t h e rbreakup of Canada and would place
Quebec in perilous waters. Quebec Liberal leader Claude
Ryan and his supporters argued that the only way for Quebec
to remain in close economic association with Canada was
within the federal system, as one o? Canada’s ten provinces.
Liberals accused the PQ of seeking to obscure the economic
consequences *trhat a breakup of Canada would entail. Polls
immediately prior to

the referendum indicated that 5 ^

percent would vote "yes" to negotiate sovereignty/ as
sociation," but almost the same percentage indicated that
57
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they would reject outright independence.

60

In the wake of the Trudeau vicotry, Levesque announced
that the long-awaited independence referendum would be
61
held on May 20, I98O.
Although he. had not set a definite
date for the referendum on independence when he was elected
in 1976, the choice of this particular time reflected his
belief that the pro-independence forces had gained a
substantial advantage in the pre-referendum campaign.

One

reason for this was that the Canadian Supreme Court had
declared parts of the law making French the sole official
language in Quebec unconstitutional; and although the Court
had confined itself to the relatively narrow issue of langua
used in the provincial legislature, the 9-0 decision called
into question other parts

of the law designed to give the

French language primacy in all walks of life and business.
Levesque immediately seized on the fact that Canada's high
court also struck down a similar law in the western
province of Manitoba, where English
official language in 1890.

was declared the sole

"It took 90 years to clallenge

the Manitoba law, but only two years to overrule Quebec,"
Levesque s a i d . ^
Levesque made the point all through the campaign that a
11yes" vote in the referendum would bring about no abrupt
60
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61
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changes* "We will negotiate and if need be hold another
referendum or elections," he told a Montreal audience,
Trudeau, however, accused Levesque of presenting Quebec
kers with an ambiguous choice* "If they had asked a clear
question to the Quebecois,

*Do you want independence or

not?' the Quebecois would have answered a resounding 'no,'"
said Trudeau* In the closing days of the referendum
campaign, Levesque said that there was a "surge of
solidarity” across the province for a "yes" vote on the
referendum, and he appealed to non-Frdnch groups to join
the "mainstream of solidarity" so that they might share
the victory he was confident of achieving. Public opinion
polls in April showed that ^8 percent of those questioned
supported Levesque, ^3 percent were opposed, with 9
66
percent undecided.
Many observers in both Canada and the United States
anxiously awaited the referendum return. Pollsters said
that the vote was either too close to call or gave the
separatists a slight edge. But when the results were
finally in, it was apparent that the PQ had suffered a
stunning defeat. Liberal Claude Ryan, leader of the
opposition to sovereignty/association, held a

percent

lead over Levesque's forces. Quebecois had said "non" to

T

66

Levesque.
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Prime Minister Trudeau, in a conciliatory gesture,
proposed a new Canadian constitution in a move designed
to reassure Quebec that the "deep aspirations" of its
French-speaking majority would be secured in the new
67
charter.
But 3*000 embittered young nationalists, dis
gruntled by their defeat in the provincial referendum,
marched on a predominantly English-speaking residential
neighborhood in Montreal, breaking windows, throwing
rocks, and clashing with riot police. At least eight
people were seriously injured in the melee. Another
group of 2,000 marched down St. Catherine Street in
Montreal, burning Canadian flags and smashing shop windows.
It was obvious that the separatists* dream of a "free
Quebec" would not die easily.
Trudeau vowed that a brand new constitution would re
place the British North America Act, and he announced that
he would send Finance Minister Jean Chretin to begin ex
ploratory talks with the premiers of all the provinces in
an effort to seek common

ground

for a new constitution.

Trudeau indicated that he was willing to give the provinces
greater

automomy at the expense of the federal government.

His only conditions were 1) that Canada remain a true
67
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federation, with the federal parliament retaining "real
powers," and 2) the new charter include a bill of rights
and freedoms including the provision securing French
linguistic rights.

"For us, everything else is

negotiable," he said. Both Ryan and Trudeau challenged
Levesque to accept the will of the majority and to
participate in good faith and loyalty

"in the development

70
of a new federalism."
In the post-election debate, however, analysts noted
that, despite the federalist victory over the separatists,
t'it

The prevailing view is that the victory of
the federalist forces has, for the time
being, checked the thrust of Quebec's
secession. But the victory was purchased
with large and vague promises from Trudeau,
Ryan, and key English-speaking politicians.
The redemption of these promises causes
more concern for the winners than the losers,
and many argue that there is a long distance
between accepting the need for change and
making specific changes acceptable to all
^
the disparate provinces in this vast country.
As the influential Toronto Globe and Mail put it, "It
should be recognized by Canadians outside Quebec that
when we urge the people of Quebec to vote

'no' we are

committing ourselves to the negotiation of change, real
and possibly wrenching change, in the structure of the
72
confederation as we know it."
69
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF QUEBEC NATIONALISM

The final word on Quebec's relationship with Englishspeaking Canada has, of course, yet to be written, and
thus one cannot point to any clear act, policy or program
that has remedied all of Quebec's complaints while satis
fying at the same time English Canada's conception of
.federalism * Perhaps the only general conclusion that can
be drawn is^that, if history is any indication, the Quebec
"problem" may not be resolved for decades or even centuries
to come. As Marcel Rioux claims,

"It is almost four centuries'

since Champlain founded Quebec. Why is there today more
than ever a Quebec 'question*1 • •• a question asked for
1
such a long time that it is flagrantly up to date."
If we accept the question posed by Rioux, then all of
the issues raised in this thesis, federalism, nationalism,
constitutional reform,

separatist parties, and particulrly
✓
the rise of the Parti Quebepois, are really elements of
a larger issue, namely, can Canada and will Canada be able
to devise a solution to allow French and English-speaking
Canadians to live in harmony? Or will these groups continue
1

Marcel Rioux, Quebec in Question, trans• James Boake
(Toronto: James, Lewis and Samuel, 1971)» P* 3«
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to struggle in the coming years within an uneasy and un
satisfactory arrangement that suits neither side? One
may legitimately ask, given the history of the tempestuous
relationship between French and English-speaking Canada,
whether there will be more Riels, Papineaus, Schoeters's
and Levesques, The researcher of these questions senses
that the answer may lie with those who are adept at using
a crystal ball, rather than with those who rely on the
empirical data and statistics of political science. Lacking
such clairvoyance, I can only hope to draw some general
conclusions ''from the information set forth in previous
chapters•
It can be seen that there continues to be a strong
sense of identity among French Canadians with respect to
their language, customs, and homeland, Quebec, Nationalist
sentiment, like the folkways of tribal cultures, is passed
from generation to generation. The youthful French Canadians
✓

who supported the Parti Quebepois in the elections of 1976,
1982, and the referendum campaign of .I98I have much in
common with their ancestors who.

fought alongside Papineau

and answered the call of the Saint Jean Baptiste Society,
Is this nationalism strong because Quebeckers feel a
natural sense of pride in their own language, heritage and
institutions, or is French Canadian nationalism merely
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a reaction to the presence of the "outside threat," the
"oppressive

foreigner," the English Canadian and the

"Yankee" American? Will nationalism take the more
peaceful forms of the Saint Jean Baptiste Society, or
does the future hold the prospect that radical terrorist
groups, like the FLQ,will again emerge to express French
Canadian frustrations through bombings, kidnappings, and
other forms of violence? Will Quebeckers be content to
confine their nationalist aspirations to socialist or
social democratic forms, or will fascist, communist or
nihilist forms of nationalism take the place of the more
moderate expression of French Canadian nationalism?
My conclusion is that Quebec nationalists will continue
to use the ballot box as their primary means of expressing
nationalist sentiment, especially now that they have a
viable separatist party at their disposal that is clearly
capable of winning elections. Moreover, the PQ shows ample
evidence that it will remain on the political scene in
Quebec for at least the immediate future. Thus, nationalists
will use the electoral option unless English Canada shows
a complete unwillingness to show appropriate sensitivity
to Quebec's language and takes regressive steps to confine
French Canadians to a subordinate position in the life of the
nation.
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As for how accommodation will be achieved between the
two clutures, perhaps some answers lie in the new Canadian
constitution. The patriation of the constitution in 1982
marked a milestone in Canadian political history. Certainly
it may be said that, of the democratic governments of the
twentieth century, Canada was an anomaly in that ite constitution
could only be changed by a foreign government. With the
patriation of the constitution, Canada has now assumed both
the form and substance of an independent nation,
2
national character for the first time."

"a true

The new* constitution's provisions that are of greatest
concern to Quebec are, of course, those dealing with minority
rights and the treatment of the French language. The ques
tion remains whether the entrenchment in the constitution
of French Canadian language rights, to safeguard French
Canada's mother tongue, will be any more effective than,
say, the First and Fifteenth amendments of the U.S.
Constitution have been in protecting the rights of blacks,
hispanics, and other minorities in the United States? What
is more, while minorities in the United States may, on
occasion, offer convincing proof that their rights to fair
housing, non-discriminatory employment and freedom from
racial harrassment have been violated, the French Canadian
cannot bring suit against a British Columbia innkeeper,
an Alberta restauranteur, or an Ontario government official
2
"Canada's Constitutional Reform Gains," The Denver Post,
December 3» 1981, p. 25A.

simply because one, or all, of these individuals is unable
to communicate with him in French, which he is accustomed
to in Quebec.
What the constitution can guarantee is that the French
Canadian will be able to carry on an active dialogue with
his federal government in his own language; that his
province, whether it be Quebec, Manitoba, Ontario, or any
other province, will not abridge his right to maintain
schools where his language may be taught, and where his
religion and customs may be practiced. He must be certain
that his institutions will not be abolished or persecuted
simply because they are different from those of the majority
in any province.
In chapter III on federalism, I discussed the consociational model of elite compromise and accommodation.
It was demonstrated that the consociational model no longer
effectively operates to diminish conflict, and this
hypothesis appears to have gained additional support during
the constitutional negotiations of 1980. Levesque
constitutional proposals which

obstructed

would make illegal the

parts of Quebec's language law (Bill 101) which declared
French as the

sole official language of Quebec. Federal-

provincial discord escalated during the constitutional
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Perhaps, however, we may he seeing a new form of
consociational democracy taking place, hot involving the
elites, but rather the direct accommodation of the electorate
to reduce tensions. Levesque's leadership was rejected in
Quebec when a proposal for sovereignty/association was voted
down in the referendum of 1980. This may be an indication
that, while one of Quebec's elite's— specifically the PQ—
wishes to see cleavages exacerbated, the general population
is doing what it can, through the ballot box, to reduce
tensions between Quebec, its sister provinces and Ottawa.
The Future of Levesque and the Parti Quebecois
At the time of the PQ defeat in the referendum on
sovereignty/association in 1981, many felt that the days
of the PQ as a majority government were numbered. However,
many federalists, and even other observers, were surprised
when the PQ was re-elected by a comfortable margin in the
1981 provincial election. It garnered 80 of 122 seats in
the Quebec National Assembly, as opposed to
for
0
the Liberal party. This victory could do nothing but fuel
sentiment for separatism, and Quebec's Education Minister,
Camille Laurin, told a cheering election-victory crowd that
Q

"soon we will be making Quebec a country."7
8
"Separatists Win Handily in Quebec Election," The Denver
Post, April 14, I98I , p. 3 .
9

.
Ibid.

In Ottawa, Prime Minster Trudeau and his Liberal
government were obviously dismayed. The PQ victory
gave Levesque what he felt was a mandate t,o take a
tough position on the issue of the patriation of the
constitution, which came before the federal parliament
in late 1981. It is also certain that Levesque's victory
gave him further encouragement to implement and enforce
the province's strict language laws regarding the use
of French,
In. the later half of 1982 and the first months of
1983» however, Levesque's popularity appears to have
suffered a steep downturn, A recent poll in 1983 showed
10
that he had only a 25 percent approval rating, and even a
longtime-separatist and early supporter of Levesque,
Pierre Bourgault, wrote that Levesque makes independence
"look like the worst possible thing that could happen
to Quebec,""Indeed," Bourgault claimed,

"when he now says

he doesn't have enough power within the confines of con
federation, I can only say 'thank God he doesn't have more
11
powers, what would he do then?'"
Many also claim that Levesque has badly mismanaged
the province's economy. Currently, Quebec has the highest
unemployment rate in Canada, 1^ percent, which is two
percentage points above the national average. In addition,
10
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it is estimated that 160,000 people have left the province,
the vast majority of them members of the English-speaking
12
minority. Following the example of Sun-Life, the nation's
largest insurance company, which moved its headquarters
from Montreal to Toronto, the Bank of Montreal recently
warned that it, too, may relocate outside the province.
There

also appears to be growing dissatisfaction,
/

_

even among French -speaking Quebegois, concerning Levesque’s
language legislation. For example, a hotel owner near the
Maine border was cited recently for displaying a sign that
read "Bar Open," prompting one Quebec citizen to refer to
the enforcers of the the language legislation as "tongue
*3.
troopers." .Levesque, meanwhile, continues to insist
that he will press forward with his original objectives
for "sovereignty/association."
A comprehensive appraisal of Rene Levesque's career
would be premature at this time, for he has not been in
office long enough to be judged either a failure or
success in the eyes of his only major constituency, the
Quebegois. What may be said with certainty in 1983 is
that Levesque has succeeded in using French Canadian
assertiveness in the areas of language and minority rights
to his political advantage. While some ridiculed his
12
Ibid.
13

Ib id •
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proposals in 19?6 , and were certain that he would be
defeated in the next provincial election, they have been
proven w ro n g , as the 1981 election shows.
In examining Levesque's political style, one is temp
ted to make comparisons beteen him and the Frenchman who
shouted "vivre le Quebec libre" from the balcony of the
Montreal City Hall in 1967, Charles de Gaulle, Like de Gaulle,
Levesque used the referendum on the sovereignty/association
issue in 1980, and de Gaulle used the referendum on the
question of the direct election of the ^resident of France
14
in I9 6 2, Interestingly, de Gaulle himself proposed a
"sovereignty/association” arrangement for Algeria in lieu
of complete independence when his program for dealing with
the Algerian crisis of the early i960 Vs failed to satisfy
the FLN. 15
Other comparisons are also appropriate. For example,
de Gaulle based his world-view on the primacy of the nation
state, and jealously guarded French

sovereignty against

encroachment by any regional organization that proposed
16
European unity at the expense of French sovereignty.
Similarly, Levesque views Quebec as a nation-state and is
making every effort to see that the province's sovereignty
is not compromised in a federal system. One could also hold
14

Henry W, Ehrmann, Politics in France(Boston * Little,
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that both Levesque and de Gaulle used the "politics of 'no,'"
17
or the veto. De Gaulle dramatically withdrew French forces
from NATO and vetoed Britain's entry into the Common Market.
Levesque has employed similar tactics at federal-provincial
conferences. For example, he tried to veto Trudeau's move
18
to patriate the constitution. De Gaulle also used the
"politics of the empty chair" at conferences and negotiations,
a gesture intended to detract from the legitimacy of the
proceedings by dramatizing the absence of an important
partner who could argue that he had not been consulted on
the issue and that any agreement was not binding, therefore,
19’
o n ’the French people. Rather than boycott an important
conference, however, Levesque has chosen to be present-and vocal--in his denunciation of any policy with which
he disagrees. It is only after he fails to obtain what
he wants from federal or provincial leaders that he threatens
to go his own way. History has shown, however, that Levesque's
threats are" more of a nuisance, to bog down proceedings, than
an actual plan of action which he intends to carry out.
Trudeau and French Canada
As Trudeau's biographer, George Radwanski

points out,

"At the most simplistic level, it is possible to say that
a separatist government is now In power in Quebec, the risk
17
Edward A. Kolodziei, French International Policy under
de Gaulle and Pompidou (Ithaca: Cornell University Press"] 1974) ,

pT 46T
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of the breakup of the confederation is more immediate than
in 1968, and therefore Trudeau has failed to achieve his
principal objective. But that would reduce the exceedingly
complex interplay of historical, social, and political
20
forces to a mindless syllogism.”
The careful observer, however, can be more generous
than Radwanski, for the PQ has now been in power almost
seven years and Quebec has not left the confederation.
Trudeau’s decision to run for Prime Minister in 1978, after
having served longer than any other elected leader of the
free world, is understandable in the context of his aspira
tions. Another leader, perhaps, would have been content to
let someone else take the helm of the nation after having
completed such a long, and often frustrating, tenure in
office. But Trudeau wished to see at least some of his ob
jectives come to fruition and refused to leave at a time
when the confederation needed the presence of a French
Canadian prime minister to deal with Quebec separatism and
the constitutional issues that remained unresolved.
At 6k 9 Trudeau will probably not remain Canada’s leader
much longer. But he may decide to stay in the game until
Levesque is no longer in charger of the government of Quebec.
Trudeau views Levesque as his nemessis; Levesque views

Trudeau

as his. The contest for Quebec may be determined by which of
the two has the greatest political longevity.
20George Radwanski, Trudeau (Mew York! Taplinger Press,
1968), p. 311.
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Obstacles to Independence-Present and Future
Despite the PQ*s sweeping victory in I98I , there are
a number of obstacles to achieving independence through
the electoral process* The very nature of attempting to
achieve independence through the electoral process creates
problems for the PQ for, as the campaign for independence
becomes immersed in the process of elections, other issues,
21

of which the separatist cause is only one, come to the fore*
While individuals may support separatism in opinion polls,
in the context of elections they may find other issues more
important, such as the state of the economy* Examples of
this can be found in the substantial number of Francophones
who declared themselves supporters of Quebec independence yet
voted for the anti-separatist Liberal party in the elections
of I970 and 1973* Conversely, individuals who do not believe
in separatism may see the separatist party as a vehicle for
registering economic protest, or other kinds of dissatisfaction,
as the 1976 election appears to demonstrate. Finally, separatist
leaders may be tempted to water-down their commitment to
separatism in order to maintain their anti-separatist
electoral clientele* This appears to have been the case with
the PQ's election strategy in 1976, and again in I98I.
In addition to the above-mentioned factors, which in
volve the general environment In which the FQ must operate,
there are also a number of important issues which the party
21

Dale Postgate and Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: Social
Change and Political Crisis (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1976). p. 193.
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must settle internally if it wishes to be successful in
the future* The first of these is that the PQ faces the
challenge of maintaining the-support of a wide-ranging
clientele which may share little more than a general
commitment to independence, and which may have different
and contradictory interests regarding other issues* With
respect to this first point, Postgate and IvlcRoberts
point out,
The most obvious conflict among Parti Quebe^ois
clientele is the conflict among economic groups.
An interesting dilemma for the PQ is that, just
as the "new middle class" and working class
Francophones may be led by quite different
grievances to support Quebec independence, so
they may have quite contradictory expectations
of what Quebec independence would accomplish;
one group seeking to continue the technocratic,
political modernization of the "Quiet Revolution"
and the other seeking to bring the Quebeci^govern
ment firmly under working-class control*
These tensions were evident in 1971 when the PQ was
asked to show its solidarity with Quebec's militant trade
unions. Although the PQ has managed to avoid major conflict
among groups which support it, this does not mean that it
will continue to be successful. There continue to be radical
elements among the PQ's supporters, such as Marxists and leftwing militants, who see a class struggle within the Francophone
community and want an independence movement that is on the
22

Ibid.
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side of the Francophone working class. The leftists are
often dismayed by the readiness of the Parti Qnehegols
to accept a continued role for private enterprise within
any new Quebec state, and even to accept American invest
ment. "For many left-wingers," Postgate and McRoberts
point out, "it is not possible to 'civilize* American
23
capital."
In addition, division exists among adherents
of the Quebec independence movement concerning the place
that Anglophones should have within the new Qbebec state.
The PQ would allow English language schools to*persist,
but the total enrollment would be fixed according to the
proportion of Anglophones within the new Quebec state at
the time of the first census. New immigrants would be
required to attend French schools. PQ conventions have
witnessed intense struggles between "moderate" and "radical"
factions over this issue. The authority of Rene*Levesque
has at times been necessary to maintain support for the
24
"moderate" position.
One may thus conclude that, in 1983, the Parti Quebegois,
despite some internal division, is

strong as a political

force in the province and that, at least for the immediate
future, the PQ will continue to shape the province's political
system. Indeed, the PQ has succeeded in transforming the
23
Ibid., p. 194.
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province's party system from one dominated by the Liberals
and the Union Nat ionale t to a two-party system dominated
by the Liberals and the PQ, What makes the PQ different
from past third party movements is that "the strong
✓
commitment of the Parti Quebecois voters to the party's
ideology differentiates it from the other 'successful'
third party, the federal Social Credit party. Whereas
the Social Credit party may be able to attribute some
of its success to economic protest, the PQ's success has
been based on a combination of economic protest and the
presence of widespread support for the PQ's separatist
26
ideology
This helps to explain its success," Further,
by Postgaije and McRoberts' measure,

"Purely economic

dissatisfaction could have been contained within the
existing Liberal-Union Nationale two-party system? without
an ideologically based rejection of these parties, there
would not have been as great a need to turn to a third
27
partjr,"
The contest between separatists and federalists will
undoubtedly continue, even after the passing of Levesque
and Trudeau, Until such time as Quebeckers are supremely
confident that they will be able to cope with the economic
consequences of independence, a separate state of Quebec
Ibid.. p. 192.
Ibid.
27
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will not materialize* But, until then, Quebecois will
certainly use the separatist movement, and organizations
like the Parti Quebecois, as bargaining chips to obtain
concessions from Ottawa* In this respect, Quebec may
have a tool at its disposal that is unique to any province
in the worlds a method to wring concessions from the
central government by a continued threat to leave the
confederation, to secede without actually having to secede*
Such an arrangement may be described as blackmail, but at
least it is a "crime" that can be committed without bloodshed,
without civil war, something that neither federalists nor
separatists wish to see. The relationship between French
and English Canada was observed by a leading French Canadian
politician shortly after confederation and is, perhaps, as
accurate today as it was in 1867« He said, "English and
French, we climb a double flight of stairs towards the
destinies reserved for us on this continent, without knowing
each other, without meeting each other, and without even
seeing each other, except on the landing of politics."

28

28
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